Actors and victims: Understanding the trends and the use of indiscriminate violence in conflicts

Research Question: Does the embedding of actors in a conflict cause an escalation in indiscriminate violence against civilians?

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By

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ABSTRACT

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Advisor: Professor Ismene Gizelis

In this thesis, I explore the different strategic positions, which actor(s) adopted during the decade-long Nepalese conflict (1996-2006). Firstly, I demonstrate who the actors of the conflict are, and establish why it is important to rethink the way actor(s) in a conflict are categorised. Secondly, I establish how the identified actors, are not static, but uncover how actors can adopt three strategic positions (i.e., *embeddedness, fixed, and temporarily-deployed*). I then present the theoretical framework; I developed for this thesis, entitled the *Concept of Embeddedness*. The *Concept of Embeddedness* addresses the conditions in which civilians experience indiscriminate violence during conflicts. I show how the strategic movement and positioning of actors within conflict zones renders civilians "piggies-in-the-middle," as they are wedged between embedded actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on temporary deployment to the zone. I attempt to demonstrate how the position of *embeddedness* triggers *temporarily-deployed* and *fixed* actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians in different zones. I propose that the use of indiscriminate violence against

civilians through the practice of embeddedness (i.e., actors becoming embedded in a zone) occurs under two conditions: First, when an embedded actor resorts to the use of indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population. Second, when fixed, but largely *temporarily-deployed*, actors use indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. The key distinction here is between embedded actors and the targets of indiscriminate violence. Using an original survey collected from 517 respondents in Nepal, across 16 districts, with combined datasets from a local human rights group, an international dataset, and interviews with 38 Nepalese elite civil society members. I show that *embeddedness* can lead actors to use indiscriminate violence on civilians. I focus exclusively on the Nepalese conflict and extracting examples from the second Sudanese conflict (1983 to 2005), the Peruvian conflict (1980-2000) and the current South Sudanese conflict (2013 to present day). I demonstrate how indiscriminate violence was distributed and how the *Concept of Embeddedness* can account for some incidents of indiscriminate violence used on civilians.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APF	Armed Police Force
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN	Communist Party of Nepal
CPN-M	Communist Party of Nepal Maoist
CPP	Conflict Prevention Programme
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DV	Dependent Variable
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDLR	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
INSEC	Informal Sector Service Centre
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
IV	Independent Variable
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PLA	The People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime Minister
POC	Protections of Civilians
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
RNA	Royal Nepalese Army
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SL	Sendero Luminoso
SLA	Sudanese Liberation Army
SP	Shining Path
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
TADO	Terrorist and Disruptive Ordinance
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UCDP-OSV	Uppsala Conflict Data Program One Sided Violence Dataset
UCDP-BRD	Uppsala Conflict Data Program Battle Related Deaths Dataset
UCPN	Unified Communist Party of Nepal
UHV	Upper Huallaga Valley
UML	Unified Marxist–Leninist
UN	United Nations
UNDPKO	United Nation Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UK	United Kingdom
UNIPR	United Nations Integration and Rehabilitation Programme
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPC	United People's Committee

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation

Across the globe, conflicts are devastating the lives of people and communities.[1] As I write this thesis, the conflict in Syria has entered its eighth year, with no end in sight. The conflict in South Sudan, which started in 2013, has become more prolonged in nature, and more warring actors (i.e., agents, combatants, defectors, rebels, army, police, and perpetrators) are involved in the conflict today than at the start of the conflict. Civilians are routinely killed in selective and indiscriminate attacks. This violence undermines not only community cohesion in the short term, but existing structures that help strengthen and foster peaceful co-existence between societies in the long term. In 2016, more than 31 million new internal displacements occurred due to conflict, violence, and disasters.[2] Faced with such violence, millions of civilians are compelled to either stay or flee their homes in search of safety.

This has prompted many researchers, policy makers, and practitioners (in conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and humanitarian aid) to try to understand why governments and rebels use violence against their own populations in conflict. This interest has produced a range of literature on the subject. Previous work distinguishes between violence based on selective targeting and violence based on indiscriminate practices against civilians (Kalyvas, 2006, Hultman 2012). In this thesis, I examine the conceptualisation of the role of actor(s) and try to move beyond static models of

[1] https://www.unocha.org/story/humanitarian-appeal-2017-climbs-235-billion-record-141-million-people-need-assistance (accessed on 10/9/2017)
[2] http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2017/ (accessed on 10/9/2017)

actors' positions (rebel verses government forces definition of actors), by redefining the mechanisms that underpin the use of indiscriminate violence.

The term actor is developed in *Chapter three*, but for introductory purposes, I extend this to include military personnel, policy, armed police, hired state militia, secret service forces, rebels, splinter groups, absorbed groups and ethnic or local groups. The term "actors" as Galtung points out, goes beyond more than two parties to a conflict (Galtung 1994) and refers here to the various groups, people, or institutional state mechanisms involved in any conflict. The term is expanded to include state authorities (e.g., the police, military, security services, and paid militia groups) and rebel groups seeking to remove the state, to include defected groups, smaller rebel groups, and local ethnic groups with a role in the conflict. The definition is restricted to all potential actors within an intrastate conflict context or setting. This incorporates individuals who have obtained at least some measure of political power through an identified group and/or authority within certain location(s) in a country or conflict setting. These actors may also engage in activities that can have a significant influence on decisions, policies, and outcomes of a conflict, which may alter the dynamics and decision of key actors and shape the overall patterns of violence in a conflict by actors. Actors are key influencers who can change the strategic situation or location of a group fighting within a conflict, resulting in the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

To date, most theories and empirical studies have concluded that the state's use of indiscriminate violence incites insurgent attacks (Lyall, 2009). Such violence is highly counterproductive because it creates new grievances, while forcing victims to seek security, if not safety, among rebels. While existing literature does explore

aspects of whether the use of indiscriminate violence may be the result of the strategic position an actor assumes, not all researchers have explored the mechanisms which impact the strategic positions actors undertake to determine if this influences the use of indiscriminate violence. A subcategory of this question is*:* Would certain strategic positions employed by actors increase in the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians?'

In this thesis, I define indiscriminate violence as significant political or non-political violence within an intrastate conflict which results in acts of violence and the killing of civilians. Indiscriminate violence can be physical (Riches, 1986) or structural (Uvin 1998), and takes place within a conflict setting and is used alongside structural institutions like state actors. Indiscriminate violence includes any action in support of defeating actors or civilians seen to be linked to an opposing side. I focus on collective and random acts of violence and killings, abuse of human rights restricted to the physical abuse of civilians (torture, rape, and abduction), by actors within an intrastate conflict. I believe that most indiscriminate violence occurs around strategic military operations and is a consequence of the strategic positions that actors can undertake during periods of fighting within a conflict. I will later show in this thesis that indiscriminate violence is not induced merely because of a lack of information. While I acknowledge the role of information to the use of indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas, 2006), even when information was at hand, police forces during the Nepalese conflict (1996-2006) still used violence against civilians indiscriminately. The manifestation of indiscriminate violence in this thesis I believe will take place when actors' party to a conflict assume a strategic position which poses a risk to the opposing warring actor. This results in the opposing actor adjusting their tactic and

strategic positions and assuming a different tactical position to respond to the new strategic position of their enemies. The new anticipated position may be intended to counter the new measures placed on the actors and the disadvantage this readjustment creates if a battle were to occur. Adjustments in strategic positions may also occur because the new position from the opposing actor becomes a threat to the actors overall strategic aim of winning. This causes the opposing warring actors to readjust their current position to respond to a potential attack by the actor who has changed their strategic position. This I suggest, means in any conflict, indiscriminate violence is used by, and moves with, actors who can access this form of violence through their strategic positions.

I propose in this thesis that actors assume different strategic positions over the course of a conflict and these positions are not stationary throughout the conflict. The fluctuation of actors' positions can change over time and space and this contributes to the continuous alteration of zones throughout a conflict. This means indiscriminate violence will continue to move with the altering zones and with the actors that access it as a resource. I discuss this argument in *Chapter Two* and *Three,* where I show how this argument differs from earlier theories that discuss information asymmetry as one of the core causes of indiscriminate violence. Indiscriminate violence is likely to coincide, partially, with an actor's inability to restrain themselves in response to external conditions shaped by other actors positioning or repositioning themselves during a conflict. Indiscriminate violence includes circumstances in which actors impose pain on the nearest person within their reach. Bystanders may refer to the violent behaviour as 'irrational', 'wild', and 'random' but at the centre of its action is

a strategic purpose. While the targets of the violence are random, the behaviour is intentionally designed to gain compliance and control, cause damage, scare, and hurt the civilian populations. I argue that, in most cases, indiscriminate violence may occur near embedded actors or in areas to which temporarily-deployed actors are sent or located. The use of indiscriminate violence is not location restricted but is instead fluid, and moves with the actors that assume different strategic positions and use indiscriminate violence at any point to defeat their enemies or control civilian populations. However, the outcome of indiscriminate violence is underpinned by the actor adopting a strategic position. In some situations, actors will not move because they are not challenged by their enemy but still use indiscriminate violence to control civilian populations which they intend to govern. Other actors may examine their circumstances and decide it is best continue to move to avoid the prospects of defeat. Therefore, the use of indiscriminate violence revolves around an actor's desire and access to frequently be reassessing their strategic position and taking on new tactical positions to reach their overall objective of winning or avoiding defeat.

To further the concept of strategic positions, I examine in *Chapter Three,* the different strategic positions that I believe actors undertake during conflicts. This is done by examining how the strategic positions contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. I suggest that the different strategic positions actors assume within a conflict contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. So, it is important to understand the different strategic positions that actors adopt to fully comprehend the use and movement of indiscriminate violence. In this thesis, I identify three strategic positions (i.e., embedded, temporarily-deployed and fixed) that

I argue contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. This is done by exploring the nature of each position, how each position is assumed, and how this leads to indiscriminate violence against civilians. As previously noted, there are some actors in a conflict that are more likely to remain in a position for extended periods than others. These actors may also be likely to live amongst civilian populations for extended periods while launching several attacks against their enemies. This was a strategy used by the Shining Path (SP) leader Manuel Rubén Abimael Guzmán during the two-decade conflict in Peru (1980-2000) (Yaworsky, 2009). The Shining Path's strategies involved living with and recruiting civilian populations. Their strategy orbited around adopting different strategic positions within different zones and causing a certain level of confusion for the state actors (state actors whom the SP was fighting). The SP strategy was to highlight the rural revolution, establish liberated zones, and encircle cities (Kent, 1993; 441). The strategy also involved living and embedding actors amongst civilian populations and then triggering a reaction by hiding amongst civilians during battle periods.

This offers my first strategic position derived from the strategic element of living amongst civilians for extended periods, the establishment of liberated zones and the encirclement of cities, which I define in this thesis as *embeddedness*. *Embeddedness* is defined as the position and time in which an actor is deeply rooted and concealed in a surrounding population of civilians during a conflict. The term 'surrounding population' means when actors encircle civilian populations in a specific location within a zone or liberated zone which is controlled by embedded actors. Embeddedness can occur when an actor goes from being temporarily-deployed or

fixed[3] (holding battle positions) to staying in a zone for extended periods of time. This period can be months up to years. The nature of embeddedness involves living and camouflaging amongst a civilian population, establishing liberated zones, launching attacks that may involve using civilians as a shield for cover and controlling geographical locations which leads to the establishment of controlled zones. Embeddedness involves an actor being sent to a stationary positioned (holding battle positions) for extended periods of time. Embeddedness does not include short periods (i.e., a few days amongst civilians) since this setup suggests that actors are not committed and will move on or be required to adjust their strategic position because of a potential attack. Thus, an actor may go from being temporarily-deployed to fixed and then embedded or start from being fixed (deployed for a length of time or recruited from the zone) and then embedded. Embeddedness can involve an actor being permanently embedded amongst civilians from the moment of deployment. Thus, to be embedded actors either have to: have their movement restricted outside of a zone or a liberated area which they control; or have to be within a contested zone (where no one party has full control) or uncontested zone (e.g., controlled by the military).

The second strategic position is defined as *fixed* position and is the position and time when an actor is either recruited for battle from a zone or stays in the zone from the start of being fixed in the zone. An example of this position is taken from the Peruvian conflict. At the beginning of the mid-1960s, the Shining Path set up a vast network of supporters and followers in the rural areas of the southern Andean departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac. This was done primarily through the control

[3] I will come to the two remaining positions (temporarily deployed to fixed) in the next two paragraphs.

of areas and faculty at the Universidad Nacional San Cristbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho (Degregori 1990). Controlling areas, faculty and curriculum provided adherents for the Shining Path, with a mechanism for recruiting revolutionary cadres from the population of provincial youths who accounted for many of the students at the university. This gave the Shining Path with invaluable opportunities, including the use of teaching positions, to diffuse its revolutionary message, the creation of a widespread network of local sympathizers who would join and support the SP in the countryside. It created a geographical basis for the creation of territorial strongholds and eventually of so-called liberated zones, once the armed struggle was initiated. The nature of fixed position is cantered on the recruitment process of locals to a group of actors who have just started their strategic foothold in a liberated or controlled zone. This position will require actors to be recruited and stationed in zones for longer periods of time than their temporarily-deployed counterparts. Fixed actors tend to hold defensive positions during a conflict. Occasionally, they may be required to deflect warring parties who try to attack uncontested or contested territory. Fixed actors are familiar with their zones of control because they are either recruited from these zones or have remained there for intermediate to extended periods. As such, they can disguise themselves naturally amongst civilians.

The position includes the effective control of geographically based zones which lead to the establishment of a controlled area. The strategy of a fixed actor is about the recruitment and creation of full-fledged, territorial-based zones or areas for the fixed actors. This strategy is characterized by an actor’s ability to compete openly with the forces of the established state and administratively by imposing territorial units and structure of governance on the civilian populations, as in the case with embedded actors. Depending on the nature and duration of a conflict, fixed actors may be

deployed to a different zone within their current zone for several days or weeks to reinforce their zones of control. This makes the differentiation between the fixed actors (who can later become embedded) and the civilian population difficult. In some situations, fixed actors may be asked to move through to another side of the zone to provide reinforcements, defend zones, and assist fellow actors. Fixed actors have much more fluidity than embedded actors, as fixed actors can still move within a liberated or controlled zone while an embedded actor will remain fixed within a zone of control.

The final position I define as *temporarily-deployed,* is the position and time when actors from all sides of the conflict are sent or deployed to a zone for short periods of time. This is often done to identify the enemy or capture the opposition's zone that may have been attacked by another actor's zone. Often this position may involve trying to counteract 'hide and seek' tactics that are used against a strong or weak side. Actors using this positioning strategy will often try to siege liberated zones controlled by opposing actors. The nature of this position may revolve around counterinsurgency measures (e.g., acted out by state forces) or hit and run tactics (e.g., acted out by rebels) prompted by opposing actors. The nature of this position may encompass a strategy of prevention by actors on all sides and may be a forward front to dealing with an opposing actor. For example, the state of Peru's counterinsurgency campaign in 1983 prevented the creation of a permanent territorial base in the departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac, which later led to the expansion of insurgent operations northward in the central Andes. In the mid-1980s, the insurgents advanced into the rainforest region of the upper Huallaga Valley and onto the Altiplano in the Southern Andes. Lima and its surrounding shantytowns were included in insurgent activities by

the late 1980s. In response to this, the state temporarily-deployed various militia, police, and military groups to deal with the implanting of SP actors amongst civilians (Kent, 1993).

The temporary deployment of actors is not simply restricted to battling the opposing side. It can also be done to oppose a strategic move or position intended to be implemented by an opposing side, with the aim of apprehending key actors or groups in contested and uncontested zones. On the rebel's side the strategy can often resemble the actors' conducting a form of mobile warfare without a home. While on the state side, activities carried out by the police, army or armed police will differ in characteristics, since it encompasses short-term deployment to zones where embedded or fixed actors may or may not be based. Nonetheless, the counterinsurgent measures are designed to deal with embedded and fixed actors. This strategic position is characterised by the ephemeral nature of a rebel actor's activities and the rebel's tentative confrontation of the state. For example, in Peru, the strategy and tactics of the Shining Path included important geographical elements to overthrow the successive democratic government through hit-and-run tactics which caused pain for the civilian populations and the state. The position involved temporarily-deployed actors being sent to zones for strategic motives (e.g., to commit violence or havoc, or for defensive and offensive purposes) (Olson, 1993).

Actors who are temporarily-deployed to a zone, depending on their strategic assignment, are normally sent to either assist their allies or to combat warring actors who may be embedded or fixed in these zones. Temporarily-deployed actors, in many cases, are required to enter civilian populations to reach their assigned zones. They are unlikely to live with civilians for extended periods but may have some

associations with certain civilian groups along the way. Along the route to their assigned zones, temporarily-deployed actors may be ordered to seek out warring groups (often for offensive or defensive reasons) that pose a threat to their deployed zones or their overall strategy. In other cases, temporarily-deployed actors may arrive at their assigned location without the occurrence of fighting between the warring actors', but they may later be attacked or ambushed by other actors in these zones.

As part of my main contribution, I propose that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians through the practice of *embeddedness* (i.e., actors becoming embedded in a zone) occurs under two conditions: First, when an embedded actor resorts to the use of indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population; second, when *fixed*, but largely *temporarily-deployed*, actors use indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. The key distinction here is between embedded actors and the targets of indiscriminate violence. In the proceeding chapters, I argue that these three strategic positions interact with one another, triggering the use of indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese conflict. I will show that these three-strategic positions are constantly interacting with each other and as a result, conflicts are likely see dynamic changes in zones of control because of these positions. I then go on to argue, that these the interaction of these positions are what causes the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Because of the strategic positioning and movement of actors, I expect indiscriminate violence to be largely triggered by the behaviour of actors that are often embedded among civilians. Indiscriminate violence will also be used by temporarily-deployed and embedded actors to gain control and spread compliance among civilians, by actors who view

civilians as a threat to their existence (White, 1989, p. 328). In other words, the use of indiscriminate violence is more likely to be observed in zones where either embedded or temporarily-deployed actors are present. Civilians living within these zones are more likely to experience intractable behaviour and become "piggies in the middle" wedged between the different actors of the conflict within the zone they inhabit.

I will then demonstrate through encounters, strategic deployment, and movement of actors and key events that *embeddedness* can help to determine when and where civilians experience indiscriminate violence during a conflict. To understand how to better protect civilians in conflict, this thesis will examine the decade-long conflict in Nepal and explore issues surrounding the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during this conflict. The aim is not only to understand how indiscriminate violence is used and moves during this conflict, but to also contribute to a growing body of literature aiming to strengthen the protection of civilian mechanisms in armed conflict. This thesis aims to further provide insight into the use of indiscriminate violence in armed conflict and to demonstrate that the indiscriminate violence in Syria and South Sudan is preventable. This is achieved by focusing in-depth on the Nepalese conflict and extracting examples of embeddedness and other strategic positions, from the second Sudanese conflict (1983 to 2005), the Peruvian conflict (1980 to 2000), and the current South Sudanese conflict (2013 to present). It is important to note that the nature of embeddedness and its causality is what this thesis sets out to explore and to an extent, examines how the duration of embeddedness impacts the use of indiscriminate violence. Since the systematic data required to understand this duration element is not fully available, it becomes difficult to focus on the time aspect on embeddedness entirely. I will show that indiscriminate violence

during the Nepalese decade-long conflict occurred because the actors' party to the conflict assumed strategic positions which had a tactical element attached to it. As argued above, actors can assume three strategic positions (embedded, fixed, or temporarily-deployed) that facilitate the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

Diverse methodological approaches were employed in this thesis, including an original survey with 517 respondents across 16 districts in Nepal, combined datasets from local human-rights' activists with an international dataset, and interviews with 38 elites across Nepal. Nepal was selected for two main reasons: first, interesting trends pertaining to battle-related deaths and one-sided violence against civilians appear in the existing data on the conflict (UCDP, 2014). The patterns that emerged in the Nepalese conflict led me to question whether the observed use of indiscriminate violence was a consequence of embeddedness; second, I found in the existing data an opportunity to test the concept of embeddedness and conduct an in-depth examination of the phenomenon within a real-life context. Thus, my primary results focus on the impact of the strategic positions of warring actors and their use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. I focus on understanding the strategic positions actors assume in a conflict, and how these positions influence indiscriminate violence used against civilians. I describe the types of indiscriminate violence respondents experienced, beyond human rights' violations, to provide a better understanding of the use of indiscriminate violence during the conflict. However, the effects of indiscriminate violence on the civilian population are not the focus of this thesis.

To understand how indiscriminate violence is used, I first explore the different actors in a conflict, and how these actors can assume different strategic positions during a conflict. If an actor's position during a conflict can fluctuate, from being fixed in one area to non-fixed in another area, this suggests during a conflict that the actors position never is static and that actors have access to different positions which can alter over the course of the conflict. It also suggests that depending on the position assumed by an actor; an actor maybe (depending on the strategic position) able to control the degrees of violence used on civilians. This implies that it is not indiscriminate violence that moves or due to a lack of information about a zone; it is, in fact, the actor who assumes a different strategic position within a conflict zone that enables the movement of indiscriminate violence and its use in the zone where actors are located. It is this issue that this thesis explores throughout the following chapters, by focusing on the strategic position of embeddedness. To do this, there is a need to examine different actors at a lower threshold. For example, instead of examining the collective actions of a state, I will need to go further and assess the action of state actors like the police and military. This helps examine the actions of actors at the micro level to observe the behaviour tied to the strategies and positions employed by actors. This way of examining actors through an extended version of the state verse rebel model enhances understanding of how actors move and use indiscriminate violence in the conflicts selected.

However, as I later contend, this was one of the shortcomings and difficulties of trying to study the concept of embeddedness. While I use a dissimilar approach to understand the use of indiscriminate violence, there are still weaknesses in the method. The mixed method approach did not enable me to examine the exact year and times when each respondent experienced indiscriminate violence. This added

information would have proven vital to further understanding when attacks were carried out, and how and why this was conducted at a micro level. This has implications for this research project, since I was unable to fully reflect the structure of embeddedness for many victims, as I had initially intended. Nevertheless, this would have also brought into the equation bias that often cannot be eliminated or controlled. This means while I do demonstrate documented patterns of behaviour and violence, this is still not statistically significant to infer that the Maoist's overall position was one of continuous embeddedness.

Although I offer a framework that will need to be further tested, the scope of the research design does not enable me to capture other potential hybrid positions that actors may have adopted throughout the conflict.

The data collected helped to shape my understanding of how indiscriminate violence transpired during the Nepalese conflict and how different actors can undertake different strategic positions to support their core remit. With every research piece, there are limitations which are inherently subjected to the types of methods a researcher chooses to adopt. The data collected in this thesis is limited but unique to the case of Nepal because it sheds added information on how the strategic positioning of actors created an environment for civilians to experience indiscriminate violence. However, while the data collection methods can be adopted in other countries, it is highly unlikely that a similar conflict with similar trends would provide researchers with the opportunity to see comparable qualities detected in this project. This is because of the time difference between the end of the conflict in 2006 and when the field research was conducted in 2014, bringing with it biases that a researcher can only mitigate but not eliminate.

Having said that, the generalisability of actor strategic position and how this led to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians is something that I believe was witnessed and continues to be witnessed in previous and current conflicts. While the results may not hold validity across cases (owing to the nature of post-conflict assessment, the mixed method approach adopted, and the time lapsed), this thesis does demonstrate that the mechanisms underlining the use of indiscriminate violence - the strategic positions adopted by actors - in conflicts, are generalizable across previous conflicts as the Peruvian and the current South Sudanese conflicts. However, future research will need to find enhanced approaches and indicators to empirically measure the strategic positions - embedded, fixed, temporarily-deployed and other hybrid positions - that facilitate the use of indiscriminate violence. While I have achieved this to an extent, further research should be conducted to better understand how the strategic positions adopted by actor's impacts the use of indiscriminate violence during dynamic periods of conflict. This would help to further advance the theory in this thesis and increase researchers' understanding of how indiscriminate violence is used, due to the strategic positions adopted by actors.

The findings from this thesis also allow the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to be better informed about when, where, and whether to deploy peacekeepers to protect civilians during conflict. This knowledge could prove important for the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions and UNSC, especially in or when providing peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions with tougher mandates that have the protection of civilians at their centre.

1.2 Outline of the Thesis

Following Chapter One, this thesis is divided into seven chapters. In *Chapter Two*, I review the literature that has contributed to understanding the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflict. I provide a critique of previous literature as well as recent studies that inform my own theory-building efforts in Chapter Three. In this chapter, I shed light on two main areas: first, the theoretical identification of the potential actors in a conflict (e.g., agents, combatants, defectors, rebels, army, police, and perpetrators); and second, how identified actors who assume a strategic positon use violence against civilians through their movement. I suggest that the opportunity for and use of indiscriminate violence against civilians occurs when actors assume distinct strategic positions within a conflict. I move beyond static models of actors' position, to show that the struggle of temporarily-deployed actors to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians contributes to the practice of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

In *Chapter Three*, I build on the discussions in Chapter Two and present the concept I developed for this thesis, entitled 'The Concept of Embeddedness'. The concept of embeddedness accounts for some of the use of indiscriminate violence through the strategic position of embeddedness during the Nepalese conflict. The process of embeddedness occurs when actors are deeply rooted in the civilian population and struggle to differentiate between embedded actors and the civilian populations. I argue that embeddedness occurs because civilians are wedged between embedded actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on temporary deployment and cannot differentiate between actors and civilians. This generates an environment where the zones inhabited by the different actors continuously change due to the

dissimilar positions, strategy, and movement of actors within these zones. I hypothesize that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in altered, contested, and controlled zones through the practice of assuming a strategic position of embeddedness occurs under two conditions: first, when an embedded actor resorts to using indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population; and second, when fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed, actors use indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I test this hypothesis using the results of this study.

In *Chapter Four*, I introduce the data collection, analysis methods and methodological approaches used in this study. I demonstrate how the methodological approaches employed contributed to understanding why and under what conditions actors resorted to using indiscriminate violence against civilians during the decade-long conflict in Nepal. I describe the method of "process tracing" used in the analysis of data collected from various sources (see Chapter Five); the methods used to conduct a survey with 517 respondents in Nepal and to examine the data (see Chapter Six); and the methods used to interview 38 elite members of Nepalese civil-society and to study the data (see Chapter Seven). In addition, I examine some ethical challenges that confronted me as a field researcher working in a post-conflict zone (Nepal) and on-going conflict zone (South Sudan). After briefly summarizing the purpose and general method of my research, I discuss in detail the research procedures I followed to implement a "do no harm" approach during field research. I then discuss the procedures designed to ensure that my interviews took place with the participants fully informed consent, including defining what this means and explaining how I

implemented it. I then turn to the procedures whereby the anonymity of those interviewed and the confidentiality of the data gathered were ensured to the best possible extent. Finally, I examine the method used to assess all three methods in this thesis, using a method called triangulation. Triangulation in this thesis helps to facilitate validation of data through cross verification from two or more sources. It refers to the application and combination of several research methods in the study of the same phenomenon. Finally, I discuss potential risks, such as social desirability bias in respondents' choices and when I conducted the survey and interviews.

In *Chapter Five*, I focus on the case study of the Nepalese conflict. I uncover who the actors in this conflict were and show how the actors who participated in the conflict assumed different strategic positions. I identify four types of actors involved: the Maoist rebels, State Police, the Armed Police Force, and the Royal Nepalese Army. By employing "process tracing," I show how embeddedness transpired during the conflict. I analysed three distinct datasets,[4] in conjunction with an in-depth analysis of data from various sources, including newspapers, journal articles, official reports, UN documents, and institutional documentation. Process tracing supported the analysis to understand: a. how indiscriminate violence was used against civilians by actors who assumed different strategic positions throughout the conflict; b. what triggered indiscriminate violence and why it was used against the civilians. Results show that state actors and Maoist rebels used indiscriminate violence against civilians during different periods. I found that embedded actors on the rebel's side often used indiscriminate violence when they were losing control of their zone but also when state actors increased their efforts. Overall, the results show that the embedding of

[4] Please see Chapter Four for a detailed description of the datasets used for this analysis.

actors triggered temporarily-deployed actors to use indiscriminate violence. I also found that state actors collectively used indiscriminate violence against civilians more often than their Maoist counterparts.

In *Chapter Six*, I present the analysis results of the data collected from the surveys I conducted with 517 respondents in Nepal. In this chapter, I examine the use of indiscriminate violence by the identified actors. In the analysis, I conducted numerous cross-tabulation trials using the data collected from the 517 surveys. The findings from the cross tabulation demonstrate that actors were more likely to be embedded during the first six months of the respondents' interaction with the conflict. However, after this period (<6 months), the results show a reduction in embeddedness, which later increases. Maoist actors were more likely to be embedded as a strategy, and state actors were more likely to be temporarily-deployed. I then conducted logistic regression analysis which is a form of predictive modelling technique which investigates the relationship between a dependent (target) and independent variable(s) (predictor), using the same data collected from the 517 respondents. This allowed me to further test the hypothesis presented in Chapter Three and examined in Chapter Five. This technique is used to understand the strength of the causal mechanisms to the outcomes being observed and the relationship between the variables selected. Results from the logistic regression analysis does not show any support for the overall hypotheses.

In *Chapter Seven*, I use the same hypotheses to examine the interviews conducted with 38 prominent elites from diverse professional backgrounds across Nepalese civil-society. Results of the analysis show support for the concept of embeddedness,

and that the process of embeddedness helped contribute to temporarily-deployed state actors' use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. A meaningful number of the interviewees believed this occurred because state actors were unable to distinguish between embedded actors and civilians. Results revealed that when the state authorities were attacked or under siege by the Maoist actors, they would often assume that certain civilians were linked to Maoist actors or were informants. This led State authorities to use indiscriminate violence or kill individuals or groups of civilians. The results offer minor support for hypothesis two. According to interviewee's accounts, actors used indiscriminate violence to gain control over zones or for retaliation purposes. Results show that the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors was associated with trying to gain control of civilian populations, often after an attack. Chapter Seven complements the analysis presented in Chapters Five and–partially in– Six and contributes to strengthening the concept of embeddedness and the hypothesis presented in Chapter Three.

In *Chapter Eight*, the final chapter, I triangulate the results from Chapters Five, Six, and Seven to reinforce the findings. I briefly touch on the method of triangulation and how it was used, then re-examine the results from each chapter to present a unified conclusion for the thesis. I then extend the discussion to the implications of this thesis for policy. I explore avenues for further research, the limitations of my own work and what the shortcomings in theory and research design were; I also touch on the overall implications for the thesis. Finally, using the insights gathered from this research I suggest ways that the international community can solve the current protection crisis that affects millions of civilians in current and emerging conflicts.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 The Dilemma

In contemporary armed conflicts, innocent civilians often constitute the majority of victims and have at times been deliberately targeted.[5] The most vulnerable populations at risk are often tortured, raped, and killed. This crisis has resulted in a surge of interest by international bodies and the international community to push the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for mandates that protect civilians during conflicts.[6] The protection of civilians has emerged as a central purpose of many contemporary peace operations around the globe.[7] Both civilian and military peacekeepers increasingly recognise the moral duty and operational importance of protecting threatened civilians during conflicts and during peacekeeping operations. As peacekeeping missions have grown in number, frequency, size, and mandate, the United Nations (UN) has made concentrated efforts to put civilian protection at the centre of these operations. This has stimulated academic interest in understanding why civilians experience violence during conflicts (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006, 2008; Hultman, 2008, 2013; Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2010).

The question of why warring parties use violence against civilians, especially when they depend on civilians for information, food, and security, continues to perplex scholars (Arreguin-Toft, 2001; Kalyvas, 2006; Mason, 1996). Much of the literature to date has concentrated on the interactions between rebels and civilians within a conflict, and violence has been viewed as a means of governing a population during

[5] http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_pv_6917_res_1.pdf
[6] http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.da
[7] http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/missing-peace/ BGR_Increasing%20Operational %20Effectiveness%20in% 20UN%20Peacekeeping.pdf

war (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009; Wood, 2010). Quantitative studies have largely focused on the consequences of country (or conflict) level factors or features that characterise the relations between the warring parties and governments, or state use of one-sided violence against civilians (Downes, 2006; Hultman, 2007, 2008; Lilja & Hultman, 2011; Valentino et al., 2004; Wood, 2010). Researchers, who study group structure and resources, have investigated the impact of the desires of a group and their incentives on the use of violence against civilians. Their findings suggest that the structure of a state and the strength of the groups fighting in the conflict can provide rebels with opportunistic incentives, such as looting, to use violence (Weinstein & Humphreys, 2008). These studies and others have expanded our understanding of why violence against civilians occurs during conflicts, and what takes place within a conflict environment. However, as I argue later in this chapter, I move beyond current models to discuss the diversity of actors involved in a conflict, and the impact of actors' strategic positions on the use and movement of violence against civilians.

2.2 Chapter Overview

In this chapter, I review the literature that has contributed to understanding the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflicts. By exploring competing theories and debates on the use of violence against civilians, I attempt to understand how and why indiscriminate violence is used against civilians. I provide a critique of previous and current literature in the areas that inform my own theory-building efforts that appear in Chapter Three. In Section 2.3, I give a summary of the main contemporary and contending theories that explore why violence against civilians occurs as a strategy. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5, I explore theories that examine how violence is used

to control the civilian populations within contested and uncontested zones, and how these theories differ from the theories that view violence as a strategy.

In Section 2.6, I explore the group defection and structure argument, largely revived by Humphreys (2003) and Weinstein (2005; 2007). I examine how the desires of a group and their incentives can also lead to violence against civilians. In Section 2.7, I examine the relevance of the four models and identify their constraints in accounting for the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. I show that while these theories have advanced our understanding, there are still gaps in our understanding of how indiscriminate violence originates moves and under what conditions it transpires. In the final section (Section 2.8), I move beyond current models and briefly present the theoretical contribution of this thesis (the focus of Chapter 3), which is founded on Kalyvas's (2006) theory on the use of indiscriminate violence in altered, contested, and controlled zones, and aims to further our current understanding of indiscriminate violence. In this chapter, and in Chapter Three, I attempt to show that embedding actors amongst civilians can account for some use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, because actors take up different strategic positions which means opposing actors need to modify their strategy and positions. Therefore, new zones are created and actors are left having to adjust their strategic positions to defend themselves against rival actors. Because of fluctuations in zones, civilians will experience indiscriminate violence from actors responding to changes in their positions that impact their zones of control and their overall strategy. In the next section, I explore how violence is used as a strategy against the civilian population.

2.3 Violence as a Strategy

In this section, I outline the framework used to identify how actors who become party to a conflict, use indiscriminate violence as a strategy and examine various studies that support this framework. Valentino et al. (2004) contend that the state may engage in mass killing in conflicts, where the population supports a guerrilla movement, as a means of reducing their strength. Azam and Hoeffler (2002) further suggest that violence against civilians diminishes the population density in an area, both through killing and successive migration, which in turn makes it harder for rebels to hide among the civilian populations. If Azam and Hoeffler (2002) are correct in their analysis that fighting zones will always see the killing and migration of civilians, then how does this account for situations where civilians are not killed or the population density in an area does not reduce, or civilians do not migrate? As demonstrated earlier, the SP held control over several civilian liberated zones, but civilians did not rush to migrate, notwithstanding the extraordinary levels of violence. During the Nepalese and Peruvian conflicts, civilians did not migrate in their tens of thousands, neither did the density of these populations drastically reduce because the strategy used by both the CPN-Maoist in Nepal and the SP in Peru. While Azam and Hoeffler (2002) view violence as a way of preventing embeddedness from occurring, this argument does not account for circumstances under which rebels are embedded amongst civilians but cause confusion for security forces; resulting in high levels of violence against civilians with no civilian migration. This occurred during the Vietnam conflict (Kalyvas, 2009), where strategies like hide and seek were used to overcome US forces.

Valentino et al. (2004) understand the use of violence as a strategy to prevent civilians from supporting the rebels. They argue that indiscriminate violence will be an instrument of last resort since actors may see no other alternative. While I do suspect, my findings will be similar, I verge away from how this moment of last resort transpires. Where I differ from Valentino et al., (2004), is on their conceptualization and timing of this moment of last resort. How can I know when an actor in a battle arrives at this moment or ceiling of last resort? Does an actor's moment of last resort depend on whether the actor is well trained or not? Does the type of battle mean some actors are more susceptible to moments of last resort over others? Or does it revolve around the dynamics of the conflict? If I add another layer of dynamics to the equation, like the strategic position an actor assumes, how will this interact with the actor's moment of last resort? For example, the timing of an actor passing through a zone (on short deployment) and their use of indiscriminate violence as a last resort will be different to an actor living with civilians who uses indiscriminate violence as a last resort. Both actors' interaction with "a moment of last resort" will depend on their interactions with the conflict, their strategy and the position these actors assume, which impacts on their rival's overall position. Each position an actor takes offers this actor with a different level of interaction with opposing actors, civilians and dynamics of the conflict.

Valentino et al., (2004), perspective suggests that actors operate within motionless, unlimited time and alteration free zones, which do not influence the use of violence. If this were to hold, then we could expect arbitrary use of violence which would be mimicked throughout all conflicts. Also, where I differ from Valentino et al., (2004), is in the concept that actor's dynamics and their use of violence is influenced by an actor's strategic position and how these positions interact with other actors. These

mechanisms are what I believe triggers the use of indiscriminate violence which I explore later in the chapter.

While Azam and Hoeffler (2002) acknowledge that rebels can hide amongst civilians, the authors assume that actors are fixed in certain areas. Azam and Hoeffler do not recognise that even when a population moves because of the violence, the rebels can follow and re-embed themselves amongst migrating civilians. Evidence of this was found after the Rwandan genocide, when the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) allowed Rwandan forces to enter DRC territory to participate in joint military operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).[8,9] The joint military operations and the violence used by the Rwandan forces against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), shows how the actors change different strategic positions and how Rwandan forces responded by assuming different strategic positions (one that involved being deployed) to deal with the FDLR. It suggests that while actors can use violence to move civilians on as a tool, it does not deter actors from embedding themselves amongst civilians at different points in time. However, a larger question is how in the case of Rwanda, positions of the FDLR and the Rwandan forces interacted.

Raleigh (Raleigh, 2013, p. 462), in her examination of the Africa continent, conversely concludes that civilians are targeted because they are accessible, and rebels kill more civilians often to create new frontlines for the conflict.[10] Eck, Kristine, and Hultman, (2007) and Hultman (2007) contend that by targeting civilians,

[8] https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/12/13/you-will-be-punished/attacks-civilians-eastern-congo (accessed on 20 December 2014)
[9] The FDLR is a rebel group composed of Rwandan Hutus, many of whom were survivors of the genocide, who fled to refugee camps and concealed themselves among refugees in 1994. https://web.stanford.edu/~sstedman/2001.readings/Zaire.htm (accessed on 20 December 2014)
[10] http://www.crisis.acleddata.com/author/clionadh/page/2/ (accessed on 20 December 2014)

insurgents are trying to distract the government and change its current policy to suit their own agenda. Hultman (2007) concludes that the high levels of violence witnessed in conflicts are perpetrated predominately by rebels during their resistance to the state. According to Hultman, violence is used to show the population that the government is unable to protect them, uphold the law, and provide the necessary security. This, Hultman (2007) argues, makes the government appear incompetent and incapable of functioning as a coherent state that can provide stability for all its civilians. Hultman and Lilja (2011) add another piece to this model asserting that ethnic, demographic structures influence the way rebels treat co-ethnics in the early phase of war, before they establish territorial control (Hultman and Lilja, 2011, p. 172). Ethnic groups tend to cluster geographically, particularly in Africa where African minorities often inhabit contiguous territories (Scarritt & McMillan, 1995). This geographical concentration facilitates recruitment to armed groups (Gates, 2002; Melander, 2009; Weidmann, 2009) and helps rebels carry out their struggle more effectively (Toft, 2003).

This suggests co-ethnic targets can be divided into two main categories: civilians and rivals. Rebels target civilian zones to ensure their cooperation in the war against the government forces, and rebels target rivals to eliminate competition and establish dominance over their ethnic community. Hultman and Lilja (2011) conclude that the killing of civilians is causally linked to a rebel group's overall act of trying to damage the government, displaying its incompetency and lack of legitimacy to protect civilians. These studies argue that mass violence is employed to show "the power to hurt," and when rebels resort to violence against civilians it is often because all other means of damaging the government have been exhausted (Hultman, 2009, p. 822).

Thus, by targeting civilians, rebels compensate for their inability to cause damage to the government on the frontline.

Hultman and Fjelde, (2014) add that ethnicity affects conflict patterns of civilian cruelty, but it is more likely in ethnically homogenous areas. Both governments and rebels target more civilians in zones where the opponent's co-ethnic groups live, compared to zones where their own co-ethnic groups reside. Hultman and Fjelde, (2014) also found that states are more likely to target civilians in areas inhabited by the rebels or areas close to the rebel bases.

However, Hultman's (2007) explanation does not clarify why the SP continued to use significant amounts of indiscriminate violence levels throughout the conflict, despite having control over most liberated zones.[11] Violence towards civilians in controlled SP liberated zones continued to increase over the years, despite the significant amounts of control that the SP had over liberated zones under their control. In fact, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's own findings indicated that the levels of violence against civilians in SP areas increased during operations that were carried out by the state.[12] Similarly, the early years of the Nepalese conflict, witnessed state police using violence towards civilian despite having information on the civilian populations.[13] Despite the similar tactics used by both rebels, in both conflicts, the outcome of violence by rebel actors is inverted. Hultman and Lilja's (2011), contribution allows researchers to observe whether the use of indiscriminate violence might be ethnically aligned but does this suggest that if an actor is not ethnically aligned to civilians from the start, that the actor will not be aligned to this group once control is established. Do actors have agency to change ethnic sides? In South

[11] The Truth Commission found the SP were indicated with having significant levels of indiscriminate violence then the state.
[12] https://www.usip.org/publications/2001/07/truth-commission-peru-01(accessed on 20 July 2018)
[13] https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Nepal-StateofConflictandViolence.pdf

Sudan's current conflict, ethnic groups have been known to change sides during the conflict. This includes the Shilluk ethnic group defecting from the Dinka ethnic group and joining their historic rivals the Nuer ethnic group, linked to the former Vice President.[14] During both the Nepalese and the Peruvian conflicts, recruits were taken from ethnic differences hegemonic areas, but those running the SP and Maoist CPN-M were not from the same caste. In Nepal, upper castes Maoists were joined in solidarity to lower caste ethnic groups. This suggests that ethnicity may not be as strong an influencing mechanism as previously thought outside of the African context.

The literature reviewed in this section helps to understand how actors can not only use violence as a strategy but can selectively distribute violence towards civilians. This understanding enables me to explore other causal activities that could potentially explain why violence is used and, in turn, why certain acts of violence continue to be used during a conflict. However, the theory that the targeting of civilians is a strategy is puzzling, especially as it appears to be a counterproductive measure. Such measures could potentially create distance between the actors and the surrounding populations, reducing their legitimacy and alienating the very people they claim to represent and be fighting for. The theory does well to assist research to understand why there is a need for actors and civilians to co-exist and survive during a conflict (Nagel et al. (2008) and Dixon (2009). While this body of research gives indications about the behaviour of actors while living amongst civilians, it does not fully explore how different strategic positions may impact and influence actors to use violence. How does the opposing actor's position and strategy impinge on an actor's ability to use or not to use violence against civilians? If violence is used as a strategy, at what point

[14] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10402659.2017.1344533

does this strategy become unproductive? How do we explain violence when this does not appear apparent through ethnic clusters in some conflicts? While the models put forward do well to explore the use of indiscriminate violence, questions remain as to how different strategic positions influence the use of violence, if at all it does. In the next section, I examine the framework that explores how indiscriminate violence is used to gain control.

2.4 The Need for Control

In this section, I explore how actors use indiscriminate violence to control the civilian population during conflicts. The theoretical perspectives I review contend that the use of indiscriminate violence is essential to controlling information, civilians, resources, and the movement of actors in a conflict. Based on his study of patterns and distribution of violence, Kalyvas (2006, p. 175) argues that violence is used to influence the civilian population and control their behaviour. Kalyvas's work concentrates on the interactions between the rebels and civilians within a conflict and suggests that violence is a means of governing civilian populations (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009; Wood, 2010). Kalyvas views violence against civilians as a tool to harass and pressure civilians into obedience and discourage unwanted behaviour. Other scholars contend that violent acts are used to secure future positions and are likely to be deployed again to suppress rebels and gain control (Boulding, 1962; Gurr, 1968; Gurr & Lichbach, 1986; Kalyvas, 2006; Poe & Tate, 1994; Zanger, 2000, p. 229).

Kalyvas, and others cited above, differ from Hultman in their view that violence is not simply a way to accomplish strategic goals, but is dependent on the circumstances in

which it is carried out. Kalyvas identifies two types of violence, selective and indiscriminate, which depend on the levels of territorial zones of control, fluctuations in informational irregularities, and balance of power within these zones (Balcells, 2010; Kalyvas, 2004, 2006). Kalyvas argues that these factors shape insurgents' behaviour and violence against civilians. In the Serbian conflict, once control was achieved on the battlefield, local non-Serbs "met their fates." Many were instantaneously killed, while others were incarcerated or harassed and tortured (Kalyvas & Sambanis, 2005, p. 13). Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict discriminating violence perpetrated by the Vietcong was a common theme within the "hamlets" (zones) that were predominantly, but not fully, controlled by the Vietcong. These "hamlets" were often contested territory between the warring zones that were fully controlled by the state (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009, p. 335).

According to Kalyvas (2006), control offers crucial access to information for either warring party and is a prior condition for targeting rebellious civilians. He contends that if rebels are not in control, they are likely to target civilians indiscriminately, due to the absence of specific information about defectors and offenders. By targeting civilians, rebels can create and implant fear amongst civilians, making it harder for the state to control the population or a territory (Vinci, 2005; Ziemke, 2008). According to this theoretical framework, violence eventually keeps the balance of power within these zones. Balcell (2010) argues that the need for control shapes insurgents' behaviour and their use of violence (Balcell, 2010, p. 291). Rebels resort to violence because it is cheaper than either selective repression or the provision of significant positive incentives (Kalyvas, 2006, p.165) and will modify civilians' expectations of returns for remaining impartial (Lichbach, 1995, p. 58; Kalyvas,

1999). Hultman, on the other hand, believes that rebels implement terror tactics to counter strategic setbacks (Hultman, 2007a), acquire resources (Hoffman, 2004), encourage ethnic harmony, inspire enlistment, and improve their negotiating situation with the government.

Kalyvas (2006) is right to suggest that control offers access to crucial information but as I will later argue, if actors use violence, then those actors do not have control over the civilian populations. For example, democracies like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, with different forms of legislative and political systems demonstrate control over their civilian populations without using indiscriminate violence. These states exercise control through laws and institutional systems and yet, control is maintained without civilians experiencing indiscriminate violence. Kalyvas (2006) assumes when violence is used it is because of a lack of information or to control. However, how do we explain violence that occurs when actors respond to a strategic attack or when violence occurs in circumstances when actors have both control and information? During the Nepalese conflict, the police in Rolpha and Rukum were known to use violence against civilians where they were stationed, despite having the necessary information and controlling civilians in the communities they inhabited.[15]

I believe if indiscriminate violence is used, it insinuates that a certain level of control does not exist, but that actors may also be using violence for other reasons. If actors must use violence, then it suggests actors never had control in the first instance. By continually punishing civilians, actors run the risk of triggering civilians to deter or flee. Thus, violence to control because of access to information becomes a

[15] https://www.mercycorps.org/sites/default/files/file1137793491.pdf (accessed: 16/09/2017).

counterproductive measure. While having access to information is important, it is not necessarily the only significant factor. If information on the location of opposing actors is not backed by a strategy, then it just becomes information that is unserviceable because it does not support the actors' decisive goal of victory. Consequently, information just becomes information without an outcome. For example, the recent U.S. military mission in Afghanistan was partly to train, advice and assist the Afghanistan forces to defeat their enemy, the Taliban. Nonetheless, the US government intentionally chooses not to engage with the Taliban despite the wealth of military information that it has, but why? Put simply, it does not serve their strategic interest to do so; information without a clear strategy of how to attack and defeat your enemy is solely information. What is crucial is a strategy designed and implemented to defeat the opposing actor. It is this strategic element which encompasses actor's positions that I will later argue can influence indiscriminate violence against civilians.

Therefore, to control a civilian population through indiscriminate violence, actors must rely on a counter strategy and its execution through the strategic positioning of actors to support their overall goal. Information helps actors to understand and know their enemy, but it will not enable actors to defeat their enemy and control civilians unless a clear strategy is in place. Where I detach from Kalyvas (2006), argument is on the notion that if rebels are not in control they are likely to target civilians indiscriminately, due to the absence of specific information about defectors and offenders. This suggests if rebels are in control, they are not likely to target civilians. However, the opposite was found to be true in the case of Peru. In early 1983, the Peruvian army set up "fortified hamlets" within the emergency zones. The strategy

was to create new communities of "protected hamlets" by physically separating the rural communities from SP. This involved deploying actors and embedding them amongst the civilians to separate the two groups. The intention was to eventually allow the ties and loyalty of the civilians to the Peruvian government to be strengthened. However, this strategy failed because the deployed units had previously used indiscriminate violence against civilians whom they were unable to differentiate from SP actors; creating tensions between the two groups. By late 1983, the Peruvian army's counterinsurgency efforts seemed to be gaining in effectiveness, forcing SP operations northward into the Andes and the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) in search of a new support base, but this came at the price of a high number of civilian deaths. By May 1984, the army had established approximately fifty counter-guerrilla bases, each with one hundred men, in the emergency zone (Switzer, 2007). These actors conducted aggressive patrols, and maintained a presence in the villages to control and have access to the information within these zones. As a result, many civilians changed sides and supported SP because of the army's use of indiscriminate violence.

What this shows is that even if control offers crucial access to information for either warring party and is a prior condition for targeting rebellious civilians, it does not mean that civilians will continue to support the actor using the violence to control. The Peruvian example demonstrates that once the army's counter measures were in place, it only made the civilian population revert away from the army, to the SP despite the level of information that they had access to. The army strategy failed and caused many of the civilians to flee, despite their access to an abundance of information. Later in the chapter, I further develop the mechanism of strategic positions to show how this can influence the use of indiscriminate violence.

Since rebel's desire and seek support from the local populace to reach their objectives, civilians can possess some degree of control to determine their relationship with the rebels (Kalyvas, 2004; Schafer, 2001, p. 231; Zahar, 2000, p.117). Previous research has also found that indiscriminate violence perpetrated by the government assists rebels to overcome their dilemma around collective action, as it galvanises the populace and security can be used as a selective incentive (De Nardo, 1985; Kalyvas, 2006, p. 156; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007). However, as Moore (1995, p. 434) points out, this argument suggests that only government violence makes civilians indifferent to supporting the rebels or the government. Frisch (2006) argues that the capacity of the insurgents is more influential in their ability to carry out violent attacks.

The studies reviewed in this section show that control over the civilian population is a central objective for both rebels and states and all actors party to a conflict. They suggest that by securing civilian support, actors are better able to determine and change the conflict's outcomes. Thus, support is strongly linked with the ability to demonstrate the capabilities of the group to potential recruits or civilians. It also means that control is a central factor in actors' use of indiscriminate violence.
The theories on why violence is used as a strategy and why violence is used to gain control over civilians contribute to our understanding of the use of violence against civilians in conflicts; However, while these models do exceptionally well to explain the need for information to control civilian populations, they undervalue the strategic positioning of actors during the different periods of a conflict and how this can influence violence against civilians but also limits the access to information. They could consider why certain actors may remain in a zone for several weeks or months,

but do not use violence. The model should also consider whether there is more of an incentive for actors who move freely within zones to use more violence over actors who are positioned amongst civilians for extended periods. The model cannot explain why information received is not always acted upon but violence occurs and whether information, in combination with an active strategy, influences violence against civilians. Furthermore, the theory does not fully account for situations during the Peruvian conflict where violence was used to control civilians by the SP, but used by the state to attempt to separate the SP and civilians. While violence was used, the strategic position that each actor assumed interacted with each other causing clashes between the different actors and their positions. The literature explored minimises the effect that strategic positions such as the embedding of actors can have on the choices of either side to use indiscriminate violence. It discounts the strategy and tactical positions which the opposing side may assume to deal with embedded actors. It ignores that even without information, zones change, and civilians experience indiscriminate violence, since actors must assume a position to respond to one another. Kalyvas's (2006) view implies that there is a need for actors to be embedded among civilians to control populations, gain information, and control the territory. Nevertheless, this model should also consider whether the strategy of embedding actors increases or decreases the likelihood of civilians experiencing indiscriminate violence, either by actors being present in the zone or actors assuming a temporary deployed position to this same zone.

2.5 Conflict Zones: Duration and Outcomes of Conflict Violence

In this section, I review research that examines the control of conflict zones and how this control impacts the outcomes of conflict violence. Understanding how different

zones are controlled by actors can allow researchers to understand the strategic positions that actors assume, which helps to create the various conflict zones. Understanding the strategic positions that actors assume helps me to understand how zones are created, liberated, and controlled. As I argued earlier in the chapter, having access to relevant information as noted by Kalyvas (2006) is important, but unless this information is acted upon, it plays a limited role for actors to use violence. By understanding how zones are created and maintained, I can understand the strategic positions which actors take up to control these zones and how violence is used within these zones. I believe this supports me to understand how strategic positions foster the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in zones. Scholars who focus on conflict zones argue that the degree of territorial control generally forms civilians' motivations to collaborate with various actors (e.g., Kalyvas, 2006, p. 88). For groups, not to resort to violence, the warring parties must maintain control within a conflict area. Control influences their abilities and incentives to restrain from using violence (Kalyvas, 2006; Metelits, 2010; Wood, 2010). This can also be counterproductive when the conditions may motivate violence, especially when expected support grows unsuccessfully or when civilians within these zones resist recruitment (Branch, 2005; Mkandawire, 2002). The issue of control raises important questions about the impact of the conditions on the use of violence against civilians. Is there a potential for violence if actors lose control or are unable to gain or regain control? How will these populations be treated if they feel forced? Will lack of control cause actors to use violence against civilians that resist? Above all, does the positions assumed by different actors help to control zones.

Research shows that indiscriminate violence is greater in zones of support for the opposition (Balcells, 2010; Hultman, 2009; Sullivan, 2012). Wood (2003), claims that within conflict zones there are robust recursive associations between rebels' military abilities and their capacity to garner general support. As such, the state uses violence to drive civilians away from the territory and even conduct mass deportations to secure an area (Downes, 2008; Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2003). Downes (2008) argues that targeting civilians is a tool to frighten the support-base of the losing group and replicates the desire to anticipate a potential encounter with the enemy (Burg & Shoup, 1999; Wood, 2006, pp. 310–313). Kalyvas and Kocher's (2009) study on the Vietnam War found that selective violence was used to gain control over the populations that were either under control of the state or in contested zones (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009, p. 335). Other studies found that indiscriminate violence is used to deny territorial control by the enemy (Boyle, 2009; Vinci, 2005).

Kalyvas (2006) contends that in areas effectively controlled by either the rebels or the government there is less violence from both, as the zone is redundant, and the opposing party cannot access it. Frontline areas where no one has full control, according to Kalyvas, will experience lower levels of violence against civilians (Kalyvas, 1999, 2006; Kalyvas & Kocher, 2009). I agree that zones with full control by either actor will experience less violence because there is no incentive to continue using violence. However, the argument that actors in frontline areas with no control have lower levels of violence is incomplete, as it implies that these zones are static and do not have the occasional need to strategically take control. It also suggests that the conflict dynamics have little influence on the use of violence.

For example, the SPLA/M initially deployed similar (Maoist) tactics to those used in Nepal and Peru (Sendero Path), using "hide and seek" and "hit and run" strategies on government infrastructures and posts to gain attention and create momentum. During the second Sudanese conflict, the SPLA's strategy revolved around operating in cities and urban areas. In these cities and urban areas these attacks took the form of popular uprisings (1985), while in the marginalised areas as Southern Kordofan, and Southern Blue Nile, it took the form of a popular and patriotic armed struggle (1955-1973 and 1983-2005) (Lesch, op. cit. in 57 Hale, Sondra, op. cit., 191-192). As a response to the SPLA/M attacks, the Sudanese Government and SAF launched vicious attacks against the SPLA/M in civilian areas but were unsuccessful in deterring the SPLA/M in these zones. As a result, the government would later use local rival clans as a form of cheap counterinsurgency operations (De Waal 1994, Salih and Harir 1994). These measures led to grave human rights violations and indiscriminate violence against women, children, and ethnic groups. In Darfur, the government used the same strategy and funded groups such as the Janjaweed, Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa to deal with the civilians, later leading to the formation of new local counter forces such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA) and the outbreak of conflict in Darfur in 2003 (Abdel Salam, 2000).[16] In the case of the Sudan conflict, there was a need to control the zone and this influenced the outcome of conflict violence against civilians. Local actors were deployed to counter the SPLA as a means of state control but without full success. Local militia were used because they were not only familiar with the zones but were better tactically positioned than the state to deal with the SPLA and recruit locals. This thesis explores these perspectives in the coming chapters by attempting to

[16] http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/darfur/#sthash.7uET5Fbs.dpuf accessed on 03/08/2014).

outline where previous research has missed opportunities to further understand how the strategic position adopted by actors in a conflict can contribute to the use of violence against civilians.

Previous studies have demonstrated that the balance of coercive power largely determines the outcome and duration of domestic conflicts (Cunningham et al., 2009). It similarly shapes insurgents' choice of war strategies, in terms of whether they pursue revolutionary or more limited secessionist goals (Buhaug, 2006), as well as whether the conflict occurs in peripheral zones or nearer to the centre of a regimes power (Buhaug, 2010). Morrow (2007) offers evidence that noncompliance with the "Laws of War" has been met throughout the 20th century "with some major violations by the side that suffers the consequences of that noncompliance" (Morrow, 2007, p. 570). These findings generally concur with Clausewitz's (1827; 1984, p. 283) observation that capacity constraints impose limitations on actors' political goals. The distribution of capabilities may similarly influence the style of warfare that insurgents adopt (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010; Vinci, 2009). Clausewitz's (1827) work suggests that these capabilities have the power to not only change but also divert the path of any conflict. The advantage of the model conflict zones demonstrated and examined by Kalyvas, (2006), is the consideration that zones can go from being contested to uncontested. This perspective can contribute to understanding the use and movement of indiscriminate violence against civilians within these zones. The model provides insight into how indiscriminate violence is used and suggests that indiscriminate violence is by no means static as the previously explored models suggest.

However, for zones to be controlled actors must be based there and live amongst civilians to control both the zone, and the civilians in these zones. Controlling zones remotely will not be a way of governing a zone, since it opens the zone to the possibility of being captured by an opposing actor. A zone cannot be controlled by simply dropping bombs since it still requires actors to be present within the zone or risk the zone being taken back. During the Peruvian conflict, the SP's central strategies were to capture liberated zones and to continue to increase these liberated zones, through recruitment and deploying actors with the purpose of increasing the zones. The SP would open "fighting zones" in which their combatants could operate, driving government forces out of these zones and creating "liberated zones". These zones were to be used to support new SP zones until the entire country was essentially one big "liberated zone". To defeat the SP, the state applied an offensive eradication strategy in line with the counterterrorist strategy recommended by the United States Armed Forces (Portugal, 2008, p. 25). This involved deploying actors to the area and making sure they could defeat the SP through strategic military operations. The threat grew in late 1981, and the government introduced emergency laws in affected areas in 1982 to support their efforts to control the area (McClintock, 1998; Fielding & Shortland, 2010).

The Peruvian example is important for two reasons. First, it shows that the movement of actors was important for creating liberated zones by strategically positioning SP actors in certain zones which could later be expand into liberated zones. Without this strategy, further liberated zones could not be created; this appears to have been done by embedding actors within these zones and controlling these zones from within. The expansion of zones was also achieved through the recruitment of locals that helped support the increase in liberated zones. The SLPA/M in Sudan deployed similar

actions, as detailed above. Second, this example helps to understand how actors within a zone take up certain positions to defeat or counteract their enemies during fighting. The Peruvian example demonstrates an offensive eradication strategy that was in line with the counterterrorist strategy recommended by the United States Armed Forces to defeat the SP. This would suggest that having a clear strategy to counter the SP was crucial to defeating the SP. This strategy could not have been possible without tactically positioning actors within zones to hold the control. To control zones remotely would have been impossible. What appears to be clear from the example is that counter measures need a clear strategy, which can and cannot be based upon information. Thus, the key component is the strategic positioning of these actors to counter those already embedded in zones. Information tells us who is present, resources the actor has etc., but it does not inform actors how to defeat their enemies. This can only be done through the strategic deployment of actors (with support of a strategy) into a conflict zone which can be influenced by information, actor's resources and other elements which form part of the overall strategy and strategic placement of actors.

Viewing the use of indiscriminate violence through the lens of strategic positions may allow researchers to understand why certain civilians may experience significant levels of violence while others experience very low levels. Exploring the strategic positions that actors assume departs from Kalyvas (2006) argument of information asymmetry because as demonstrated in section 2.4, having access to information can inform actors on the ground about what is occurring, but information alone will not explain why violence is used against civilians. For any strategy in a conflict setting to work, actors must assume a strategic position (whether they are temporarily-deployed,

fixed or embedded) to defeat opposing actors. Information offers awareness, but it does not decide what strategies will be used and how this strategy through strategic positions reacts with dissimilar strategic positions within zones. Even without information, actors can still have a clear strategy which is informed by the actors assuming strategic positions. This was shown earlier in the Peruvian government's plan. Despite being unaware of what was taking place within certain liberated zones, the government still put in place counter measures to deal with the SP. Information may have influenced this process. Nonetheless, what is crucial is how the policy of strategically placing actors interacts with opposing actors assuming similar or different strategic positions.

As such, it is important to understand and account for not only actors' choices but the strategic positions that actors can assume and their movements because this can help us better understand how violence is used and moves across zones, throughout a conflict. In the next section, I explore the use of distributed violence through theories of group structure and examine whether this model can better explain the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians instead of the conflict zones argument developed above.

2.6 Group Defection and Structure

In this section, I examine the group structure framework to determine whether the use of indiscriminate violence is linked to group dynamics or identity and, if so, whether these dynamics are influenced by the fluctuation of conflict zones. I distinguish between groups with membership based on material incentives and groups based on shared identities. I also examine the implications of the nature of organisational structure for the behaviour of a group during a conflict.

Group structure theory maintains that group organisation causes violence; and that violence is a function of internal group structures, values, and the group's recruitment process (Humphreys, 2003; Lichbach, 1987; Petersen, 2002; Mason & Krane, 1989; Sambanis & Zinn, 2005; Weinstein 2005, 2007, p. 78; Weinstein & Humphreys 2008). In other words, some insurgent groups use indiscriminate violence on the civilian population, while others selectively punish those who cooperate with their rivals and have a more collaborative relationship with the population. Kaufmann (1996) and Posen (1993) contend that ethnic recruits are likely to join rebel groups out of concern for their safety, especially if the relationship is negative (see Tullock, 1971). Goodwin (2001) and Kalyvas & Kocher (2007) claim that some civilians join groups for protection because they may have experienced violence. Other scholars argue that combatant or rebel groups' access to resources will determine recruits' decision. According to this argument, well-resourced groups entice recruits with material rewards and are likely to embark on a path of indiscriminate violence, whilst poorly-resourced groups recruit based on ideology. This allows recruited members to use violence selectively whilst maintaining some civilian support (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007, pp. 177-216; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006, p. 432; 2008, p. 444; Weinstein, 2007, p. 7; Wood, 2003; Zahar, 2000, pp. 107-128). In addition, some scholars examine the role of defections in group structure and the use of violence against civilians (Weinstein, 2007).

Groups suffer from what is named, the "resource curse." They are flooded with opportunistic joiners who exhibit little commitment to the long-term goals of the organisation; although the selective incentives that leaders allocate can contribute towards actors either remaining in or defecting from a group (Lichbach, 1994;

Popkin, 1979; Weinstein, 2005, p. 598). Weinstein's (2006) alternative explanation: namely that the initial conditions –particularly the availability of natural resources - a prospective insurgent group faces, shape its propensity for violence against the civilian population. Insurgent groups with access to resources can create selective incentives to motivate people to join the insurgency; those without access to substantial resources must make uncertain promises about future gains. Resource-rich environments tend to favour opportunistic insurgencies, populated by less committed individuals driven mainly by the desire for profit. Resource-poor environments tend to favour activist insurgencies, populated by highly committed participants who are willing to wait for their rewards, even if it takes years. Thus, the initial conditions produce different kinds of insurgencies with varying propensities for violence. Opportunistic insurgencies tend to be more indiscriminate in the use of violence against civilians, while activist insurgencies tend to be more careful to minimize brutality and protect civilians.

Building on this perspective are "looting" theories that claim that revenues from the extraction and export of natural resources are used to finance the start-up costs of rebellions, resulting in the desire for rebel groups to prolong the conflict to gain more natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Fearon, 2008, p. 5; Keen, 1998; Ross, 2004). Other structural issues, such as defections, can be destructive to a group's capacity for command and control, especially groups that rely on privacy for survival. Defections can contribute to a group's fragmentation, particularly amongst insurgent groups and terrorist organisations (Berman 2009; Pokempner et al. 1995, p. 47). Defection can also occur when a group of rebel's exhibits too much repression, producing counterproductive consequences. This counterproductive behaviour may

also occur when, due to the duration of the conflict or when actors are temporarily deployed or fixed in zones (embedded) amongst the civilian population and a leader changes their aims. An example, of this occurred when the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) in Algeria caused many civilians to defect to the government side, because of the repression of civilians (Hamoumou, 1993, p.157; Gutiérrez Sanín 2008, p.14, as cited by Humphreys & Weinstein, 2006, p. 430). This was also witnessed in the example above during the Peruvian conflict. According to Weinstein (2005), the strategic use of targeted violence primarily requires effective organisation, making violence an active strategy and successfully raising the cost of defection (Weinstein 2005, p. 598; 2007). Beyond this, the theory suggests that actors operating within certain conditions will also remain fixed and are less likely to use indiscriminate violence if they are a part of a campaign or 'activism.' What about areas that are well resourced but do experience significant levels of violence, what can explain this phenomenon?

While the opportunistic theory raises some important points, the model assumes that the path of an insurgent group is determined because of rational choice and that an actor's decisions are rational at all times. In other words, if an actor is in a high-resource area they are more likely to be rational because they are always thinking about what is in their interest that this linked to the resources, which means the actor is constantly rethinking their position. However, if an actor is in a low-resource area, their rational choice barely exists because they are not 'in it to win it' and their ideology remains constant throughout. The model does not account for actors who defect from a group to other groups, regardless of whether in well-resourced or low-

resourced areas, as this scenario is certainly possible. Specifically, the model does not account for situations where there are multiple actors changing zones of control forcing other actors to move on. It overlooks evidence that some groups with long-term goals and strong disciplinary structures nevertheless commit large-scale selective violence. Furthermore, the model assumes that the existence of local resources determines that rebels inevitably become violent predators. It disregards the power of leadership and the role that a leader can have in avoiding this problem. Additionally, the model assumes that resources remain fixed and does not account for changes in actors' access to resources due to the fluctuation of zones from being contested to uncontested. Group structure and defection can also be affected by the conditions actors are placed in or the opportunities they see outside of their current group structure, which will increase when the group moves to different zones during the conflict. If the incentives within the group are not strong enough to satisfy the actors, they may resort to using violence or choose to defect. Defection can also occur when actors (temporarily-deployed or fixed) see an opportunity to separate from their existing group structure because of a lack of incentives in a prolonged conflict. There are three more general concerns with this model. First, the model does not offer careful conceptualisation of how insurgent groups differ from one another, which makes it difficult to study groups comparatively or over time. Second, key existing theories are only loosely related to pre-war political life: in this literature, insurgent groups seem to come out of nowhere once war begins. There needs to be a better understanding of how these groups emerge over time and how this past can link to their futures acts and positions. Third, there is little explanation of change over time within war. For example, the model claims that resources available in a conflict zone are often static. There is not an explantion as to whether these resources are exist

before the conflict or are new resourced discovered during the conflict. Thus, the model cannot fully account for the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

2.7 Theoretical Gaps

The theories outlined above (Sections 2.3–2.6) attempt to understand the use of violence against civilians in conflict. Kalyvas (2003; 2006; 2009) argues that by targeting civilians, insurgents seek to discourage unwanted actions, such as defection to the enemy's camp. Violence differs depending on the amount of territorial control and can be divided into selective and indiscriminate categories. Hultman's (2007a; 2009; 2013) work accounts for significant changes in the number of civilians killed between different periods of violence during a conflict. Weinstein and Humphreys (2008), further explain how incentives provided by internal group structure play a large role in how actors use violence against civilians. The literature explored recognises that violence can be and is used for multiple purposes and varies not only based on conflict intensity, but on relations between civilians and actors. These key theories diverge in their explanation of the variance of violence, both in terms of magnitude and patterns. However, as I have previously argued, they do not entirely account for the use of indiscriminate violence in the case examples demonstrated above. The examples drawn from Peru show that the geographical positions of actors are important to the strategy which informs the strategic positions of the actor and could influence the use of indiscriminate violence.

While Hultman (2007) argues that violence occurs for strategic purposes, Lyall (2009) claims it is used to show to the populace that the rebels cannot protect them as the state can. Kalyvas (2006), however, claims it occurs because of fluctuations in

contested or uncontested zones and information asymmetry. However, while these arguments have advanced our thinking, there are still segments that are yet to be discussed. These questions include: Does having information act as the key to understanding how violence is distributed or is violence delivered through the positions that actors assume?; Do the actors involved in a conflict assume different strategic positions and if so, what positions are these?; Do the different strategic positions adopted by actors influence indiscriminate violence against civilians?; What impact does this have on violence against civilians through military strategies, and is information the causal mechanism to understand violence against civilian or does strategy and the strategic position of actors matter more?; What is the impact of the duration of a conflict and the different encounters that occur within it?; What is the impact of the duration of the conflict on actors on either side (e.g., government combatants, armed police units, rebels, militants) who are embedded within and around civilian's zones?; And does the strategic positioning of actors contribute to the overall use of violence against civilians? The answers to these queries will provide further insight into why indiscriminate violence is used against civilians.

The examples drawn from South Sudan, Nepal, and Peru conflicts, suggest that there are other mechanisms at hand that contribute to the use of violence against civilians. While information played a role, the strategy which is linked to the strategic positions that actors assume, may have played a larger role in the use of violence against civilians. Despite having information, what appears to be influential was the strategic position used to deal with the opposing rebel actors. In Peru, the government's tactics of deploying the Army and Navy using US counterinsurgency measures caused the Peruvian state to react in a manner that led to the use of violence against civilians.

While in Nepal the strategy of embedding actors amongst civilians appears to have contributed to indiscriminate violence being used against civilians by the state. While the discussed models do well to answer why indiscriminate violence is used, the approaches have little to say about the specific ways indiscriminate violence occurred in Nepal, which is the focus of this thesis. Many of those attacked during the Nepalese conflict were attacked or experienced attacks in public. Indiscriminate violence was often used after an actor experienced an attack by an opposing rebel group and commonly in broad daylight. These attacks were isolated, sporadic, and surreptitious but the killings were in public.

To analyse indiscriminate violence, scholars rely on a standard set of categories to sort actors and the messy reality they inhabit. When analysing indiscriminate violence, analysis generally relies on the categories "perpetrator" "victims" "bystanders" and rescuers." Membership in these categories is assumed to be exclusive and stable. In this scheme, a perpetrator cannot also be a rescuer; and once a perpetrator, always a perpetrator. The problems with this system of categorising, however is that it fixes people in a way that is not derived from the realities of indiscriminate violence and the flow of indiscriminate violence, particularly because as previously demonstrated, there is an element of strategy and positioning of actors involved. Violence is dynamic, while categories are static. In dynamic settings, contexts and conditions change, sometimes in an instant. These changes, in turn, can shift actors' relations, strategy, positions and perspectives. Static categories cannot capture these shifts. Neither can they capture endogenous sources of transformation that occurs through the unfolding of processes. Another problem with standard

categories is that they smooth over tensions that exist both within and between categories.

In the Peruvian example, actors did not confine their activities to one category; rather, they often moved back and forth between categories, in this case strategic positions, or straddled multiple positions at the same time. In some zones, actors were embedded, while others were fixed and supporting liberated zones of expansion. In the South Sudan example, the Sudanese state hovered in the margins, through the recruitment of militia and payed them to go in their place. These actors did not participate in the killings directly but nevertheless played a part in them. How should we categorise them? As victims, bystanders, or perpetrators with an asterisk?

What we need is a way to engage these complexities directly. By ignoring them, we risk building theories around skewed understandings of the phenomena we are trying to explain. If the same person was capable of being embedded and temporarily-deployed, for example, then explanations based on motive would be indeterminate, since the motives for one set of actions would not prevent or subsume motives for the other. Analysing the full range of actors' strategies is also crucial for theorising the agency of these actors. If we were to base theories of agency on only one set of actions - the set that most easily fits an existing analytic category - our theories would be at best, partial and at worst, wrong. The answer is to take special care to ensure that the categories do not speak for the data, rather, that the data speaks for itself, no matter where that leaves them on the grid.

Exploring the use of violence through the strategic positions assumed by actors is important for two reasons. First, it allows researchers to understand how the various

strategic positions –influenced by strategies–may impact the use and fluctuation of indiscriminate violence against civilians. This aids understanding as to whether the distribution of violence lies with the strategic objectives and the positions actors assume. Second, by understanding how the strategic positions influence the use of violence, it is possible to better understand how indiscriminate violence may be distributed across conflict zones by actors.

Excluding Kalyvas's (2006) model, the models discussed in this chapter are restricted in their consideration of actors involved in a conflict and how these actors can use violence against civilians. These models do not capture the potential associations between the state and hired militants and the rebel and splinter groups. Beyond this the models do not explain the incidents of violence which took place during the Peruvian and Nepalese conflicts which I believe are uniquely linked to the strategies adopted by actors during the conflict. This, I suggest, confines any analysis to a one-dimensional lens (e.g., state versus rebels in established positions) and limits the ability to account for differences in patterns, such as the movement of actors, and their use of indiscriminate violence and the impact of their strategic positions.

2.8 Embeddedness

The literature reviewed in this chapter has contributed to understanding the use of indiscriminate violence in a conflict. The theories reviewed stem from two main theoretical perspectives: *organisational theories* and *strategic frameworks*. This chapter examined two organisational theories: the group structure framework (Section 2.6); and three strategic frameworks –the relative strengths of a rebel group (Section 2.3), the need for control and contesting and uncontested zones (Sections 2.4 and 2.5),

and suppression of the opposition (2.3).While the models in their various ways account for the use of violence, they are incomplete when explaining why actors use indiscriminate violence against civilians and how indiscriminate violence moves throughout a conflict by the strategic positions adopted by actors. Following Kalyvas's (2006) argument around the control and fluctuation in contested and uncontested zones, this thesis aims to better understand: a. who the actors in a conflict are in the case of the Nepalese conflict; b. what strategic positions actors can assume during a conflict and whether these positions contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence; c. how indiscriminate violence is distributed through the different identified strategic positions; and, d. how the interactions of strategic positions from various sides influence the use of indiscriminate violence.

To move beyond the limitations of standard approaches, I propose an alternative lens; one that can take moving pictures, rather than just static snapshots. This lens is trained on the dynamism of actors and their actions shifting or transforming through the unfolding of violence across time and space. This alternative lens begins by viewing indiscriminate violence and the strategic positioning of actors as a process, not a clearly bounded event. As a process, indiscriminate violence and strategic positioning of actors ceases to be a clearly demarcated temporal period of violence; instead, it becomes a messy agglomeration of actions taken and not taken, through strategies that are linked to strategic positions and decisions, made and unmade. Indiscriminate violence and the strategic positioning of actors as a process becomes a temporal and partial unfolding of strategic actions, shifting context, and includes actors with multiple motives. This process, moreover, need not be linear, for indiscriminate violence can speed up, slow down, claim new targets, and abandon the old. Viewing

the indiscriminate violence and strategic positioning of actors as a process, generates different expectations to viewing it as a discrete event. If indiscriminate violence is a process, then we would expect actors to move between categories or for a group of actors to occupy multiple categories at the same time. Viewing actors dynamically allows me to: probe a broad range of people's behaviour during conflicts; and examine whether the strategic positioning that actors assume links back to the use of indiscriminate violence, but there may be a need to do this to simply understand what actors are doing. Indeed, one of the aims of this study is to understand the ways in which these actors do not fit these categories neatly. To this end, I have developed a theoretical concept, entitled *embeddedness*, which I discuss in detail in Chapter 3.

The theoretical contribution of this thesis, *embeddedness*, is based on the *need for control through strategically placing actors in position—controlling of zones contesting and uncontested zones* (Kalyvas, 2006). Embeddedness is divided into two main areas: *actors in a conflict*, which accounts for the need to understand who the actors are in a conflict; and *movement and use of indiscriminate violence by actors*, which accounts for the use of indiscriminate violence through the strategic position of actors through the process of embeddedness. The first area, *actors in a conflict*, acknowledges that several actors can be involved in any conflict. By understanding who actors are, researchers can understand who can use indiscriminate violence against civilians. For example, in a conflict where a rebel group is fighting the state, we must recognise that rebels can also splinter off into smaller groups, be associated with other rebel groups, or engulf other rebel groups through fighting or incentives. The number of actors involved in a conflict can grow from state versus rebel actors to include actors from smaller, associated, or defected rebel groups. Equally, states have

the power to employ new actors, as demonstrated in the Sudanese government's attempts to defeat the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) by employing the Janjaweed to conduct attacks against the SLA and innocent civilians in Darfur.[17] This shows how the dimensions of any conflict can expand and the need to consider the relevance of more disaggregated actors.

The second area is the *movement of indiscriminate violence by actors through their adopted strategic positions*. Exploring the strategies deployed by actors and potential strategic positions that actors can assume in any conflict (temporarily-deployed, fixed, and embedded) can help us better understand how violence is used and moves across zones, throughout a conflict. This perspective will allow observations to account for changes in indiscriminate violence that is perpetrated by actors who assume certain strategic positions in a conflict. However, building on Kalyvas's (2006) main argument about the control of zones in contested and uncontested territory, if zones go from being contested to uncontested, actors have the potential to move within these contested and uncontested zones. This presents a challenge to our understanding of who the actors using violence against civilians are and why. An example of this challenge is illustrated in Figure 2.0.

[17] http://news.trust.org//spotlight/Darfur-conflict (accessed on 31/07/2014)



Figure 2.0: An example of the movement of actors

In this example, Actor A (the state) controls the Red Zone; Actor B (the rebels) controls the Green Zone; Actor C (the rebels) controls the Yellow Zone; and Actor D (the rebels) controls the Blue Zone. To have consistent control over the Red, Green, Yellow, and Blue zones, actors A, B, C, and D must be embedded in their respective zones. If they leave their zone at any point, they risk losing control to their enemies. At one point, the state decides to seize the Green Zone, and deploys actors from its base and from the Red Zone to commence an offensive against the rebels. Actor A once embedded in the Red Zone, then moves to the Green Zone (Move A). After two weeks of fighting, the rebels in the Green Zone recognise that they are losing and bring reinforcements from the Yellow and Blue Zones. Actor C once embedded in the Yellow Zone, and Actor D, once embedded in the Blue Zone then moves to the Green Zone to reinforce it (Moves B and C). This scenario suggests that within a short period of fighting, actors potentially move back and forth within and outside of different (contested and uncontested) zones. As the fighting continues, actors move to

different areas but also remain in some zones for short to long-term periods. It is in this manner that actors assume different strategic positions (temporarily-deployed, fixed, and embedded). If we add more actors to this example, then the conflict will expand further. Fighting will no longer be just between Actors A and B, but also between Actors A, B, C, D, E, etc., all of whom want a stake in the Green Zone. This example highlights the complexities of understanding the use and movement of indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, it is through this complexity, I believe, and through the exploration of the strategic positioning of actors that this thesis can account for and explain the use of indiscriminate violence in a conflict. This example shows that actors within a conflict are not static. Actors have the potential to continue to move and assume different positions during a conflict. However, this movement depends on the strategic positions that they assume due to the dynamics, changing situation, and objectives of the actors fighting in the conflict. Understanding the movement and strategic positions of actors can help to understand the use of indiscriminate violence.

Understanding the actors involved and their movements, positions this research to gain an understanding of how indiscriminate violence is distributed and who the actors distributing this violence are likely to be. This raises further questions, such as how long are actors likely to live among civilians? While actors live among civilians, does the likelihood of other actors using indiscriminate violence against civilian's increase? Do lengthy (embedded) periods among civilians, in conjunction with tactics such as “hit and run,” cause actors to become violent? Correspondingly, how do embedded periods impact temporarily-deployed actors on short-term missions? Do embedded periods help form positive or negative relations with the civilian

population? Applying these insights to the question of how indiscriminate violence is used during conflict through the strategic positions assumed by actors (e.g. embeddedness) is useful for several reasons. First, it invites the analysis to disaggregate and identify key actors. Second, it invites the analysis to investigate the various acts and activities key actors undertake in different context. Third, it leads the analyst to explore the structure and content of the relations that tie these actors to one another. Strategies and actors' movements over time and space provide the immediate context in which civilians and actors interact for, against, and towards others. Actors' movement through strategies over time and space thus offers the basis for locating the use of indiscriminate violence.

In Chapter Three, I explore who the potential actors in a conflict are and how the actors' strategic positioning and movement can lead to extended periods of embeddedness amongst civilians. I extend Kalyvas' (2006) argument and consider the questions posed above. I develop a theoretical perspective to help understand the strategic positions of actors and the use and movement of indiscriminate violence against civilians. I argue that the three strategic positions that actors adopt in a conflict (temporarily-deployed, fixed, and embedded) contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. I argue that the condition of embeddedness may account for some use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Embeddedness allows any actor to not only control the civilian population but to be camouflaged among civilians. This causes confusion among temporarily-deployed actors who are unable to identify the opposing actors when attacked. They then resort to using indiscriminate violence against anyone within the vicinity. As such, I suggest, it is the

presence of embedded actors that causes other actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians within zones.

CHAPTER THREE

THE "PIGGY-IN-THE-MIDDLE"[18] DILEMMA

3.1 Chapter Overview

In this chapter, I build on the theories and research reviewed in Chapter Two and present the theoretical framework I developed for this thesis, entitled the *Concept of Embeddedness*. This concept addresses the conditions in which civilians experience indiscriminate violence during conflicts through strategic positions which actors can assume during conflicts. I demonstrate how the strategic movement and positioning of actors within conflict zones renders civilians "piggies-in-the-middle," as they are wedged between embedded actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on temporary deployment to the zone.

The study follows the recent micro political turn in the study of conflict violence (King, 2004, p. 432). Its findings are not necessarily unique to Nepal, the main case study examined in this thesis. In fact, the findings are quite consistent with the multitude of ethnographic and micro historical accounts of civil war violence that Kalyvas (2006, p. 9-10) argues is a universal process formed by recurrent elements and organised in systems with regular structural features. Thus, while context may differ, mechanisms recur." Beyond Kalyvas (2006), I argue that mechanisms underpinning the strategic positioning of actors understood in depth, in one setting, such as Nepal, are of theoretical importance for three reasons. First, they can help to confirm or disconfirm hypotheses derived from more general theories of violence.

[18] The phrase "piggy in the middle" is defined as "A person who is placed in an awkward situation between two others." Oxford Living Dictionaries. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/piggy_(also pig) _in_the_middle (accessed January 12, 2018).

Second, they help to identify unspecific assumptions or logic that underlines existing theories. Third, they suggest the micro mechanisms that are at work during the use of indiscriminate violence, due to the strategic positioning of actors, may or may not be like civil war violence or other forms of organised violence. In short, findings from the case of Nepal are both validating and additive. This thesis thus, tries to contribute to an emerging literature that seeks to understand and explain indiscriminate violence from multiple dimensions but more specifically through the strategic positioning and movement of actors in conflict.

The study contributes to this literature in three additional ways. First, it revisits questions about the nature of indiscriminate violence but through the strategic positions adopted by actors. While previous theories have explored the use of indiscriminate violence to control or because of resources etc., I explore indiscriminate violence through the strategic positions that actors can assume to understand how violence moves with the actors using this form of violence. Second, this thesis highlights the importance of analysing the strategic movement of actors to understand the dimensions of indiscriminate violence. This helps to gain further insights into the complexities and ambiguities during the use of indiscriminate violence, shedding light on the nature of indiscriminate violence, the mechanisms triggering its use and how actors commit to it. It should be of interest to scholars who seek to better understand why actors kill civilians during certain moments in conflicts through particular strategic positions, often when these strategies are not designed to harm the civilian populations. Third, since the world's population is predicted to flock to urban areas,[19] and megacities in large numbers, with 70 per cent of the world's

[19] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html

population expected to live in cities by 2045, it is also predicted that these cities will house up to 10 million people across Africa and Asia. Poorly governed with high unemployment and criminality makes it fertile territory for violent extremism. The predicted fluctuation of civilians to urban areas suggests the nature of future conflicts may need to be fought differently. When states go to war, the enemies they encounter are irregular actors - not troops organised into armies but often freedom fighters, guerrillas, splinter groups and terrorists (actors). What this demonstrates is that the concept of embeddedness through the strategic positions, irregular fighting forces and urban warfare will all impact on a state's ability to differentiate between civilians and the enemy during conflicts. It is also likely that much of the fighting in future conflicts are likely to take place in and around urban cities. This will further impact conflict dynamics and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Above all, it will influence, and certainly alter, the way the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), Western States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union respond and intervene to protect civilians through peacekeeping missions. To understand this potential change, it is important to examine how previous conflicts were fought and how the strategic positions adopted by actors in a conflict helped contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

In this thesis, I propose that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians through the practice of embeddedness (i.e., actors becoming embedded in a zone) occurs under two conditions: first, when an embedded actor resorts to the use of indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population; and second, when fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed, actors use indiscriminate violence against

civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. The key distinction here is between embedded actors and the targets of indiscriminate violence. The use of indiscriminate violence will occur during different times and under different conditions, depending on the strategy deployed by actors during the conflict.

Chapter Three is divided into three core sections that demonstrate how indiscriminate violence against civilians occurs through the process of embeddedness. The first section (Section 3.2) offers a summary of how indiscriminate violence is viewed by Kalyvas (2006) and other researchers. This section provides the basis for the categorisation of indiscriminate violence employed in this thesis and outlines what indiscriminate violence is and what it is not. In Section 3.3, I develop a theoretical description of actors and then further conceptualise the potential actors in a conflict. This section shows that rethinking and regrouping conflict actors allows for an improved understanding of who can trigger and use indiscriminate violence. I present three strategic positions that the identified actors can assume: *embedded*, *temporarily-deployed*, and *fixed*. I later develop the three-strategic positions in section 3.4. However, for the purposes of the reader, I briefly provide the following introductory reminder of each parameter, which I develop later in the chapter: *embedded* actors are deeply rooted in a surrounding population of civilians during the conflict; *temporarily-deployed* actors are actors sent to a zone to either assist their allies or to combat warring actors who may be embedded or fixed in these zones (depending on the strategic assignment); and *fixed* actors can be recruited locally or stationed in zones for intermediate or extended periods of time and tend to hold defensive positions during a conflict. They are also familiar with the zones of control because

they are local or have remained there for long periods. In this section, I define each strategic position with examples from previous conflicts and demonstrate how these positions trigger and allow actors to use indiscriminate violence. In Section 3.5, I focus on the strategic position of embeddedness, which underlies the concept of embeddedness that guides this thesis. I argue that actors embed themselves amongst civilians not only to camouflage themselves but to control the civilian population. I demonstrate how embeddedness triggers the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by fixed actors, but predominately by temporarily-deployed actors who are not embedded. I then present key theoretical propositions and the expected outcomes of this investigation.

3.2 Understanding Indiscriminate Violence

In this section, I briefly explore what indiscriminate violence is. Indiscriminate violence differs from other forms of violence, such as selective violence or genocide. It is often defined as significant political or non-political violence within a conflict that leads to the killing of civilians. Psychological theories of decision-making, explain indiscriminate violence through decision-making under conditions of risk while considering the possible losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, McDermott, 2008; p. 69). In this theory, an initial editing phase concerns exactly how choices are presented, while a second phase concerns how choices are made (McDermott, 2008, p. 69). The theory uses the concept of "framing" to describe choices people make. Framing refers to how options are presented, which is significant since choices can be affected by their "method, order or manner of presentation" (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; McDermott, 2008, p. 70). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) established that people exhibit a natural aversion to extreme situations or options. Thus, by creating a

more extreme option Kahneman and Tversky could motivate a decision-maker to select a middle route that had appeared unacceptable without the contrast effect of more extreme additional option (McDermott, 2008, p. 70; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The second phase, or evaluation, involves a value purpose and a weighing function. Prospect theories have been applied to a variety of political science theories such as loss aversion, the status quo bias, framing issues, deterrence, and bargaining negotiations. An approach originated by Fathali M. Moghaddam (2006) focuses on the social and psychological procedures that lead to terrorist actions. This theory provides an alternative interpretation of the idea that choices are framed as the circumstances progress; where the choices, or in this case doors, seem to close for an individual. Moghaddam (2006, p. 70) envisions a narrowing stairway leading to a terrorist action at the top of a building. The stairway leads to higher floors and whether people remain on a floor depends on the doors and spaces people perceive available to them on that floor (Moghaddam 2006, p. 70-75). The further one climbs, the fewer choices one sees until "the only possible outcome is the destruction of others, oneself, or both" and where the perception of deprivation can be individualistic or communal (Moghaddam 2006, p. 70). These models are helpful when trying to understand why combatants are susceptible to using indiscriminate violence in conflicts. Resorting to indiscriminate violence may have been manipulated through framing, as choices appear to be limited. If the choices presented to people seem limited, then we can begin to understand why actors may have interpreted their situations as grim and acted upon their perceptions and feelings of dissonance. However, these models are not helpful when trying to understand the use of indiscriminate violence by actors through the different strategic positions that actors

adopt. The theory also misses an opportunity to assist the thesis to understand how indiscriminate violence is distributed during different strategic periods of a conflict.

According to Kalyvas's (2006) framework, which offers the basis for the perspective developed in this thesis, the definition of indiscriminate violence excludes petty crimes or relatively low-level outbreaks of violence that occur within the domestic sphere. However, Kalyvas (2006) does not specifically explore the way this thesis intends to capture how the strategic positioning of actors influences the use of indiscriminate violence. Previous literature argues that due to its persistence, indiscriminate violence has given rise to speculation that it is an irrational reflection of ideologies (Loizides, 2002, p. 429). Some scholars believe that actors' irrational behaviour is linked to the experience of heightened adrenaline in the war zone (Loizos, 1988, p. 642). Grossman and Krueger (1995) argue that the use of indiscriminate violence is linked to the environmental conditions created during conflicts, which impinge on actors' emotional status. They contend that the recent loss of friends or a beloved leader in combat can also enable violence on the battlefield. In many circumstances, soldiers react with anger, which is one of the recognised steps of coping with death. According to Grossman and Krueger (1995, p. 179), this emotional state can lead actors to believe that killing is the only way. This perspective provides some understanding of how actors can use violence in a reactive manner in response to attacks from the opposing side.

Kalyvas (2006) and other scholars view the use of indiscriminate violence from the perspective of control and as a way of pressuring civilians to comply. Indiscriminate violence may be used to achieve a variety of goals, such as eliminating certain groups,

displacing people, plundering goods, or establishing a group's power and demonstrating the ability to hurt another group (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 147; Andeson & Dill, 1995, p. 435). For Kalyvas (2006, p. 142), there is a distinction between what he defines as "selective" and "indiscriminate" violence. Selective violence entails tailored targeting, while indiscriminate violence entails collective targeting. He argues that combatants[20] seek control of the population (regardless of their preferences) by creating credible benefits for collaborators and, more importantly, assured sanctions for civilian defectors. According to Kalyvas (2006), indiscriminate violence is the only way of achieving this kind of control. White (1989) similarly found that indiscriminate violence is routinely used to increase submission and gain compliance with the authority of those who feel they may be threatened (White, 1989, p. 328). However, if indiscriminate violence is used at first, it quickly becomes counter-productive and selective violence eventually becomes the only sustained way to achieve control (Kalyvas, 2006). The authors above do well to separate and define selective and indiscriminate violence. This helps me to understand how it has been previously understood and described during previous analysis but raises further questions when tied to this thesis' framework. For example, how will the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians operate during the strategic movement and positioning of actors in a conflict? Will indiscriminate violence be used differently with dissimilar actors who adopt different strategic positions? Will different actors on opposing sides use similar or different forms of indiscriminate violence if they inhabit similar strategic positions or will there be notable differences? Will this contrast depend on the actor's position or will it be influenced by whether actors are in contested or uncontested zones? How will embedded actors respond to different

[20] The term combatant is used to reflect Kalyvas' (2006) views; but throughout this thesis, I refer to combatants as actors in a conflict.

strategies that are intended to separate them from civilians, and will this activate the use of indiscriminate violence by actors on temporarily-deployed missions? Will this alter the nature, pattern and technique through which civilians' experience violence? Does indiscriminate violence look different between actors whose strategic objective is to search for actors amongst civilians, verses those who's tactic is to live amongst civilians for extended periods?

According to Kalyvas (2006, p. 150), indiscriminate violence often aims to deter people from collaborating with rival actors by collectively sanctioning suspected collaborators and those related to them. Cairns (1997) claims the use of indiscriminate violence reflects the tendency of many overseers to designate various types of extrajudicial killings, including instances of selective violence, indiscriminately (Carlton, 1997, p. 10). Downes (2004) and Valentino (2004) argue that indiscriminate violence is much more visible than its selective counterpart and, as such, is thought to be more prevalent. Kalyvas (2006) argues that indiscriminate violence usually takes place in the context of military operations, known as "mopping-up," "search and destroy," or "scorched-earth" manoeuvres that confine and kill rebels and weaken insurgents' headquarters and habitats. It is also used when there is a lack of information in areas where the presence of actors on the opposing side is limited, such as urban centres and in villages that openly support the opposition (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 63; Kalyvas, 1999; 2006, p. 149). According to Kalyvas (2006, p. 150), indiscriminate violence aims to deter people from collaborating with rival actors by collectively sanctioning suspected collaborators and those related to them. This may lead state actors to perform violent operations against the civilian population to separate civilians from the rebel actors. Kalyvas acknowledges the potential for the

embedding of actors in a conflict zone and recognises that state authorities have trouble differentiating between embedded actors and civilians, leading to the need for operations that separate actors and civilians. Indiscriminate violence is used to deter civilians from collaborating with rival actors by unravelling shared relations, which can become stronger over time.

Kalyvas (2006) and others are right to explore the use of violence in the context of military operations. An operation can often have a strategic objective but does this account for whether the military operations which are strategic can facilitate the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. It is my belief the use of indiscriminate violence is a causal outcome of operations (i.e. strategic positions interacting with each other and actors need to control civilians) that have strategic elements revealed through actors' strategic position. In other words, military operations are strategic in nature but require actors to assume strategic positions for these operations to be functional, successful, and largely tactical. As argued in Chapter Two, having access to information is important, but it is not the crucial element to indiscriminate violence for the author. Military operations need information which supports a plan or a strategy. However, for a plan to defeat a rival actor to be credible, actors must adopt a strategy which is accompanied with the actor adopting a strategic position which assists the actors achieve their goals. Even if information is provided, the level of information is comparative and not all information goes toward supporting operations or controlling civilians. Information can be weak, strong, fabricated, inaccurate and accurate, but information only is not crucial to defeating an actor's opponent; information only tells actors what is occurring within a zone. Actors will be faced with a choice to either act upon this information with a strategy, which involves the

deployment of actors to counter those who are embedded, or ignore, or do nothing by choosing to 'sit on it.' Whether the strategy is to hold and control a zone or attack remotely with weapons, a strategy will be essential to encompass actors taking up a position to defend this zone. Thus, the use of indiscriminate violence is part of a tactic and is used as a response to the strategic positions that interact with one another. I will revisit this point, later in the chapter.

3.3.2 Addressing Civilian Agency

Civilians who are "piggies in the middle" amongst the different actors do have variations of agency depending on the strategic positions which they interact with. For example, the level of agency between civilians and embedded actors will not be clearly established during the earlier periods of embeddedness. Once the embedding of actor has begun, I expect the level of agency and dependency on civilians to be strengthened and increase as the process of embeddedness continues.

In situations where actors are fixed, the agency between civilians and this group of fixed actors will be highest amongst all the strategic positions. However, this can fluctuate and typically depends on the actors' overall approach when fixed with locals. Since this position hinges on the recruitment of locals, civilians will have higher levels of agency from the start of when fixed actors and civilians interact with one another. This is partially because those recruiting locals may have once or continue to be locals themselves. However, the levels of agency may vary depending on the relationship between actors and civilians. During the second Sudanese conflict, the Sudanese state recruited the Janjaweed militia groups to recruit locals and deal with the SPLA/M. Civilians in this situation had higher levels of agency because they were recruited to form and be a part of local militia groups to fight the SPLA/M.

I expect the agency between civilians and temporarily-deployed actors to be little to non-existent. This is largely because this actor's strategic position requires actors to pass through civilian populations for limited time; unless this actor's strategic position changes. Since this actor is continuously moving, the dependency on civilian populations is limited and will not involve large amounts of interaction like actors who are fixed or embedded. However, the level of indiscriminate violence, i.e., target and sources distinction, I expect to be much higher because of the weak association between this position and civilian populations. For the purposes of thesis, I focus on the impact of civilians as "piggies in the middle" from the perspective of embedded actors.

3.3 Defining Indiscriminate Violence in this Thesis

Kalyvas' (2006) model is a stepping stone for this thesis, with well-defined conditions, manifestations, and parameters to detect indiscriminate violence. Key to his perspective is the acknowledgement that indiscriminate violence is likely to transpire during periods of military operations, such as "search and destroy" or "scorched earth" manoeuvers. While the scholars presented above shed light on what indiscriminate violence is and how it can be used, the current understanding of the conditions under which indiscriminate violence occurs is constrained. The concern with the scholars' perspectives is the focus on actors who tend to assume an embedded or fixed position. The literature seems to ignore actors who have short-term goals and objectives, such as temporarily-deployed actors whose time amongst the civilian population is limited. If I adopt the thesis theoretical framework of strategic positions, it will require a new thinking and understanding of how indiscriminate violence is defined and revealed. I believe control can be gained through military

strategies (Kalyvas, 2006) and once control is gained, the incentives to continue using indiscriminate violence are significantly reduced, especially when embedded actors use indiscriminate violence. If at any point indiscriminate is used against civilians, it suggests that actors do not have control over the civilian populations. I believe indiscriminate violence by actors who are temporarily-deployed will be used for different reasons than actors who are fixed and embedded. In other words, the use indiscriminate violence through strategic positions is demonstrated differently through each strategic position. Some actors' positions may require indiscriminate violence to be used to control; while others strategic positions involve actors using indiscriminate violence to respond to an opposing actor's strategic position that tactically becomes a threat to their overall position and objective. In other words, the levels of indiscriminate violence are linked to the different strategic positions.

This dual role of indiscriminate violence was observed during the Peruvian conflict. In January 1984, President Terry placed General Adrian Huaman Centero in command of the emergency zone in Ayacucho Peru, where the SP had control over the zone. Centero's focus was a broader counterinsurgency effort that caused the population to slowly begin to switch sides and support the military (Ocasio, 1995, p. 4). As the 1985 elections grew closer, President Terry decided to increase the military presence in the emergency zone, sending between 5,000 and 7,000 soldiers into the southern highlands and deploying an additional 2,500-3,000 soldiers' into the northern highlands and UHV. Over 10 per cent of the army participated in active operations against SP, with many maintaining positions to defend key infrastructure. By Election Day, the army had deployed nearly 40,000 additional troops in approximately 4,000 polling stations to defeat SL and their hit-and-run tactics (McClintock, 2005, p. 89;

Central Intelligence Agency, Terrorism Review, 1985, p. 20). As a response, the SP launched attacks on civilian populations whom they had once been embedded amongst to counter the militaries position. The strategy involved the SP actors being on temporary deployment and using indiscriminate violence against civilians and state actors.

The Peruvian example shows that the deployment of actors to SP zones triggered two outcomes. Initially, the SP changed its strategic position to respond to the states' deployment of military actors by temporarily deploying SP actors. Next, as a response to the states deployment, the SP used violence against civilians to regain control over previously held zones, to demonstrate that the state could not protect civilians. This example establishes the diminished dominance the SP had over the zone and civilians. This was largely due to the new strategic position which involved deploying an increasing number of military personnel to SP zones, creating a counteractive response from the SP who resorted to using violence against civilians. This was not done through access to information as suggested by some researchers. In fact, while information may have been important, it was not crucial to countering the SP during this period. General Adrian Huaman Centero military strategy of drying the waters, involved deploying military actors to civilian zones for extended periods (later becoming embedded) and increasing troop numbers in these zones. This would later lead to Centero assuming further control over the zone. By strategically positioning state military to SP zones which interacted with SP embedded positions; this obstructed the SP's overall significance and position with civilians. The SP was left with no choice but to counter the army's new strategy by assuming a new strategic position with countermeasures. These countermeasures required SP actors to be

strategically repositioned and use indiscriminate violence as a strategy, to change civilians support back to the SP.

While the earlier models help to understand indiscriminate violence, they do not explain how the different strategic positions assumed by actors interact with one another and create complex processes for indiscriminate violence to flourish. While I agree with previous researcher in their analysis that indiscriminate violence is used to control, I argue that indiscriminate violence can also be used to respond to strategic positions that an actor assumes, which poses as a threat to their overall objective and the zones they control. This can result in counter measures that lead to violence against civilians as a way of controlling civilian populations and the zone civilians inhabit. As the Peruvian example shows, the changes in strategic positions later altered the relationship between embedded SP and the civilians whom the SP were once embedded amongst. Thus, the manifestation of indiscriminate violence through each strategic position is shown and used differently depending on the actor and their strategic position.

I suspect indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors will be used to create an immediate impact on civilians and the zone inhabited by actors. I do not believe these actors can create sustainable change or control, unless they transform their position. For there to be long-term control over a zone and civilians, temporarily-deployed actors will need to be amongst civilians for prolonged periods. This will require this actor to change their tactic and strategic position, from one that attempts to separate and attack civilians, to one that embeds lives amongst civilian populations in zones. To establish control over civilians and zones, indiscriminate

violence must be used over a certain period by actors that are embedded with civilians, over time. This eventually gives actors full control over the civilian populations within these zones.

Therefore, the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors is not about controlling civilian populations for extended periods, since this is not something the strategic position allows temporarily-deployed actors to be able to do on the ground, nor remotely. Control by temporarily-deployed actors cannot be gained by airstrikes; airstrikes only cause the population to disperse, which later allows other actors to re-embed themselves amongst civilians in new zones.

I expect temporarily-deployed actors' use of indiscriminate violence to be fiercer in nature because their objective during their interactions with civilians is only designed to pass through civilian zones and deal with opposing embedded actors. If temporarily deployed actors, after using indiscriminate violence, decide to change their strategic positions to a position which is embedded, then we can expect a change in tactic that involves some form of a heart and minds campaign. This means the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors is less about control, and instead associated with inflicting harm, creating havoc and countering the enemy. Thus, the targeting of civilians and source distinction will vary depending on the strategic position assumed by each actor. I will later come back to this point when I discuss the definitions of each strategic position.

Therefore, I define indiscriminate violence as: collective and random acts of violence and killings, and abuse of human rights which is restricted to the physical abuse of civilians (torture, rape, and abduction) by actors who assume different strategic positions within the context of intra-state conflicts. I expand on Kalyvas' (2006),

classification and theoretical framework to define indiscriminate violence as significant political or non-political violence within a conflict that leads to acts of violence and the killing of civilians. I believe that most indiscriminate violence occurs around the military operations and is linked, largely, to temporarily-deployed actors. I argue that, in most cases, indiscriminate violence occurs near embedded actors or in areas to which temporarily-deployed actors are sent. I expect indiscriminate violence to be largely triggered by the behaviour of actors that are often embedded among civilians to control the civilian populations when first embedded. For embedded actors, it will also be used to gain control and spread compliance among civilians they view as a threat to their existence (White, 1989, p. 328). Indiscriminate violence is likely to be frequently used by temporarily-deployed actors as a response to the strategic position of embeddedness or when actors are on route to fight the opposition. The use of indiscriminate violence is likely to be observed in zones where embedded, temporarily-deployed and fixed actors are present and interact with each other. Civilians living within these zones are more likely to experience intractable behaviour. Civilians become “piggies in the middle” wedged between the different actors of the conflict within the zone they inhabit.

The purpose of indiscriminate violence is to try and gain control during or after operations or to retaliate for recent attacks, depending on the actor's strategic position. I believe that indiscriminate violence is likely to coincide, partially, with an actor’s inability to restrain themselves in response to external conditions shaped by other actors who assume different strategic positions. The use of indiscriminate violence includes circumstances in which actors impose pain on the nearest person within their reach. Bystanders may refer to the initial violent behaviour as irrational, wild, and random; but at the centre of its action is a strategic purpose. While the targets of the

violence are random, the behaviour is intentionally designed to gain compliance and control, cause damage, and scare and hurt the civilian populations. Indiscriminate violence can be physical (Riches, 1986) or structural (Uvin 1998), and used alongside structural institutions like the state, rebel groups and local militia groups who assume any of the three positions described above. Indiscriminate violence includes any action in support of defeating actors or civilians seen to be linked to an opposing side. In the next section, I outline in Section 3.4 and 3.5, who the potential actors of a conflict are.

3.4 Actors of Conflict

In this section, I develop a refined understanding of who the actors of a conflict are to provide the study with a framework to understand who can use indiscriminate violence through the strategic positioning of actors. To do this, I first provide a nuance definition of actors. Since I have established that different actors can assume diverse strategic positions and actors are not fixed to a position, actors have the capability of adopting both singular and multiple positions throughout the conflict. This understanding helps me to appreciate how indiscriminate violence parades itself against civilians through actors' anticipated strategic positions.

In this thesis, I define the term actor(s) as a state or non-state formally organised groups. This includes the armed-forces of the government and an opposing civil organised group, within the state borders. I restrict the use of the term actors to internal actors in an intra-state conflict. On the state side, actors can include military, police, armed police, hired state-militants, and secret-service forces fighting the opposition. On the opposing side/s, this can include rebels, splinter groups, absorbed

groups, and ethnic/local groups (See Table 3.0). The term "actors" as Galtung points out, goes beyond more than two parties to a conflict (Galtung 1994) and refers here to the various groups, people, or institutional state mechanisms involved in any conflict. Actors include individuals who have obtained at least some measure of political power and/or authority in a society engaged in activities that can have a significant influence on decisions, policies, and outcomes associated with a given conflict. In democratic countries, this would include all elected leaders, candidates who are running for elections and relatively high-level policy makers who have a significant impact on the formation and execution of policies that have an impact on society during a conflict. This definition includes all those in power who have been elected to these positions, including government ministers, and those members of the legislative branch who are in the opposition. It also includes individuals who oversee government institutions (e.g. the foreign Ministry) that are considered important. Given the context in which this thesis examines actors i.e. conflict setting, I restrict actors to include actors in non-democratic settings or semi-democratic settings who may carry out similar functions but are not elected, or at least not elected in free and fair elections. This may be because there are no elections or because elections have occurred in circumstances not considered to be free and fair. Members of the political opposition may not be permitted to serve in the legislature or in any other formal capacity. Those opposed to the government or the state may be leading extra-parliamentary groups, militia groups or rebel group at a national or local level. These actors may even find themselves in exile within the state and not outside as is normally the case when the word exile is used. In other words, actors are or can be state or non-state individuals or groups who are formally or informally organised.

Contested, Uncontested Zones and Strategic Positions

A crucial question which needs to be discussed is whether the strategic positioning of actors determines whether a zone is contested or uncontested. A zone is not static; rather a zone can alternate from being contested to uncontested, within a short or extended period. However, this is dependent on the dynamics of fighting between actors who are strategically positioned within this zone. For a zone to be contested or uncontested, I argue this is dependent on who controls the zones through the strategic placement of actors in each zone. To this end, a zone can be contested because various actors adopted different strategic positions which alter over a period and interact with one another. This means a contested territory is any zone where an actor enters a zone of control and poses an immediate threat to the actors controlling that zone upon entry. Thus, if an actor is attacked by another actor from the opposing side while within the zone they control, this may lead to the zone becoming contested or remaining uncontested. Consequently, the strategic positioning of an actor in a zone can also help researchers and this thesis to understand whether a zone is contested or uncontested. For the zone to be contested, several actors must be strategically placed in this zone. Some contested territories are faction-affiliated (e.g., some zones will have alliance in these zones, while other zones that are uncontested might have the similar alliance).

This means in a contested zone, an actor on the state's side can be embedded, fixed and temporarily-deployed, while actors on the opposing side(s) can also be embedded, fixed and temporarily-deployed. This is largely because the zone is contested, and no one group of actors' holds ultimate control; hence why the zone is contested. The strategic placement of actors in contested and uncontested zones can impact the

overall dynamics within a zone. This means no one zone is ever fully controlled until one actor completely controls that zone. In a contested zone, no one actor can continually dominate the zone, unless the opposing actor retreats or strategically withdraws or repositions their actors. Strategically placing actors in this zone will continue to mean that no one actor will control the zone unless one side is defeated, a peace agreement is agreed upon, or ceasefire occurs.

For a zone to be uncontested and remain uncontested, actors must be on the same side and have the capacity to adopt several strategic positions in the same or neighbouring zone, with no opposing actors within their occupied zone. Uncontested zones are zones where one party, or a group of actors on the same side, control a zone without there being any resistance. Actors may encounter opposing actors but for the zone to remain uncontested, this would suggest this zone has not changed sides. Actors in uncontested zones can adopt any of the three strategic positions depending on the dynamics taking place within that zone that may pose a threat to the actors' overall strategic aim. Uncontested zones differ from contested zones because the strategic placement of actors in uncontested zones suggests actors have full control, while contested zones will have the potential to host various actors, with varying degrees of active fighting taking place within these zones. As a result, I contend actors' strategic positions can also help determine whether a zone is contested or uncontested because of the geographical control the strategic positions gives actors within these zones (See Kalyvas, 2006). Therefore, it is important to understand the different strategic positions that actors adopt to fully comprehend the use and movement of indiscriminate violence. To do this, I will first build upon the traditional state versus the rebel dichotomy framework of understanding indiscriminate violence. By

expanding this model, I can better understand how indiscriminate violence is triggered and distributed through the strategic positioning of actors in a conflict.

Much of the literature on the use of indiscriminate violence touches on how actors use indiscriminate violence towards civilians. The literature provides a dyadic conceptualization on the use of indiscriminate violence in a conflict (state versus the rebels). Previous research has viewed the distribution of violence during conflicts through the lens of these two actors (See Figure 3.0). While recent scholars (Lyall, 2009; Kalyvas, 2006) do distinguish between the diverse types of state actors at the disaggregate level, i.e., opposition or rebel actors. Previous frameworks constrain our understanding of the ways indiscriminate violence occurs between the different actors and civilians, who can all move through space and time by adopting different strategic positions.

When conducting the initial analysis of the actors involved in the Nepalese conflict and in other conflicts that I summarise in this thesis, I found the traditional framework to be limiting and unsupportive of the explanation of violence I was witnessing. The traditional model (state versus rebels) does not help this thesis to understand how actors' strategic positions and movement can be disaggregated at a micro-level. Later in this chapter, I build on this traditional model to demonstrate how previous examinations may have missed this disaggregated level of analysis. I later argue that this disaggregated level of analysis is essential if researchers want to understand how indiscriminate violence is triggered by the strategic positions adopted by actors.

Since I am interested in how the strategic positions trigger the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, there is a need to conceptualise how actors are

disaggregated in conflicts. Therefore, identifying the diverse potential actors of a conflict allows this study to track where all actors move to, how indiscriminate violence is distributed, and why certain civilians may experience indiscriminate violence while others do not. By identifying who the different actors of a conflict are, I can provide an enhanced understanding of how, when, and why these actors may use indiscriminate violence against civilians across their assumed strategic positions. This helps me to understand how indiscriminate violence operates within zones that actors inhabit.

In Table 3.0, I outline the diversity of actors on the state and rebel side. In this thesis, these actors have been identified as the actors who can use indiscriminate violence and adopt different strategic positions, as conceptualized in this chapter and the previous chapters. I disaggregate the different actors using an expanded state versus rebel framework to understand how actors on either side can adopt and expand upon each strategic position. This is necessary as earlier research does not use the theoretical framework adopted in this thesis (i.e., actors adopting different strategic positions) to understand how this leads to indiscriminate violence. While traditional spectrums of viewing conflict actors are limited. The developed framework in this thesis provides an opportunity to expand on previous research that may have used this traditional framework to understand the use of indiscriminate violence.

Since no one actor in a contested zone has full control, the potential number of actors adopting strategic positions in a contested zone can be high. Using figure 3.0 as an example, the number of potential actors in a contested zone could potentially rise to six. However, If I expand this notion to include the disaggregated actors from table

3.0, then the number of potential actors rises to 27, with different actors from both sides adopting a strategic position (as seen in figure 3.5 and 3.6 combined). In a situation where one side controls an uncontested zone, with no opposing actor, the number of actors in this position will be less because it is dominated by one main actor, or an alliance of actors who may or may not adopt all three strategic positions within this zone. In table 3.0, I adopt the understanding that on the state side, there can be the potential to have the military, police, armed police, hired state militant and secret services forces. While on the rebel's side, actors can include rebels, splinter groups, absorbed groups and ethnic/local groups.

Table 3.0: Table of identified actors on the state and rebel side.

State Actors	**Rebel Actors**
Military	Rebels
Police	Splinter groups
Armed police	Absorbed groups
Hired state militants	Ethnic/ local groups
Secret service forces	

Figure 3.0, illustrates the way previous research views actors and their use of indiscriminate violence. This perspective does not consider other potential actors who can move within fighting spaces (zones) by adopting different strategic positions and using indiscriminate violence throughout a conflict.



Figure 3.0: Contemporary thinking of who the actors of a conflict are.

The current model is restrictive because not only does it not allow for the diversity of actors involved in a conflict, but it does not disaggregate and account for different actors' strategic positions and the geographical control over conflict zones that actors may adopt. Above all, the model cannot explain how actors can operate in a zone, particularly zones that can be contested and uncontested as discussed above. In the next sections, I expand the parameters of each strategic position and provide examples from previous and existing conflicts to help us understand the nature of each strategic position. I then expand upon the traditional (state versus rebel) model to provide a better understanding of the strategic positions these actors can assume in a conflict.

3.5 Parameters and Positions of Actors

In this section, I reinforce my proposition by demonstrating that actors tend to occupy three strategic positions, *embedded*, *temporarily-deployed*, and *fixed*. I establish how

these strategic positions differ and allow different actors to exercise indiscriminate violence against civilians. Crucial to understanding the parameters of each strategic position, it is equally vital to comprehend the nature of each position and how each position can transpire. The times in table 3.1 are used in this thesis as an outline in relation to the Nepalese conflict. These times are based upon archived accounts, interviews and examples drawn from the strategy of the Mao's revolution, Peruvian and second Sudanese conflicts. Mao's red book details how actors should respond during temporary deployment.

> "When we encamp, if there is a presumption that the enemy may be near, we should send every day a guerrilla company—or at least a platoon—toward the enemy's defences to carry out reconnaissance at a distance (from 20 to 30*i*) for several days or to join up with the local forces and carry out propaganda among the masses, in order to inspire them to resist the enemy. If this unit discovers the enemy, it should, on the one hand, resist him and, on the other hand, report to us so that we can prepare to meet the foe or to retreat without being drawn into an unnecessary battle."[21]

Mao claims if the enemy is near, the response should be the deployment of a guerrilla company or a platoon, which can be anything between 8-24 men.[22] Mao refers to the deployment of actors for several days, not weeks. He goes on to argue that actors should try and resist the enemy, but if this is not possible then they should report back for reinforcements. As a result, I will partially use some of Mao's red book to help determine each strategic position. The time frames for temporarily-deployed actors in

[21] http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/QCM66.pdf [access on 08/10/2018]
[22] https://www.thebalancecareers.com/u-s-army-military-organization-from-squad-to-corps-4053660 [access on 08/10/2018]

table 3.1 also originate from my pre-interviews conducted with experts of the Nepalese conflict. During phase two of my field research, I met with senior military, police generals and Maoist strategists who provided me with estimated times of when their actors were deployed to zones on temporary deployment. Based on this and accounts from victims. I provide an outline of time frames for the other strategic positions which can enable me to better assess the nature of each position during the Nepalese conflict.

For the purposes of this thesis, *embeddedness* is defined as the position and time in which an actor is deeply rooted in a surrounding population of civilians during a conflict. The term surrounding population of civilians means when actors encircle civilian populations in a specific location which makes up a zone or liberated zone controlled by embedded actors. Embeddedness can occur when an actor goes from being temporarily-deployed or fixed[23] (holding battle positions) to staying in a zone for extended periods of time. This period can be months to years. The nature of embeddedness is the element of living and camouflaging amongst civilian populations. It includes the establishment of liberated zones, launching attacks that may involve using the civilians as a shield for cover and controlling geographical locations, which leads to the establishment of controlled zones and new governance systems within the zone. Embeddedness involves an actor being sent on deployment to a stationary position (holding battle positions) for extended periods of time. Embedded actors are not a part of the local population but can later live amongst locals as if they were civilians themselves. Embeddedness does not include shorter periods, i.e., a few days amongst civilians because this scenario suggests actors are

[23] I will come to the two remaining positions (temporarily deployed to fixed) in the next two paragraphs.

not committed and will move on or be required to adjust their strategic position because of a potential threat or attack. Thus, an actor may go from being temporarily-deployed to fixed and then embedded or start from being fixed (deployed for a length of time or recruited from the zone) and then embedded. Embeddedness can also involve an actor being permanently embedded amongst civilians from the moment of deployment. Thus, to be embedded actors must have restrictions on their movement outside of a zone or a liberated area which they control or within a contested zone (where no one party has full control) or uncontested zone (e.g., controlled by the military). The restriction means once an actor moves outside of their position within a zone or outside a controlled zone, then the actor has changed their position and the former position of embeddedness ceases to exist.

A more recent example is taken from the battle of Mosul in 2016, where US coalition forces supported Iraq forces to tackle jihadists in the area. The Northern Iraqi city of Mosul –where the offensive against the jihadists had lasted more than six weeks, and where Baghdad forces were trying to flush out the terrorists embedded amongst civilians in the eastern districts where Iraqi troops had not yet been able to penetrate – is where the jihadist actors in this case where deeply embedded amongst civilians for several weeks before the offensive took place in the area. This involved Iraqi forces, with support from the U.S. and coalition forces, being deployed to this area to sift out the actors.

A similar example is observed during the second Sudanese conflict where actors were embedded and fixed and were used to expand the zones of control for the SPLA/M. In 1984-85, the SPLA/M began operations in new areas, attracting young men from

north of Bar Al-Ghazal (Collins, 2008, p. 143). Their strategy at the time was to deploy actors to the Lakes province who later became embedded amongst the civilians; this was especially the case around Yirol, which fell to the SPLA/M in December 1985, as did Rumbek in 1989. During these operations, the SPLA/M would embed themselves amongst civilians for periods of time to convince new recruits and locals to join the group as they pushed north. The SPLA/M then advanced on Wau, a government stronghold, and continued this strategy until 1987, moving as far as the Rumbek district in 1987. The SPLA/M also started re-entering northern Bar al-Ghazal from its bases to the south in the Lakes province in early 1986 but did not confront government and militia forces until 1987.

The example from South Sudan shows that embeddedness can involve an actor being temporarily-deployed or fixed (holding battle positions), but for them to be embedded, they must remain in a zone for extended periods. The second Sudanese conflict involved embedding actors amongst civilians for extended periods and slowly extending these zones of control, by capturing neighbouring zones through fixed actor and re-embedding actors into these new zones. The example also demonstrates how capturing a zone worked with fixed and embedded actors through a local recruitment process. Embeddedness also included the SPLA/M actors living amongst civilians for extended periods of time with local village families. The process of embeddedness appears to be used by actors on the rebel side. State actors seem to not embed themselves but stay in a military barracks on the outskirts of a village or zones.

During the Nepalese conflict, embeddedness occurred when Maoist embedded their actors with civilians and then conducted events with locals in Rolpha and Rukum districts before the emergence of the conflict. Before the conflict, the Maoists

organised several community events and launched several campaigns to embed themselves amongst the civilian population (Dhakal and Pyakuryal, 2007, p. 77). Campaigns such as "Sija" helped organise a centralized Maoist force which was then deployed in small groups to civilian zones. These groups were mostly composed of party members, insurgents, and leaders. They organised the masses, propagated the party line and held studies in Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (Thapa, 2003:155). This helped to embed actors and spread the Maoist philosophy. Actors were initially formed into fighting groups of 3-4 members. During the second plan (1998) the Maoists increased the size of their deployed units to 7-9 combatants, and during the third plan, squad numbers increased to 32 (Thapa, 2003; by Li Onesto 2003:157). The strategies of the Maoist, like that of the Sudanese conflict, demonstrate the steps taken to embed their actors before the conflict, amongst the civilian populations.

I suggest that the actors who challenge the state (i.e., rebels, splinter groups, absorbed groups, and ethnic/local groups) are most likely to assume this position. I believe embeddedness occurs because most actors fighting the state will need to have some form of a base that is not located where the state actors are based. This increases their chance of support from civilians. Finally, I believe rebel actors will use this position more than state actors because state actors will often have barracks in or around civilians' zones.

An actor may go from being temporarily-deployed to fixed, and then embedded, or start from being fixed (deployed for a length of time or recruited from the zone) and then embedded. An actor can also be permanently embedded amongst civilians from the moment of deployment. Embeddedness also includes the restriction of actors' movements within a contested zone (e.g., where no one party has full control) or

uncontested zone (e.g., controlled by the military or a rebels). Therefore, measuring embeddedness beyond a two-week period provides a reasonable amount of time to examine an actor's activities and determine whether they are significantly more likely to use indiscriminate violence and then move on.

Temporarily-deployed actors are sent to zones for strategic motives and have an incentive to maximize short-run plunder by stealing and harming civilians (e.g., to commit violence or havoc, or for defensive and offensive purposes) (Olson, 1993). Actors who are temporarily-deployed to a zone, depending on the strategic assignment, are normally sent to either assist their allies or to combat warring actors who may be embedded or fixed in these zones. This is often done to identify the enemy or capture the opposition who may have attacked this actor's base. This position will often involve trying to counteract 'hide and seek' tactics that are used against an opposing side. Actors using this strategy will often try to siege liberated zones controlled by opposing actors. On the state side, the nature of this position may revolve around counterinsurgency measures (e.g., acted out by state forces) or hit and run tactics (e.g., acted out by rebels) conducted by opposing actors. The nature of this position may encompass a strategy of prevention by actors on all sides and may be seen more as a forward front to dealing with an opposing actor.

I draw an example from the second Sudanese conflict to demonstrate this transformation: the second Sudanese civil war that lasted over twenty years from 1983 to 2005, until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Young, 2012, p. 28). This period witnessed clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces

(SAF) and the SPLA/M along the Ethiopian border (Akol, 2009, p. 21, 33). It was also used as a training camp for the newly-recruited SPLA/M combatants who initiated “hit and run” and “hide and seek” tactics against the SAF and would later flee into the jungle. The SPLA/M operated through small underground cells, infiltrating popular associations, attacking SAF units, and seizing their equipment. In response, the government launched counterinsurgency operations in these zones along the North-South border. The SAF deployed actors and while on deployment to SPLA/M zones, the SPLA attacked the SAF with counter measures. The SAF’s lack of ability to deal with the situation resulted in the government of the north initiating Operation “Scorched Earth.” This operation involved advancing through civilian-inhabited land and destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy. The strategy involved targeting food sources, transportation, communications, industrial resources, and even civilians. The SAF deployed air raids on civilians, and mobilised and armed local Arabs living near to advanced SPLA/M zones, as a quick-fix method. This increased indiscriminate violence against civilians who were located amongst or on the route to the SPLA/M zones, while ethnic groups who were aligned to the SPLA/M were also targeted.

The temporary deployment of actors here is not simply restricted to battling the opposing side but was also to oppose a strategic move or position intended to be implemented by an opposing side, with the aim of apprehending key actors or groups in contested and uncontested zones. On the rebel’s side, the strategy can often resemble the actors conducting a form of mobile warfare without a home. While on the state side, actions carried out by the police, army, armed police, etc., will appear differently in nature because it encompasses short-term deployment to zones where

civilians may or may not be based. The counterinsurgent measures are designed to deal with embedded and fixed actors. This strategic position is characterised by the ephemeral nature of rebel actors' activities and the rebels' tentative confrontation of state and the state's response.

Temporarily-deployed actors, in many cases, are required to enter civilian populations to reach their assigned zones. They are unlikely to live with these civilians because of trust issues but may have some associations with certain civilian groups along the way. Along the route to their assigned zones, temporarily-deployed actors may be ordered to seek out warring groups (often for offensive or defensive reasons) that pose a threat to their deployed unit or zones. In other cases, temporarily-deployed actors may arrive at their assigned location without the occurrence of fighting between the warring actors; but they may later be attacked or ambushed by other actors in these zones. In other situations, temporarily-deployed actors may encounter fighting between smaller splinter or rebel groups when they seek out the enemy. An actor may also be sent on temporary-deployment to reinforce a zone where there is no fighting.

An example of the nature of temporarily-deployed actors is taken from the decade-long Nepalese conflict. In 1998, the government launched Operation Kilo Sierra II, which lasted for two months from mid-June to August 1998. This involved the use of police forces from Kathmandu and neighbouring districts being deployed into the heart of the Maoist zones. Kilo Sierra II caused an estimated 200 deaths: 15 in Rolpa, 20 in Rukum and over 50 in Jajarkot with the rest in areas surrounding the Maoist zones (Li Onesto, 2006, p. 159). The Maoists would also retaliate with "hit and run" and "hide and seek" attacks in smaller units with civilians at the front line and then return amongst the civilian populations as if nothing had happened. This made it

extremely hard for the police to distinguish between Maoists and civilians and often left the police frustrated, later leading to the use of indiscriminate violence as a way of gaining control (Karki and Seddon 2003, p. 429). The police also used techniques such as "search marches" in Maoist zones, which often led to extreme force and torture against the local populations and led to the death of more civilians (Karki and Seddon 2003, p. 430). The example demonstrates that both the state and rebel actors were sent to different zones to counter the efforts of each actor.

Temporarily-deployed actors will be able to operate in both contested and uncontested situations where an actor is deployed to. In the example above, temporarily-deployed actors on the state side were used to filter embedded actors amongst civilians. These actors were sent on a mission to search for the actors that were embedded amongst civilians. While on the Maoist rebel side, the nature of temporarily-deployed actors involved sending actors on hit-and-run missions designed to attack the state's actors and provoke them into a response. For measurement purposes, temporarily-deployed actors are only present in zones for a few days up to a maximum period of a week. Anything beyond this period would lead these actors to become fixed, and anything beyond a fixed actor means this actor becomes embedded. I suggest all identified actors can assume this position. State actors may use this strategic position because of the need to demonstrate state power and their presence to the larger civilian population during conflicts.

Finally, *fixed* actors are normally recruited or stationed in zones for longer periods of time than their temporarily-deployed counterparts. Fixed actors tend to hold defensive positions and are often used to expand in or to new liberated zones. Occasionally, they may be required to deflect warring parties who try to attack uncontested or

contested territory. Fixed actors are also familiar with the zones of control and the civilian populations they inhabit because they are either recruited from these zones or have remained there for intermediate to extended periods. As such, they can disguise themselves effortlessly amongst civilians. Depending on the nature and duration of a conflict, fixed actors may be deployed to a different zone outside their current zone for several days or weeks to reinforce their zones of control. This makes the differentiation between the fixed actors (who can become embedded) and the civilian population difficult. In some situations, fixed actors may be asked to move through to another side of the zone, with which they are familiar, to provide reinforcements, defend zones, and assist fellow actors. I suggest that all identified actors can assume this position.

Their strategy is centred on the recruitment and creation of full-fledged, territorial-based zones or areas. Fixed actor's strategy is characterised by an actor's ability to compete openly with the forces of the established state, and administratively by imposing territorial units and structure of governance on the same group of civilian populations where fixed actors are recruited from.

During the Peruvian conflict, the fixed positioning of actors was witnessed by the recruitment of local actors by President Gracia. By 1987, it was clear that SL was regaining control of the Valley, with a successful attack by SL on a police station in Uchiza in the state of San Martín, and the subsequent occupation of the town on 31 May 1987. García re-established the State of Emergency to include San Martín, Huánuco, and Ucayali. In addition, internal disputes between the police and the army meant that the brutal "Sinchis" were re-deployed and embedded amongst civilians. General Alberto Arciniega later assumed control over this emergency zone in April 1989, commanding a force of 4,000 troops (Dreyfus, 1998, p. 103). Like Carbajal in

1985, General Arciniega rapidly realised that the civilians were the power base of the SP. Noticing this, he switched his strategy to reflect the interest of the civilians and gave them a choice between SP and the army. As a result, SP stepped up its attacks and moved their operations to urban areas, particularly towards the capital, Lima. During this period SP, still chose to use "hit-and-run" tactics and embedded combatants further amongst civilians. By 1989, SP was permanently operating and embedded amongst Lima civilians (CVR 2003, 2.8.3, 246). Beginning in the mid-1960s the SP established a vast network of supporters and sympathizers in the rural areas of the southern Andean departments of Ayacucho and Apurimac, primarily through control of the education faculty at the Universidad Nacional San Cristbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho (Degregori, 1990). The control of areas, faculty and curriculum provided adherents for the SP with a mechanism for recruiting revolutionary cadres from the population of provincial youths who accounted for many of the students at the university. This provided the SP with invaluable opportunities, including the use of teaching positions to diffuse its revolutionary message, the establishment of a widespread network of adherents and sympathizers in the countryside. It created a geographical basis for the creation of territorial strongholds and eventually of so-called liberated zones, once the armed struggle was initiated.

As a response, the García government decided to support the creation of numerous local indigenous militias who collectively became known as "Rondas Campesinas" (Fumerton, 2001; Nuñez-Palomino, 1996). The Rondas came into existence in Southern Peru in the province of Huaychao on 21 January 1983, when villagers killed seven SP members as a response to SP abuses in the area (Mitchell & Hancock, 2007). The Rondas had minimal training by the army but were used as a first line of

defence against SP (Starn, 1996, p. 232; Theidon, 2000; Fumerton, 2002). Over the years, the number of Rondas rapidly multiplied from 700 in 1989 to 1,200 in 1991, and finally to 2,400 in 1997 with a membership of almost 236,000 (Fumerton, 2001; CVR, 2003). The nature of fixed position was centred on the recruitment process of locals to counter the SP actions. The Rondas was a group of actors who already had a strategic foothold in a liberated or controlled zone.

In Table 3.1, I define what the expected periods are for each position. The times in table 3.1, are used to help me categorise and capture each strategic position only. These periods are used in Chapter 6 to assess the durations of each strategic position assumed by an actor during the Nepalese conflict.

Table 3.1 Strategic positions of actors and periods amongst civilian populations.

Length of Time/ Actors	**0–1 Week**	**1–2 Weeks**	**2 Weeks– End of Conflict**
Embedded Actors			X
Temporarily-deployed Actors	X		
Fixed Actors		X	

As Table 3.1 shows, I classify fixed actors as present amongst civilians in a zone from 1-2 weeks, while embedded actors are present from 2 weeks to several months or years in a zone. Temporarily-deployed actors are present in a zone from the moment of deployment up to the first week. After the first week, any actor present in this zone becomes fixed. It is important to note that each strategic position can occur during any period of the conflict. I later divide the Nepalese conflict into four periods to better examine the activities of the different actors involved in the conflict (*Chapter 5)*. This

enables me to examine the influence and effect of each strategic position on the use of indiscriminate violence. This means I can better assess some of the moves and strategic positions during the conflict. This can support me in understanding how indiscriminate violence occurred because of the strategic positions that actors adopt. The setting of these different periods enables this study to focus on the events, positions, and strategies, and how different actors distributed indiscriminate violence throughout the conflict. In my initial field research conducted in 2012, many of the experts that I spoke to recounted that actors who lived embedded amongst civilians often did so over a 3-4-week period. Those interviewed included: a Maoist strategist (C7RN007), who planned a large majority of Maoist campaigns across the country; a military expert (C7RN0035); a serving senior Armed Police Force Inspector General (C7RN014); and a senior Royal Nepalese Army General (C7RN012). The Maoist overall strategy was to deploy actors to a zone and capture the zone fully with the aid of Maoist rebels within a 72-hour window. If the Maoists were not successful in doing so within the 72-hour window, then the Maoist actors would move on to a different zone.[24]

During my field research, a respondent recounts the Maoist strategy of attacking zones. The respondent claims that if the Maoist could not respond and capture the police post within 45 minutes, they were instructed to kill the police.

> "We (Maoist) would often attack the police post by splitting into two groups. The first group would lay the bombs down and the second group would enter the compound and demand weapons… if the police did not surrender then we would kill them…we were also instructed to capture these

[24] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160701740488?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=rsan20

> posts within 45 minutes…the hope was the zone could be fully liberated within 72 hours." C7RN004

The extracted interview details the pace at which the Maoist operated in Nepal to capture posts and position their actors. It shows the Maoist strategy involved deploying actors and rapidly using "hit-and-run" tactics designed to shock and cripple the state's police. If the zone was not captured within the assigned time frame then Maoist temporarily-deployed actors would leave the area, resulting in the actor not becoming embedded. This I expect will later lead to violence on civilians by the state. The accounts of the Peruvian and second Sudanese conflict demonstrate that actors often took several weeks to be fully embedded in a zone and control an area. In these same accounts, actors who were temporarily-deployed often spent a few days in a zone and were often sent on very short missions; when this mission was over, these actors would return to their barracks or to civilian areas. As a result, in Table 3.1, I have given the time frame as 0-1 weeks with the understanding that most deployed actors will return to their base that very same day or will mount an offensive that will take a few days but not with the intention of staying within a civilian area. Since this strategic position assumed by the actor is intended to be used to hit-and-run, to cause as much damage as possible or quickly separate actors. The strategy of separating embedded actors from civilians will involve strategically sending actors in a zone that may later become embedded.

The fixed actors' time frame is about recruitment and holding zones. Any period longer than two weeks means that an actor is embedded. The examples of recruitment from the second Sudanese conflict demonstrate recruitment was done in stages and often involved actors being sent, fixed, and then embedded. Actors continued to

control neighbouring areas by recruiting locals who then became fixed, and increasing the number of liberated zones for the SPLA/M. Therefore, I provide a framework of one to two weeks as a time frame for fixed actors. As I mentioned earlier, the periods are used here to measure the nature of all three strategic positions, but this will of course vary in different conflicts. Thus, any future research will need to understand how the periods in each conflict should be examined if research intends to use this theoretical framework to understand each strategic position and their links to indiscriminate violence. The periods provide me with an opportunity to identify changes in actors' strategic positions and the use of indiscriminate violence. This helps to determine whether embedded actors trigger indiscriminate violence, but I do not use this as a positive confirmation of the overall strategy; rather, as a way of estimating what occurred. Therefore, in the next chapter I detail how I used a mixed method approach to help me understand the nature of the strategic positions actors assume. In the next section, the strategic positions actors can assume and the influence of these positions on the use of indiscriminate violence are discussed.

3.6 Strategic Position of Actors

To better understand the strategic positions actors can assume, I first re-examine the identified actors in relation to the use of indiscriminate violence. In Figure 3.1, I outline the rebel actors as: rebels, splinter groups, absorbed groups, and local/ethnic groups, who are mutually exclusive actors; while the state actors are: police/armed police, military, secret service, and militant groups, who are also mutually exclusive actors. All identified actors can use indiscriminate violence.



Figure 3.1: Condensed version of actors' groups

Although Figure 3.1 helps to understand who the probable actors in a conflict are, the model is restrictive because it presumes actors hold static positions during the conflict. The model also does not account for the strategic positions and movement of actors within different zones, which is the main contribution of this thesis and may contribute to some use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, what if the model accounted for the use of indiscriminate violence by factoring actors who move by taking up a strategic position in a conflict, as briefly illustrated in the previous sections? Kalyvas' (2006) theoretical position on the fluctuation of zones suggests that actors move and are in no way static as Figure 3.1 suggests. It is important to note that I refer here to situations in which actors are fighting during an active conflict and move through zones, but civilians remain fixed.

As previously mentioned zones can go from being contested to uncontested and back again, as actors adopt different strategic positions. Therefore, it is important to understand the potential movement of actors in a conflict to understand the strategic positions they can assume. While Kalyvas (2006) contends that zones change, I further argue, that zones change because actors (i.e., those identified in Table 3.0) assume different strategic positions which interact with one another during a conflict, and these strategic positions result in the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.[25] Any additional model must consider all identified actors and account for the fluctuation in conflict zones and the changes in zones over time due to shifts in actors' strategic positions. In the next section, I move beyond current models and present a complementary model: the concept of embeddedness that focuses on one of the strategic positions that actors can assume in a conflict, embeddedness. I explore how embedded actors are central to the experience of indiscriminate violence by civilians in conflicts, and how this strategic position may contribute to higher levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

3.7 The Concept of Embeddedness

In this section, I argue that the strategic position of embeddedness is one of the central triggers of indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflicts. I continue to draw on accounts from past conflicts, to show how embeddedness transpires and how it can lead actors to use indiscriminate violence. I demonstrate how actors embed themselves amongst civilians to control the civilian populations and hide from their enemies, rendering civilians, with no vested interest, "piggies in the middle." I show the impact of embeddedness on temporarily-deployed actors in their use of

[25] The influence of actors' strategic positions on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians is explained in the next sections (3.7 and 3.8).

indiscriminate violence. Finally, I present a hypothesis on the conditions under which embeddedness can contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence.

During the Peruvian conflict (1980-2000) with the Sendero Luminoso (SL), General Luis Cisneros in 1983 described the Peruvian government's strategy as follows:

> The police forces do not know who Sendero Luminoso [SL] is, nor how many there are, nor when they are going to attack. For the police to have any success they would have to begin to kill Sendero Luminoso [Senderistas] and non-Senderistas [civilians] because this is the only way they can ensure success (as cited by Taylor, 1983, p. 43).

This example shows the complexities of differentiating between civilians and the SL and how effective the strategy of embedding actors (SL) with civilians was. It shows how issues of differentiating between actors and civilians led to the strategic use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, while differentiating between the two groups was difficult, using indiscriminate violence was viewed as the only alternative.

Embeddedness is also demonstrated in the testimony of a victim of the decade-long conflict in Nepal (1996–2006), who was interviewed during my initial field research in 2012 and is part of the data I collected (517 surveys and 38 interviews) in Nepal. G1—the name of the interviewee has been anonymised—the interviewee, described the act of rebels embedded amongst civilians to disguise themselves from the military, and how civilians were used as instruments for attacking the military. The following is an excerpt from her account:

> They came at night, when it was dark and when no one could see them and warned us not to tell anyone. They stormed into our homes and took our food and water and demanded that we cook food for them. The rebels would stay with locals for several days, weeks, and months. They served the elderly, women, and the community well, and almost every other day we were forced to have culture evenings and events, where we were told about the rebels' struggle and what it meant for Nepal's future…One evening after a culture show, the rebels gathered locals, and we marched towards the army barracks. Suddenly, there was a loud bang, white light, and lots of smoke and shouting; these exchanges lasted for over an hour. After the attack, the rebels fled, leaving us the civilians to pick up the pieces. The following morning, the army came in and swept the village for rebels. They were very angry and accused many of us of supporting and hiding the rebels. The army then took my husband and son and accused them of being Maoists. I pleaded with them and told them we had been forced to provide food and shelter. I begged them to let them go, but they would not listen and pushed me to the ground; and that was the last time I saw my husband and son.[26]

G1's account demonstrates two aspects of embeddedness. First, rebel actors lived (embedded) with the civilian population for weeks and several months. According to G1's account, rebel actors served the local community and, arguably, became like the civilian population. They went to great lengths to serve and help the elderly and women in the community. Second, because rebel actors were embedded, civilians

[26] An extract from an interview conducted by Andrew Edward Tchie (the author) with a female victim and respondent in Jumla, Nepal (Respondent no: 025, on 23rd September 2012).

were used to attack the military-base. This resulted in the short deployment of military to G1's village and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians; because the state-actors could not differentiate between civilians and embedded rebel-actors.

These accounts demonstrate that actors (rebels in both instances) routinely embed themselves amongst civilians to gain control over the civilian populations and to confuse the enemy actors. The accounts establish that the process of embeddedness produces two main outcomes: first, the use of indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population by actors who become embedded amongst civilians; and second, the use indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors, who are unable to differentiate between, embedded actors and civilians (often after an attack).

3.8 How Embeddedness Transpires

In Figure 3.2, I present when, according to my concept, indiscriminate violence is likely to transpire through the process of embeddedness. I suggest that in the initial periods of a conflict, the fighting primarily occurs between the identified actors.[27] The first peak in a conflict is in the number of battle-related deaths between fighting actors. This later shift's during in the second peak to increases in the number of indiscriminate violence cases against civilians. As the number of battle-related deaths begins to decline, embeddedness begins, and the onset of indiscriminate violence against civilians begins. It should be noted that I do not designate a specific time-frame for the decline in battle-related deaths, and the shift to an increase in indiscriminate violence.

[27] In this section, I refer to the state and the rebels as the opposing parties solely for ease of reference. This does not exclude the different actors identified earlier.



Figure 3.2: When indiscriminate violence occurs through embeddedness.

I argue that the fighting shifts from actor against actor violence (battle-related deaths) to actor against civilian violence (indiscriminate violence) due to the process of embeddedness and its interactions with other strategic positions. I suggest that during the commencement of embeddedness, actors who become embedded are likely to use indiscriminate violence to control the civilian populations and gain control over the zone they are now embedded in. Once control is achieved, I believe, indiscriminate violence will no longer be used by the embedded actor unless another actor challenges the strategic position. This will look different depending on the actor being examined and the strategic positions that each actor takes on during the conflict. The cultural event rebel actors forced civilians to take part in, as per G1's account of the Nepalese conflict, is an example of the way rebel actors control civilians and the zone by building trust.

Similarly, temporarily-deployed actors are likely to use indiscriminate violence in their attempt to take control of the zone they are deployed to and defeat the actors that exist in this zone. Temporarily-deployed actors are also likely to use indiscriminate violence on civilians directly after an attack, as was the case in G1's testimony. Since temporarily-deployed actors are normally sent on short missions, they are vulnerable to attacks by embedded and fixed actors. As they are not from these zones, temporarily-deployed actors often seek the enemy (embedded actors) amongst the civilian populations and struggle to differentiate between embedded, fixed actors, and civilians, as the Peruvian and Nepalese accounts above demonstrate. I suggest that all temporarily-deployed actors are likely to use more indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of their deployment because they struggle to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. This I believe will occur because of the complex environments that these actors are confronted with when they are sent to a zone which interacts with other actors' strategic positions. This was demonstrated during the Peruvian conflict by the SP's strategy against state actors.

In Figure 3.3, I present a depiction of when, I believe, indiscriminate violence is likely to be observed in a conflict more so by embedded and temporarily-deployed-actors. I believe an actor who is embedded (e.g., rebels) uses high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians to gain control of the zone during the initial stages of being embedded. Once control is achieved, the use of indiscriminate violence declines. When the indiscriminate violence used by embedded actors begins to decline, temporarily-deployed actors begin to use indiscriminate violence to gain control of the zone and in response to attacks by embedded actors, who are difficult to

differentiate from civilians. Consequently, civilians become "piggies in the middle" of the conflict. This switch in the sources of indiscriminate violence occurs because different strategic positons interact with one another. There is no incentive for embedded actors to continue to use indiscriminate violence once control has been achieved (this might change if embedded actors are engaged in battle with temporarily-deployed actors). When temporarily-deployed actors engage with embedded actors from opposing sides, I expect indiscriminate violence to rise because temporarily-deployed actors have been sent to embedded actors' zones to tactically deal with embedded actors.



Figure 3.3: Timing of indiscriminate violence by embedded and temporarily-deployed actors.

Thus, high levels of indiscriminate violence will be used because of the tactical positions and differentiation issues that temporarily-deployed actors experience. This will often occur when these actors are trying to seek out embedded actors amongst the

civilian population, as occurred during the Peruvian conflict. As such, embedded rebel-actors can become targets of indiscriminate violence (among the many innocent civilians) when state-actors attempt to separate embedded actors from civilians. Since temporarily-deployed actors are unfamiliar with the zone they have been deployed to and have no association with the civilian populations, any attacks they receive before or after deployment, results in a harsh response towards the civilians whom the embedded actors are hidden amongst. It is important to note that all actors can assume any of the three-strategic positions (embedded, temporarily-deployed, and fixed), and all actors can go from being temporary-deployed, to fixed, to embedded, regardless of whether they are on the side of the state or the rebels.

I suggest that the level of indiscriminate violence used by temporarily-deployed actors is likely to be higher but observed over shorter periods of time than the embedded actors. Furthermore, since temporarily-deployed actors have no ties to civilians they are sent to (opposition actors), the incentive to stop using indiscriminate violence against civilians as a tactical response is absent. This means that use of indiscriminate violence will move to different zones. I expect to see fewer categories of indiscriminate violence used by temporarily-deployed actors on civilians than by their embedded counterparts.

On the other hand, indiscriminate violence used by embedded actors is likely to occur over longer periods but with less intensity than that of temporarily-deployed actors. I believe that the motivation of embedded actors to continue using indiscriminate violence on the same civilians will diminish for one main reason: embedded actors will not continue to use indiscriminate violence because they become dependent on the civilian populations over extended periods. This dependency helps to nourish

relationships between civilians and embedded actors. This dependency or interrelationship between actors and civilians is dependent on conditions where embedded actors continue to be entrenched amongst civilians for long periods. This can create a situation for civilians who are with embedded actors to establish and sustain agency between civilians embedded actors. After extended periods of interrelationship, the continuation of indiscriminate violence against civilians will only act as a counteractive measure. This was witnessed by the SP when the Peruvian states military pulled its troops back into barracks and allowed the SP to continue to use indiscriminate violence against locals. This directed many of the locals to switch sides and support the state. In Nepal, the same observation was made on the Maoist side due to the collective violence used by the state against civilians in Rolpha. Civilians would later switch to supporting the Maoist because of the continuous use of indiscriminate violence that they received under operation "Romeo."

To fully understand how the process of embeddedness triggers actors to use indiscriminate violence, it is important to understand what the process of embeddedness does to actors who are embedded and to actors who assume a temporary-deployed position. To this end, I focus on the embedded actor and demonstrate how the strategic positioning of an embedded actor in a conflict is used to control the civilian population. I then illustrate how the embedding of actors can trigger temporarily-deployed actors on short missions to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, to establish control and sustain control, actors must be embedded in these zones. To exercise control, it cannot be done by, or through airstrikes on civilian populations because this causes civilians and actors to disperse away from the zone. If airstrikes must be continuously used, it

suggests that the actors using the airstrikes do not have control and do so to gain control.

An example, of this can be drawn from the current Syrian conflict in Aleppo where the Assad regime used airstrikes to bomb rebel held areas to push the rebels out of areas that the rebel controlled. The regime did not have control of the area but through bombing, the strategy was to try and push embedded rebels away from civilian inhabited zones or captured rebel zones. Airstrikes did not provide the state with control over civilians and rebel support bases but caused rebels and civilians to flee the zone with no control over the civilians or rebels in the area. In fact, this led to civilians fleeing to Idlib and rebels embedding themselves in Idlib amongst civilian populations.[28] Similarly, the US airstrikes on Assad's chemical weapon plants, as a response to the chemical attacks on civilians (in Damascus), did not mean the U.S. state had control over the bombed zones. In fact, once the airstrikes were over, the Assad regime responded by firing 40 defensive missiles at thin air in a failed attempt to save the three Syrian chemical weapons sites destroyed by allied air strikes. A total of 105 missiles rained down on a research centre in Damascus as well as a storage site and bunker 15 miles west of Homs at 4am Syrian time. Britain launched eight Storm Shadow cruise missiles from the sky as the US and France provided support from the sea and jets. France fired 12 cruise missiles, three from a frigate and nine from aircraft, while the US provided the bulk of the firepower with 85 missiles in total.[29] This did not deter the Assad regime or give them full control over sites. If any of the coalition countries wanted to show control over Syria, it would require the western

[28] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/russian-warplanes-strike-idlib-syrian-rebels-brace-assault-1499968381 (access on 31/09/2018)
[29] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/04/14/russia-claims-ally-syria-shot-71-103-missiles-launched-us-britain/

states to put “boots on the ground” which is something that was observed in northern Syria (Raqqa) where US forces backed by Kurdish forces defeated the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As mentioned earlier, for any actor to control a zone, they must be rooted in that zone. This helps to deflect the enemy but also ensures that no other actor can take control of this zone.

In Figure 3.4, I show how the three strategic positions assumed by actors are affected by the process of embeddedness.



Figure 3.4: The two conditions of indiscriminate violence through the process of embeddedness.

All actors can go through the process of embeddedness and through this process two outcomes are produced. Figure 3.4 shows how the strategic position of an embedded actor, through the process of embeddedness, results in the use of indiscriminate

violence against civilians to control the civilians in this zone, as similarly occurred during the Nepalese conflict, in G1's account. The impact of embeddedness on fixed and temporarily-deployed actors, resembles what occurred during the Peruvian conflict, in General Luis Cisneros account. Temporarily-deployed actors largely use indiscriminate violence because they cannot differentiate between civilians and embedded actors. This, I argue, leads to the dilemma General Luis Cisneros described, and leads to the first part of my hypothesis on the conditions under which embeddedness triggers indiscriminate violence:

Hypothesis One:

> *H1: Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?*

As stated previously, it is the strategic movement and positioning of actors from different sides that renders civilians "piggies in the middle," wedged between embedded actors who control a zone and actors who are sent on temporary deployment. The three strategic positions, I argue, are crucial for studies seeking to understand how to protect civilians in a conflict. It is undeniably important to understand these strategic positions if researchers want to further understand the distribution of indiscriminate violence over the course of any conflict, and to understand how different actors may access and use indiscriminate violence in the first instance. Such understanding will better place conflict researchers and peacekeepers to understand how indiscriminate violence can be used against civilians and to curtail its use through enhanced protection awareness.

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 transform the traditional state-rebel dichotomy illustrated in figure 3.0. The model expands the traditional government-rebel dichotomy by increasing the number of actors and demonstrating how actors can access indiscriminate violence through the strategic positions. Figure 3.5 and 3.6 illustrate how the strategic positions actors undertake can interact with one another and lead to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Figure 3.5, illustrates the concept of actors assuming one of the three strategic positions (embedded, temporarily-deployed, and fixed) through the movement of rebel actors and Figure 3.6 illustrates the concept through the movement of state actors. It must be noted that the figures in no way suggest that actors are static. The actors depicted are fluid within zones that they inhabit, and actors have the potential to interact with one another over the course of a conflict wherever they are positioned. The figures refer to a situation where actors are fighting during an active conflict and move throughout different zones, but civilians can remain fixed.



Figure 3.5: Rebel actors, their strategic positions, and links to the use of indiscriminate violence.

As mapping all identified actors with their potential strategic positions in one figure would be confusing, Figure 3.5 displays a consolidated version of rebel actors only, while Figure 3.6 displays a consolidated version of the state actors only. Figure 3.5 shows that rebel actors can adopt any of the three strategic positions. While splinter groups, absorbed groups, and ethnic/local group actors are often not as established as some rebel groups and tend to be a smaller unit of fighters, they can also assume the three strategic positions and use indiscriminate violence.



Figure 3.6: State actors, their strategic positions, and links to the use of indiscriminate violence.

Figure 3.6 shows how state actors can assume different strategic positions. The state employs actors, such as the police/armed police, military, and the secret service that can all assume any of the three strategic positions and use indiscriminate violence.

For arguments sake, I have placed the state-employed militant groups under the secret services because most states avoid having direct control over employed militant-groups. Military and police groups would also prefer not to have any associations with uncontrollable and ill-disciplined actors. State-employed militant actors can also assume any of the three strategic positions and use indiscriminate violence.

Kalyvas (2006) found that it was necessary for actors to use a certain level of violence to not only control the civilian populations but also to maintain information and avoid defection. According to G1's account of the Nepalese conflict, when rebel actors first came to G1's area, they surprised the civilian population and forced many to be a part of cultural shows and provide them with food. G1's testimony also indicated that embedded rebel actors lived with civilians and even helped the elderly population. This shows that a certain level of force and trust was needed to control the zone and civilian populations at the beginning of embedding actors. Similarly, General Luis Cisneros' account shows that even the police working at the local level struggled to differentiate between the SL and civilians, because the SL were deeply embedded. Researchers also found that before the Peruvian conflict had commenced, as early as 1970, the SL leader, Abimael Guzmán, embedded and recruited local actors when he was a University professor.[30] Thus, I expect embedded actors are likely to use indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population. This leads to the second part of my hypothesis on the conditions under which embeddedness triggers indiscriminate violence:

[15] https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141114.pdf (accessed on 23 March 2016)

Hypothesis Two:

> H2: *Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations?*

In the next chapter, I provide an overview of the methods and methodological approaches used in this thesis to examine the concept of embeddedness and the hypothesis presented above. In Chapter Four, I examine how the methods of process tracing, survey distribution, and interviews were designed, distributed, and analysed. I explore the sampling methods used for recruiting respondents for the survey and interviews. I also discuss the ethical issues that arose, and how I dealt with these issues. By means of existing data and the data collected from the selected case study in the field, in later chapters I demonstrate how embeddedness occurred in the case of Nepalese conflict and resulted in the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN

4.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter introduces the research methods and methodological approaches used in this thesis-to understand why and under what conditions actors resorted to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the Nepalese conflict (1996–2006). Four methods were used in this study: process tracing of relevant sources and data (see Chapter 5); a field survey with 517 respondents (see Chapter 6); interviews with 38 Nepalese elite interviewees (see Chapter 7); and triangulation of sources from the different data collection methods (see Chapter 8). Results of the analyses of the data collected are reviewed throughout the chapters and triangulation analysis is conducted in the final chapter (Chapter 8), to provide a holistic understanding of the findings.

This chapter is composed of four sections. In the first section (Section 4.2), I present the conflict in Nepal as a single case study. Nepal was selected for two main reasons: first, interesting trends pertaining to battle-related deaths and one-sided violence against civilians appear in the existing data on the conflict (UCDP, 2014). The patterns that emerged in the Nepalese conflict led me to question whether the observed use of indiscriminate violence was a consequence of embeddedness; and second, I found in the existing data an opportunity to test the concept of embeddedness and conduct an in-depth examination of the phenomenon within a real-life context. In the second section (Section 4.3), I discuss the three datasets[31] selected to provide an in-depth understanding of the context of Nepal. I then explain how the

[31] Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) battle related deaths; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) one-sided violence; and Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) human right observational group in Nepal.

method of process tracing was used with the combined datasets to understand the trends in the conflict and examine the use of indiscriminate violence through the process of embeddedness. In the third section (Section 4.4), I describe the fieldwork I conduced in Nepal. In 2014, I surveyed 517 respondents, from 16 of Nepal's 75 districts, retrieving and documenting accounts from victims, rebel members, military, and police officers. I present the survey design analysis conducted, its distribution and administration; and discuss how I navigated ethical issues, and sampling. Throughout this chapter I discuss ethical dilemmas that I was confronted with, including: issues of presentation when delivering the field research, and how I navigated through the selection of actors who were party to the conflict and this research; how I dealt with potential bias and misunderstandings of the key definitions; how my interpretation and respondents may have differed; and how I address these differences. I also touch on some of the challenges of field work in difficult settings and the concerns and limitations regarding a researcher's role. Finally, I discuss the predicaments that arouse in the diffusion of research findings and data. In the final section (Section 4.5), I discuss the methods used to interview elite Nepalese, including senior government officials, civil society leaders, district and regional rebel leaders, military generals, and senior CPN-Maoist party members. I introduce the methods employed to sample the interviewees, the design and implementation of the open-ended interviews, and how I addressed bias. I explain how pre-coding and codes were formed and used to analyse the data from the interviews using the qualitative software MAXQDA.[32] I also describe the method of triangulation and its use to examine the study's results further. I discuss the benefits of using triangulation in this study and why this enabled

[32] https://www.maxqda.com/what-does-maxqda-do (accessed 23/02/2017).

me to provide a holistic understanding of what occurred during the Nepalese conflict, as outlined in Chapter 8.

4.2 The Case of Nepal

The decade-long conflict in Nepal (1996–2006) involved two main actors: The Government of Nepal (divided into the police, Armed Police Force, and the Royal Nepalese Army); and the rebels' Communist Party of Nepal Maoist (CPN/CPN-M). These individual actors will be further examined in later chapters. I have selected this conflict as a case study for two reasons. The first motivation pertains to the length of the conflict and the thought-provoking trends observed in the datasets from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)[33] on Nepal and the international Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC)[34] on the use of violence during the conflict. The data indicates that high levels of battle-related deaths occurred during the conflict. In the early years of the conflict, violence levels were relatively low but significantly increased during the middle period. State forces appeared to engage in higher levels of violence against civilians than the rebels and were also known to be deployed mostly to the rebel strongholds. I suggest that the high levels of battle-related deaths were associated with the high levels of violence used by the state against the civilian population. In other words, actor against actor violence preceded actor against civilian violence. According to the data, there were alternate periods of battle-related deaths and indiscriminate violence against civilians. Figure 4.0 presents the number of battle related deaths (UCDP dataset), cases of one-sided violence against civilians (UCDP dataset), and human rights abuses (INSEC dataset) during the conflict.

[33] Battle related deaths (UCDP) http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/brd/ucdp-brd-codebook.pdf, one-side violence (UCDP), http://www.ucdp.uu.se/downloads/old/ns/ucdp-nonstate-11_2006.pdf (accessed on 25 December 201)
[34] http://www.insec.org.np/ (accessed on 20 December 2017)



Figure 4.0: Battle-related death and one-sided killing during the Nepalese conflict 1996-2006.[35]

As Figure 4.0 illustrates, battle-related deaths associated with the Maoist rebel actors commenced in 1996, but were relatively low at the beginning of the conflict. This number rose slightly in 1998 and decreased the following year. However, from 2000 to 2001, there was a slow increase in battle-related deaths and the numbers significantly rose in 2002. The numbers decreased in 2003 and rose again in 2004. Data on violence against civilians began in 1997 and shows an increase in violence a year after the start of the conflict, later peaking in 2002. The data shows that the levels of violence Maoists used against civilians were highest in 2002, but are

[35] Sources: UCDP: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP; Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC): Violence against civilians: http://www.inseconline.org

relatively lower than the state.[36] I suggest that the early periods of indiscriminate violence against civilians relate to the state's policy of dislocating civilians and Maoist rebels who were embedded amongst the civilian population. The data reveals that from 2001 to 2005, there is an increase in the use of violence against civilians by the state, which may be linked to the efforts of the armed police force and the Royal Nepalese Army (state army) to separate the rebels from the civilian population. I suggest that during this period civilians were targeted as well, which would explain the spike in violence observed in the data. This suggests that the use of indiscriminate violence may be linked to certain strategies or operations used by different state actors. The increase in the use of violence against civilians by the Maoist rebel actors may be linked to the group's potential loss of control as the Royal Nepalese Army entered the conflict and used firmer tactics than the police.

The second motivation for selecting the Nepalese conflict as a single case study is the opportunity it offers to test the theoretical framework and hypothesis I presented in Chapter Three. Yin (2009, p. 14) defines the use of a single case studies as, an empirical investigation that examines phenomenon in-depth and within its real-life setting, particularly when the margins between phenomenon and setting are not clear (Landman, 2003). Gerring (2004, p. 342) argues that a case study should be a rigorous analysis of a single unit…a spatially bounded phenomenon witnessed at a specific point in time or over some delimited period. Yin (2009, p. 47-52; Landman, 2003) adds that single case studies allow examinations to apply, test, and build theories through the application of multiple qualitative and/or quantitative research methods and provide an empirically-rich but holistic account of specific phenomena. The

[36] Please note the state's use of indiscriminate violence involved three actors: the state police, the armed police force, and the Royal Nepalese Army.

Nepalese conflict provides me with an opportunity to observe, test, and verify the phenomenon of embeddedness and its links to indiscriminate violence, to test the concept and hypothesis presented in Chapter Three.

4.3 Process Tracing

In this section, I discuss how process-tracing of various qualitative sources with the combined datasets (from three sources) was used to understand the emergence and operation of embeddedness in the Nepalese conflict and its link to indiscriminate violence. I examine how combining the datasets and exploring key events (using interviews, newspaper sources, articles, among other sources) contribute to a rich understanding of embeddedness.

Process tracing is a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis that systematically examines evidence by taking into consideration the research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator (Bennett, 2008, 2010; Fenno, 1998; George & Bennett, 2005). Process tracing requires finding diagnostic evidence that provides the basis for descriptive and causal inference. Process tracing can contribute to diverse research objectives (Campbell, 1975, p. 181-82), including:

- Identifying novel, political, and social occurrences and analytically describing them.
- Evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering new hypotheses, and assessing these claims.
- Gaining insight into causal mechanisms.
- Providing an alternative means to conventional regression analysis.

The combination of the datasets and process tracing enhances the analysis and helps the study to focus, test, and observe the causal inferences (See: Yin, 1984, 2008; Sewell, 1996, p. 261).

4.3.1 Process Tracing Analysis

The process tracing analysis in this thesis employs historical information from UNDP documentation, interview accounts from leading military generals, police, civil society groups and human rights activists, books from leading Nepalese authors. It also includes reports from government and United Nation Interagency Rehabilitation Programme (UNIRP) documentation, newspapers like the Nepali Times and Himalayan Times, and other sources on the Nepalese conflict to understand the process of embeddedness and its links to indiscriminate violence. It provides this study with a means to understand how actors become embedded amongst civilians and resort to using indiscriminate violence through the strategic positions; how indiscriminate violence moves and is triggered during the conflict; and how and under what circumstances embeddedness causes other actors to use indiscriminate violence.

To focus the analysis, I divided the conflict into four-time periods that are not time constrained. I do this in Chapter Five to be able to further investigate in other chapters the nature of the strategic positions and the use of indiscriminate violence at a micro-level. Dividing the conflict into four periods in Chapter Five allowed me to survey the events, strategies, and tactics used during each period and make micro discoveries about the nature of the conflict, especially around major and minor events. It also allowed me to consider whether these events influenced the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, and to assess the behaviours of actors and the impact of

their strategic positions on the use of indiscriminate violence. Furthermore, dividing the conflict into discrete periods increased the opportunity to detect embeddedness, specify its timing, and understand changes in its use by the different actors. The four periods under examination are as follows:

- Period 1: The onset and initial phase of the conflict.
- Period 2: The halfway mark in the number of battle-related deaths, changes in leadership, or the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.
- Period 3: The peak in the number of battle-related deaths until the decline of the conflict. This may include the onset of indiscriminate violence.
- Period 4: The decline in the number of deaths, a peace agreement, and the end of the conflict.

4.3.2 Data Selection

This study relies on rich and diverse data to understand the trends in the use of indiscriminate violence and its links to the strategic positions like embeddedness. To understand what occurred during the different periods of the Nepalese conflict, in terms of the number of battle-related deaths and instances of violence against civilians, I used the following datasets: the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset[37] on battle-related deaths; the UCDP one-sided violence dataset,[38] on violence against civilians; and the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) dataset,[39] on human rights abuses across the districts of Nepal.

[37] http://ucdp.uu.se/ (accessed on 02/02/2017)
[38] http://ucdp.uu.se/ (accessed on 02/02/2017)
[39]http://econ.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/extdec/extresearch/0,,contentmdk:23155659~menupk:64214916~pagepk:64214825~pipk:64214943~thesitepk:469382,00.html (accessed on 13/06/2015)

4.3.2.1 Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) Armed Conflict Dataset

The first major dataset on conflict emerged from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research.[40] The Armed Conflict Dataset examines the internal and external conditions of conflict from 1946 to the present day (Gleditsch et al., 2002).[41] The advantage of this dataset is the low threshold of 25 annual battle-deaths.[42] The dataset aims to provide data for battle-related fatalities (civilian as well as actors) for all state-based[43] conflicts with more than 25 battle deaths in a single year. This threshold allows for the analysis and comparison of the data with the violence count dataset obtained from INSEC dataset. The dataset was designed to match the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset, from 1989 to 2016, and is annually updated by UCDP project. The Armed Conflict Dataset differentiates between three types of conflicts: war, intermediate armed-conflict, and minor armed-conflict; and it is grounded in quantitative and qualitative assessments.[44] The UCDP dataset offers an opportunity to explore macro-level trends and factors using quantitative analysis tools.[45] According to Suhrke, et al. (2005) this perspective contributes to understanding actors' behaviour during conflicts.

4.3.2.2 Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) One-sided Violence Dataset

The UCDP's one-sided violence dataset is an actor-year dataset that covers the period from 1989–2017.[46] The dataset includes information on instances of one-sided violence against civilians perpetrated by governments and formally organised armed

[40] https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ (accessed on 20 December 2017)
[41] http://ucdp.uu.se/ (accessed on 20 December 2017)
[42] http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/15/a_15928-f_UCDP_paper1.pdf (accessed on 20 December 2017)
[43] State-based conflicts are conflicts between two organised parties, at least one of which is a government, and include interstate conflicts, extra systemic conflicts, intrastate conflicts, and internationalized intrastate conflicts.
[44] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0112_state_capacity_conflict_cardenas.pdf (accessed on 20 March 2016)
[45] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/245491176_Armed_Conflict_1946-2001_A_New_Dataset (accessed on 20 December 2015)
[46] http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/nsos/ucdp-onesided-14-2016.pdf (accessed on 20 December 2014)

groups.[47] One-sided violence against civilians must result in at least 25 deaths to be included in the dataset. The one-sided violence category has received much attention and is used as the central data for several studies of modern-day warfare. The data captures insurgency strategies and tactics that are of a different kind from those pursued in normal combat.[48] The data collected by UCDP is better disaggregated to understand the types of actors which function at lower thresholds of society and conflicts. The dataset collects information on indiscriminate violence using geographic coordinates. This allows for a micro understanding of what is transpiring and captures the actors conducting violence beyond just the state and the rebel actors. While earlier datasets collect information solely on the state and rebel actor's use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, the UCDP data goes steps further by recording the number of violent acts by all actors. This is done by collecting data on several smaller groups of actors who commit indiscriminate violence at a lower threshold of 25 battle-related deaths. This means every noteworthy act of violence related to the conflict is documented, pin-pointed to an actor, and geocoded located. The dataset also allow dataset like the UCDP Non-state actors to be integrated into the dataset. This allows me to track the actors involved over the course of the conflict and their use of indiscriminate violence. The one-sided UCDP dataset helps shed further light on the causes, dynamics, and effects of organised violence in conflicts.

4.3.2.3 Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) Dataset

The INSEC dataset includes individual-level data on the victims of the Nepalese conflict (1996-2006). The INSEC dataset is a census and not a sample of the known population of victims for which information could be collected. The unit of data

[47] http://www.estepanova.net/SIPRIYB0902.pdf (accessed on September 2017)
[48] http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/stockholm/Fjelde_Hultman_OSVgeo.pdf (accessed on 20 December 2017)

collection is the individual victim; and the dataset provides information on: whether the victim was killed, injured, or disappeared; the districts and villages where the victim was targeted; the permanent home address of the victim; the circumstances of the attack (e.g., combat, extra judicial); socio-economic information; whether the victim had any affiliation to rebel groups or other political parties; identification of the perpetrator; and whether the victim was considered to be a government or Maoist informant.

INSEC collected village-level data on every actor present and involved in the conflict. This was then linked to the number of associated killings, rapes, and tortures identified by field staff during the conflict. For example, when INSEC field staff heard reports of a Maoist killing in a district or village, they went to the victims or the victims' families and asked them about their experience. Thus, the observations in this dataset are important to this study. However, the dataset does not collect information on the geo-cordinates of violent incidents at the village level which restricts evaluations with other datasets. The dataset was published by Subodh Raj Pyakurel,[49] and used in articles, including *Education and Civil Conflict in Nepal* (Valente, 2013)[50] and *More Inequality, More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal* (Nepal, Bohara, & Gawande, 2011).[51]

As Figure 4.0 demonstrates, the combination of the datasets allows this study to observe and analyse the trends in indiscriminate violence in the conflict and establish

[49] Individual-Level Data on the Victims of Nepal's Civil War, 1996–2006: A New Data Set.(accessed on 13/08/2016).
[50] Christine Valente (2014). World Bank Econ Rev (2014) 28 (2): 354-383; https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lht014 published: 03 June 2013 (accessed on 10/02/2014).
[51] Mani Nepal, Alok K. Bohara, Kishore Gawande (2011). More Inequality, More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal; http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00529.x/abstract (accessed on 01/11/2014).

when actors resorted to its use. By understanding these patterns, I can align the results with the process tracing analysis and enhance the initial findings. This provides the opportunity to understand how embeddedness is linked to the use of indiscriminate violence.

4.4 Field Research

In this section, I outline the methodological approaches I used to design, distribute, and conduct the survey in Nepal. I describe the challenges I encountered, and the adjustments made to conduct the survey with civilians from different parts of Nepal in 2014. In this survey, I employed a comprehensive approach to study the process of embeddedness, movement of actors, and their use of indiscriminate violence during the conflict.

The field research in Nepal was conducted over a one-year period in 2014 and included three phases from 2012 to 2014. The first phase involved an initial field examination of Nepal in the summer of 2012. This phase allowed me to investigate the context of the Nepalese conflict and to evaluate the nature of indiscriminate violence and it consequences for civilians. In the second phase, in 2013, I conducted in-depth interviews via Skype with 18 civil society leaders, non-governmental organisations leaders, and national human rights activists. Each interview lasted 90 minutes and allowed me to understand the context of the Nepalese conflict and identify the districts that were impacted by the conflict and match this with the existing data. The first two phases allowed me to connect with various victims' groups, civilian society members, and elites associated with the conflict. This helped me to get established before the third phase (the main field research) was conducted

in 2014. The first two phases also allowed me to make informed decisions about the selection of districts to be sampled for the study to explore the distribution of indiscriminate violence across the various districts. The third phase comprised of surveying the 517 respondents in 16 districts of Nepal. The method of selection I chose was used by the Maoist CPN-M (the political wing of the Maoist insurgent group) to identify underdeveloped districts. These districts were used as Maoist bases and were often the rebels' strongest zones against the government. The Maoist also used these districts to mobilise civilians and launch attacks against the states actors.[52]

Field research in conflict zones is challenging for both methodological and ethical reasons. In conflict zones, the usual imperatives of empirical research (to gather and analyse accurate data to address a relevant theoretical question) are intensified by the absence of unbiased data from sources such as newspapers. The biased nature of data compiled by administrations operating during the conflict zone, leads to problems establishing what a representative sample is or should be, and examining that very same sample, while trying to deal with logistical issues particularly in a mountainous area like Nepal. Similarly, the ethical imperative of research ("do no harm") is intensified in conflict zones by the various parties in a conflict, the general unpredictability of events, and the traumatization through violence of combatants and civilians alike, but also in a country in a post-conflict setting where the evidence of conflict is still raw. One of the concerns during the field research was memory loss of those participating in the field research. Eight years had lapsed, and I was concerned about how people would respond to the questions being posed. This creates an opportunity for bias to slip in. One way of discussing this concern was to use a mixed

[52] Crisis group report http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/nepal/104_nepal_s_maoists_their_aims_structure_and_strategy.ashx (accessed on 15 July 2016)

method approach to collect information on the various areas of discussion. This provided me with an opportunity to explore answers to the research questions from different sources and triangulate this together at the end. A second way around memory loss risk was to ask similar questions within the survey that I can later select on to draw inferences about the results. The final method was to open the survey collection methods to different types of people. This does not eliminate the bias that existed, but it provides me with an opportunity to reduce bias within the results. Asking similar questions within the survey and during the face-to-face interviews allows me to check whether the respondents fully understood the question and understand how the strategic positions were used, if used at all. This was achieved by explaining to respondents before the interview what the different strategic positions were, how indiscriminate violence was conceptualized, and what indiscriminate violence looked like and how it might have been demonstrated during the conflict. The reason for doing this is to be able to give the respondent examples that were accessible but comprehensible. This allows the respondents to reflect on their experiences and link this experience to the questions being asked of them during the survey. This of course can introduce bias and mislead respondents to answer the survey in a certain way. A solution to this bias is to clearly label each section of the survey that focused on indiscriminate violence as “indiscriminate violence” or “violence by embedded actors.” This was also applied in sections of the survey where respondents were asked to examine the use of violence by fixed and temporarily-deployed actors.

4.4.1 Survey Design

The survey was composed of 95 questions and designed to capture the incidents and duration of indiscriminate violence during the conflict.[53] It was designed to collect, capture, and examine the embedding of actors, the use of indiscriminate violence, and the trends and movement of indiscriminate violence. The survey distinguished between actors who were temporarily deployed or sent on deployment to civilian zones and actors who remained amongst civilians and if so, for how long. The survey considered how the embedding of actors may have led to the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded, temporarily-deployed, and fixed actors. To capture the respondents' geographical awareness of indiscriminate violence, the survey attempted to create scenarios that connected respondents' answers to events of indiscriminate violence they experienced. This allowed me to understand the use and distribution of indiscriminate violence.

Most survey questions were closed-ended, with supplementary sub-sections for respondents to add comments where needed. Some questions were open-ended and provided respondents the opportunity to expand on their answers, while others were restricted. This was necessary to capture the respondents' unique experiences and understanding of the conflict, while accounting for similar traits in the occurrence of indiscriminate violence. The survey considered the behaviour of actors on all sides, from the perspective of the respondents, allowing for an understanding of embeddedness through the eyes of the respondents. While I cannot measure respondent's ability to misinterpret the definition of the strategic positions, (embeddedness, temporarily-deployed, and fixed) and the use of indiscriminate

[53] Please see Appendix A for a list of 95 survey questions used to survey 517 respondents, elites, in 16 districts for this investigation. Please see Appendix D for the Nepalese translated version.

violence, one way of addressing possible misinterpretation which can lead to bias during the survey and interview process was to discuss the definitions of each major position. This was done by explaining the thesis framework with respondents who were participating in the survey. I did not read the definition out in full, but I explained to the respondents before the interview started what I was seeking to understand, how I understood it (i.e. measurement of embeddedness conceptually and empirically), and how it could potentially be identified to the respondent. Each respondent was given examples of what each position looked like and what forms indiscriminate violence encapsulated until they felt fully satisfied with the concepts of the thesis and were ready to complete the survey. This helped respondents to assess in their own manner what occurred. The process was put in place to help align the respondents' experiences within the theoretical framework that I was examining, without dismissing their own experiences. This I believe helps to reduce a respondent's ability to misinterpret or lie about what took place. While I cannot say that this eliminated the incentives to lie about what occurred or misinterpret the different positions, I believe there was no noteworthy incentive for civilians to lie about their accounts; mostly since there has been no compensation system put in place apart from the UN reintegration policy, which only rebels were entitled to. The one incentive for respondents was to be a part of a research project where the researcher (a foreigner) would listen to and document all respondents' experiences as a part of this PhD thesis.

The survey was designed in the United Kingdom (UK) and tested on a small sample of conflict victims, who were students studying in the UK at postgraduate level. Most participants were human rights or political science students in their second year of

studies and had originally come from Nepal. I also tested the survey in Nepal for translation and dialect alterations as required. By communicating with Nepalese organisations in Nepal that I had engaged with in 2012, I was able to conduct a pilot of the survey as well. Two Nepalese organisations participated in the pilot: the Nepali Times, a national newspaper in English run by Mr Kunda Dixit;[54] and Didibahini, an organisation focussed on gender equality and social justice issues founded by Ms. Saloni Singh.[55]In addition, three people from the Nepalese diaspora in the UK, who were impacted by the conflict, were also recruited through social media. These sources were used to pilot the survey and make the necessary adjustments needed for the field.

For the survey to be operational in Nepal, it was translated and revised several times. A Nepalese-born research assistant (Mr Keshab Giri),[56] based in the UK at the time, conducted the original translation from English to Nepalese. Two Nepalese journalists, based in Nepal and educated in the UK, then revised the survey. Based on their feedback, Mr Keshab Giri amended the survey, and I sent the amended version to two independent translators who reviewed the survey and refined it. Once this was completed, a Nepalese-English newspaper editor made the final amendments. Bilingual (Nepalese and English-speaking) respondents completed the questionnaire in an average of one hour. Respondents requiring translation support completed the survey with a research assistant in one hour and thirty minutes, on average.

[54] http://nepalitimes.com/ (accessed on 10 Mach 2016). This newspaper was one of the few national papers in English and reported comprehensively about conflict
[55] http://www.didibahini.org/ (accessed on 10 Mach 2016). Didibahini was one of the few organisations in Nepal working on gender equality and social justice issues during the conflict. Saloni Singh, the current Executive Chair has worked with women in Asia and Africa and consulted for the United Nations and UN women.
[56] http://sydney.edu.au/arts/staff/profiles/keshab.giri.140.php (accessed on 25/12/2017)

4.4.2 Survey Distribution

Distributed to over 1,200 people in 16 districts in the field, I conducted the survey with two research assistants (alternating) over a period of 10 months. However, only 517 completed surveys were collected. This was the result of the withdrawal of a Nepalese organisation from the study due to funding issues. Survey respondents were victims, child soldiers, rebel combatants, army, armed forces police, regular police, and members of civil society. Districts sampled included: Banke, Bardiya, Bajhang, Doti, Dadeldhura, Dang, Dolpa, Jumla, Kailali, Kailkot, Kanchanpur, Kathmandu, Panchihar, Rolpa, Rukum, and Rupenidehi. In each district, I sampled an average of 25-60 respondents. The survey was a traditional paper and pen questionnaire distributed amongst individual civilians with face-to-face contact or conducted in groups of 10–15 people.

4.4.3 Respondents

The respondents varied in age, caste, education, socio-economic status, and geographic location. In two hilly districts (Jumla and Dolpa) based in the far-western regions of Nepal, the education levels were extremely low and civilians tended to speak the root dialect of Nepalese. In these districts, I was accompanied by a research assistant who translated the surveys for locals. In a few instances, when the research assistants were not familiar with the local dialect and the geographic location, the survey was conducted with the aid of a local person and the research assistant. In most cases, I was present; but in a limited number of cases (four), because of the sensitivity of the issues discussed (e.g., rape), I observed from a distance. This created a friendly and relaxed environment for the respondents, so they were not overwhelmed by the number of researchers present.

4.4.4 Survey Administration

My inquiries were met with the enthusiastic collaboration from many residents, irrespective of class, occupation, or political affiliation. Residents acted on a willingness (perhaps even a need in some sense) to discuss with an outside researcher their own history and that of their family's and community. Perhaps this willingness is a measure of the trauma and change brought by the conflict. I also suspect much of this derived from the fact that many of the victims in rural areas had never been fully surveyed since the United Nation Mission in Nepal started and ended in 2010. Those surveyed often expressed a desire for their story to be told, and some account be made of the local history of the civil war. This willingness of many residents of contested areas to talk about their personal and community histories at length with a researcher is common to other ethnographies of civil wars, however in the case of Nepal there was an abundance of this willingness, to share talk and discuss the conflict. I regretted not being able to talk to as many of the people who were willing to talk to me during the interview process as I would have liked to.

The administration of the survey differed depending on the location and the characteristics of the respondents. The first and most commonly used method was the self-administered format, which often involved the presence of the researcher sitting with an individual or a group of respondents and assisting them with the survey as needed. This was the preferred method and tended to occur in both accessible and hard to reach areas of Nepal. It involved staying in a location for 1.5 weeks and interacting with respondents from diverse backgrounds and experiences. This method

helped reduce selection and social desirability bias to a certain degree, but it did not eliminate or exclude it because civilians were self-selected.

The second method was the group-administered format, which was conducted through human rights organisations, civil society groups, and victim groups. This approach enabled me to interact with conflict victims and build personal connections to understand their experiences and testimonies. This format also allowed me to recruit a wide array of respondents. This method opened the investigation to additional insights into embeddedness, the use of indiscriminate violence, and how embedded actors triggered temporarily-deployed and fixed actors to use indiscriminate violence. In Kailali and Banke districts, respondents were selected in collaboration with NGOs, civil society groups, or community-based groups. This presented the investigation with sampling bias issues, because respondents were not selected randomly from their communities. However, a list of potential respondents was obtained from a diverse range of civilians. I elaborate on how I addressed the issue of sampling bias in the next sub-section.

The third method was the household drop-in /off system and was used the least because it was time consuming and location restricted. This format was largely used with victims who were bed-bound, wounded, or sick. It was also often used for the elderly, who gave in-depth accounts of their experiences of the conflict. The elderly often overheard conversations between actors when they stayed overnight and could provide information on embeddedness, strategies of actors, and their use of indiscriminate violence.

4.4.5 Addressing Bias

Eight years had passed since the end of Nepalese conflict when the survey was conducted. While the memory of the respondents is always uncertain as time passes, I purposely relied on the survey as a way of assessing respondents' understanding, and to critically engage the respondents to think about the answers they were providing. While time lapse will lead to issues of verification and sharpness of account etc., the best way I could reduce this risk was by asking similar questions within the areas being explore. For example, if there was a section on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, then sections of the survey where this question was located would ask similar questions, aimed at the respondent answering the question again, but worded differently. This does not eliminate all levels of bias during the field research, which is something I could not fully avoid but tried to account for.

There have also been significant studies on the conflict, which meant that social desirability bias could pose a problem. Social desirability bias can undermine a study's attempt to obtain valid measures of public attitudes or behaviours. It can also impact the broader social environment when the results of the study are revealed, as the social influences that helped shape the responses can have a ripple effect. To avoid these issues, I employed four mechanisms: first, I asked respondents similar questions towards the latter parts of the survey. This allowed for an array of optimal answers and to check the respondents' answers; second, the survey relied primarily on the self-completion approach. Respondents were encouraged to complete the surveys on their own and freely ask questions as required; third, the research assistants and I avoided referring explicitly to the subject matter from the outset. This helped to avoid priming respondents to answer questions in socially acceptable ways; and created scope to explore their values and priorities unfettered, before focusing on the main

topic of interest; and fourth, I reassured respondents that "there were no right or wrong answers," to reduce any concerns about being judged for their responses.

In retrospect, I am aware of many mistakes I made during my field research, of which two deserve mentioning. First, I wish I had better recorded the comments made before the interview formally started; this pertains to the pre-interviews conducted with respondents. Many of these pre-interview sessions provided me with a wealth of understanding of how actors moved strategically, what actors were thinking, and the positions they adopted. However, given the nature of these pre- and post-interviews this would have meant many of the respondents pulling out of the research project because of the fear I was immediately documenting their account upon arrival. I was slow to understand the value of those interactions as I initially had an overly simple understanding of what the conversations represented. Only later did I come to understand those interactions as a way of demonstrating the frustration with the conflict and the government's inability to address many of the grievances, much of which was covered during the survey and was the actual cause of the conflict, but was omitted from this research project. Second, I came to wish that I had interviewed more residents from the 16-selected district who did not support the insurgency, as the material I gathered from this group was generally less rich than from supporters. In addition, I wish I had interviewed more residents instead of only surveying respondents. This is not to say there was no value in surveying local residents. In fact, surveys meant that definitions of the strategic positions of actors, time frames for adopting these positions, and the moving and indiscriminate violence was better understood because respondents were often required to think carefully about their interactions with the different actors during the conflict, and how indiscriminate

violence moved. Giving residents the opportunity to be part of the interview process would have given me more nuances into violence, which would have added a further layer of understanding. That different level of understanding, I believe, could have further solidified some of the claims and findings I could have made throughout this research project. This is not to say that the surveys do not provide a rich understanding, but extended interviews in this situation would have provided further understanding, and strengthened the causal claims made in this thesis.

4.4.6 Ethical Issues

For field research to be ethical, research respondents must consent to their participation in full and demonstrate an understanding of the potential risks and benefits (Kelman, 1972; Belmont Report, 1979). In the context of my field research, this norm of informed consent meant that those I interviewed should understand the purpose of my research and the potential risks that they could run into talking with me (as well as any potential benefits), so that they could make a fully-informed decision as to whether they wanted to speak with me. The challenges of implementing this norm were numerous: what were the risks and benefits of participation? And would illiterate and marginally-literate rural residents understand the informed consent process, or would it alienate potential participants?

This study involved civilians and actors who had experienced indiscriminate violence and whose cases had not been heard in court or by any formal Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). As such, the safety of the respondents was paramount. This meant that consent forms had to be signed on a separate sheet and then coded with a unique field number to prevent links between the respondents' survey responses and the consent forms. When respondents were referred to the study,

I used the premises of the organisation or went to a location recommended by the organisation to meet the individual or community members. If the individual did not speak English, I travelled with a research assistant who provided translation assistance. Before the survey was conducted, I presented the aims of the research project and explained that consent was needed before the survey could be completed. I also explained that the survey results would be stored on a secure cloud server. Some respondents in remote parts of Nepal required an explanation of what a cloud server was. Respondents were then provided with information sheets, available in both English and Nepalese. They were asked if they understood the content of the information sheet and were given the opportunity to ask questions before signing the consent form and commencing with the survey. Respondents could provide their signature through finger printing, electronically (via an Apple iPad), or by hand. These were later scanned and uploaded onto the cloud server. I conducted the survey verbally, one-on-one, with respondents who were illiterate or unable to read or write. Each respondent was given a unique field number after they completed the survey.[57] This unique number was used to conceal the respondents' identities.

In the Kailali and Banke districts, respondents were selected through collaboration with NGOs and civil society groups, as well as community-based groups. In Kailali, I worked with Searching for Common Ground Nepal[58] and the United Nations Development Programme, Conflict Prevention Programme (CPP).[59] The CPP has since been decommissioned. In Banke, I worked with the National Women's

[57] Please refer to the codebook in Appendix C, IndRespDistrCode
[58] http://www.sfcg.org/programmes/nepal/ (accessed on 10th April 2016)
[59] http://www.np.undp.org/content/nepal/en/home/operations/projects/closed-projects/peacebuilding-and-recovery/cpp/home.html (accessed on 10th April 2017)

Commission.[60] Since the selection of respondents in these districts was neither independent nor random, to reduce selection bias, I selected respondents systematically from an extensive list that the organisations had gathered over a decade. I determined the sampling size required (between 25–60 respondents from each district) and selected every Nth record from the list. Although not optimal, this method moderately reduced the opportunity for bias in these districts.

4.4.7 Survey Sampling Methods

Survey distribution captured a wide range of civilians and was not limited to respondents from the capital Kathmandu. Many of the conflict victims were women who had experienced deep suffering and the loss of loved ones, and who were now acting as the head of their households. In some districts, young men who were former combatants or rebel members were surveyed.[61] The sample-included districts located in the far western, western, central, and eastern regions of Nepal.[62] In many cases, the respondents were conflict victims, police official, and rebels. Figure 4.1 is a map of Nepal with its 75 districts, 16 of which were included in this investigation.[63]

[60] http://www.nwc.gov.np/ (accessed on 10th April 2016)
[61] Some were rehabilitated under the United Nation Interagency Rehabilitation Programme. http://www.unirp.org.np/Home.aspx (accessed on: 12/03/2016)
[62] http://www.np.undp.org/content/nepal/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/successstories/an-improved-madrasa--a-peace-dividend-for-a-religious-minority.html (accessed on 10/3/2017)
[63] Districts survey were Banke, Bardiya, Bajhang, Doti, Dadeldhura, Dang, Dolpa, Jumla, Kailali, Kailkot, Kanchanpur, Kathmandu, Panchihar, Rolpa, Rukum, and Rupenidehi,

Figure 4.1: The 75 Districts of Nepal.[64]

The average time I spent in each zone varied depending on the amount of time available and the landscape of the district. In some districts, the overall time I spent was 1.5 weeks.

4.5 Interviews with Elites

In this section, I outline the methodological approach, sampling methods, and techniques employed to interview 38 Nepalese elites.[65] To triangulate the results from the process tracing, and the surveys with the result of the interviews, I used questions from the survey in the interviews. However, the interview questions were open-ended, unlike the survey questions that were mainly fixed, with few open-ended questions. In-depth interviews in peace research are usually used in combination with other

[64] Sources: http://ncthakur.itgo.com/map04.htm (accessed on 10/3/2017)
[65] Please see Appendix B for a list of elite respondents. Please note due to safety concerns names of elite respondents, contact details, gender and interview dates have been anonymized.

methods for collecting data; they are rarely used as the sole source of data (Johnson, 2002, p. 104). A single in-depth interview study conducted at one point in time cannot in, and by itself, explain or make generalisations for other cases. However, when firmly based on, and compared with earlier research, that is when it is put into the realm of the 'collective enterprise' of science (King et al, 2004, p. 186). An in-depth interview study can suggest valid descriptive or causal inferences. In-depth interviewing can be used inductively, to generate new hypotheses or theory by studying an issue in a conflict or post-conflict setting.

Alternatively, in-depth interviewing can be used deductively, to investigate whether a theory based on findings from studies at the societal or national level is applicable at the grassroots, individual level. By combining research methods to gather both quantitative and qualitative data, the analyses in research can at the same time be made broad and rich.

Across the 16 districts where interviews were conducted, I interviewed 50 people: seven Maoist insurgent commanders; five police inspector generals or police inspectors; four Senior Army Generals; three academics; two journalists; two judges; 12 NGOs or civil society group members; nine UN or UN agency staff; and six members of parliament. For reasons that will be further explained later, I dropped 12 interviewees from the analysis conducted in Chapter Seven because a few interviewees decided not to be a part of the project. In addition, a few respondents, after further probing during the interview process, showed an inability to understand specific questions that were posed. Others also had issues with language and could not understand the translated version of the questions.

Through interviews and observations during meetings, I documented the history of the conflict in some local communities, the political trajectories of conflict as it escalated over the course of the years, the relations between civilians and the armed actors, and the patterns and some tactics of Maoist rebels.

While I could gather several primary documents and databases to observe many meetings of different organisations, my principal research method was that of the semi-structured interview, where I asked open-ended questions from a prepared list and pursued topics in depth, as seemed appropriate and relevant. Many respondents were essential to the quality of information eventually gathered. It was important for the research to gather perceptions on these issues from social groups across the political spectrum (including the armed actors). I assured all those I interviewed that their identity would be kept confidential (in many cases, their participation was anonymous).

My initial entry to my first interview was facilitated by a non-governmental organisation who was working on truth and reconciliation issues. The local organisations I contacted in 2014 introduced me to residents and gave me the opportunity to have people come in throughout the day to conduct interviews with. Various contacts in Nepal (through my initial field research visit in 2012) introduced me to members of non-governmental organisations working in the other field sites, who then facilitated my entry to other interviewees in other districts. In the rural areas, I was assessed by the Maoist local leaders who were present in each area. This meant having to be cross-examined by state authorities as well. After listening to my explanation of the project, authorities on all sides would check with political leaders in Kathmandu to confirm my identity. Given that I used the snowballing method of

interviewing elites on the government side, I assume a similar process took place among government officials. Thus, prospective interviewees were identified through the construction of several parallel and evolving networks of contacts (urban and rural, insurgent-affiliated and government supporting, and rural residents who supported neither side). In the circumstances of political violence and divergence, like in the Terrai regions (due to violent protest against the state in 2014), the dynamics were a little different when speaking to respondents. I did not attempt to construct representative samples of local respondents but did my best to interview members of a wide variety of organizations, both those affiliated with the government and those affiliated with the opposition.

Locals Maoist and state authorities introduced me to a variety of residents, including people who supported neither side (otherwise not easily identified). I did carry out research in areas that where controlled by the Maoist (e.g. Rolpha, Rukum, etc.) that were contested over the period of the conflict and areas that were solely controlled by the state (e.g., Kathmandu). However, key to understanding violence was to survey and interview areas where the Maoist were present or areas that switched the hands of control over the course of the conflict. I did not attempt to conduct field research in areas where insurgent activities were entirely absent (which would have been the ideal research design, as it would have added a clearly contrasting case). Field research in the conditions of the Nepalese conflict during the times of my research was generally safe. The risk was often due to the altitude of the district or the unregulated planes that I often had to take to get to a community on foot. However, I fully enjoyed this experience and would not trade it in.

The interview questions aimed to capture the interviewees' perspectives of events pertaining to embeddedness, indiscriminate violence and who used it, and the triggers of indiscriminate violence. The interviewee's responses contributed to understanding the use, changes, and movement of indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese conflict. The questions were occasionally adjusted to account for respondents' range of understanding of the conflict, as not all elite interviewees' experience of the conflict was the same and each person had a different level of understanding. To choose the questions for the interviews, I conducted in-depth research on the interviewees beforehand. This helped to focus the questions and provided the option to ask follow-up questions.

Questions, such as "How long did the indiscriminate violence continue?" were often difficult for elites to answer because their knowledge depended on where they were based and their position within society at the time. For example, if the former Home Secretary reported that indiscriminate violence was not systematically used during the conflict, this depended on the sources of information he/she was exposed to during the conflict. A frontline police officer that witnessed indiscriminate violence used by colleagues would have a different perspective. Therefore, one's critical perspective depends on the environment, the type of information acquired, and the sources of this information. To discuss such constraints, I asked further questions to clarify and gather more information from interviewees.

4.5.1 Sampling Methods

In-depth interviews are used to gain a deeper understanding of processes of the conflict both among elites and among different groups of the population. At the elite

level, in-depth interviews are often used to follow a process (for further reading see, for example, Berry, 2002 and Richards, 1996). At the grassroots level, in-depth interviews are used to learn from different subgroups of the population to better understand the challenges, possibilities and risks of peace.

Although Nepal is now a federal state, a dominant caste system remains ingrained in society and continues to control much of society and the state. The sampling criterion for the interviews was not designed to reflect this reality, but to engage a variety of civilians who reflect high levels of experience, conflict knowledge, and understanding. This required the inclusion of knowledgeable and credible Nepalese thinkers, who understand the issues explored in this study.

Considering the issue of access is essential for designing ethically-sound field research. Potential dangers and security concerns must be considered when reflecting upon when the time is right, and for what? What information do I need? What do I have the right to ask? Who is it possible to approach? More than merely whether information can be 'accessed' there is the question of ethics and sensitivity in determining what information should be gathered. Despite the guidelines, rules and regulations, the field research process ultimately rested on my critical judgment and a decision that I felt was right for the research project during the time of conducting the field research. Considering the access, I had to carefully consider who I was selecting, who was willing to be interviewed, and why? Do those who are willing to share information differ from others in some way? The reliability of the information in an interview and the underlying interests that may steer the interviewee's response need to be considered. Post-conflict areas can become over-researched, bringing 'research

fatigue' in its wake, which may in turn lead an interviewee to provide the answer he/she has learnt researchers want, just to get the interview over with. There may be incentives other than wanting their story to be known, driving the interviewee to share information, for example, the hope of financial compensation. There is no easy answer or solution as to whether one should compensate interviewees; it is an area of much debate (see Dunn and Gordon, 2005; McNeill, 1997; Wilkinson and Moore, 1997). However, for this research project I did not compensate people with money but made clear the project was an opportunity to set the record straight and to explore the use of indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese conflict in a different way. Some argue that if interviewees are taking time off from work and thereby lose income to participate in a study, they should be compensated for this loss. To avoid this concern, I travelled to all the interviews locations, where they felt comfortable, safe and willing to share their account. For example, some interviewees (those omitted from Chapter Seven's analysis) were more interested in hurrying through the questions and saying anything that comes to mind, rather than taking the time to genuinely and carefully respond to the questions. Others did not have the capacity to answer the questions after further probing their accounts. This was something I confronted on two occasions and a situation which I felt would diminish the validity of the inferences made from the study. As a result, I dropped both interviews, and others, from the analysis to reduce bias. The justification for taking this decision was to avoid certain, inescapable selection biases, which were important for this study.

Actors self-selection

In this thesis, the actor selection process was dealt with by contacting numerous individuals who were known to either be party to the conflict or operated in a senior

capacity during the conflict (this varied from government positions, to rebel leaders rebel generals in the field to members of a civil society organisation). As mentioned previously, the list of selected respondents came from an extensive list of civilians composed by myself, in collaboration with two research assistants, and with support from a newspaper editor. This process was put together to bring a collection of elites who operated at different levels but played a critical role, or understood how actors used and moved with violence during the conflict. Inherently, there will always be biases from the selection of respondents, especially from the views selected respondents will hold. Thus, my two research assistants and newspaper editor helped to provide some balance by providing me with a different perspective, which helped me to support the reduction of my own biases but not eliminate this bias. This was done by mainly countering my western perceptions I derived from my desk research. This enabled us to produce a detailed list of interviewees which I felt (with collective effort): a) helped me to understand the various concepts, i.e., the three strategic positions, the nature of these positions, and describe how the positions manifested and interacted with the use of indiscriminate violence; and, b) explore through respondents' eyes which actors played a critical role during the conflict, at both the local and senior levels of the conflict. This meant the list of elites were not only selected from research assistants' knowledge but also acquired by me researching achieved records, official documentation, military and police reports, public speech records, etc. This supported the compilation of an extensive list of respondents whom I felt could, and would, have an extensive understanding about the strategic positions of actors and their use of indiscriminate violence.

Some respondents' roles were more significant than others during the conflict. For example, my list of interviewees included two Maoist strategic planners, and NGO

observers of human rights violations. However, the accounts interviewees provided were diverse; the Maoist strategic planner could give me extensive information about the movement and position of actors, while the NGO observers' accounts were orientated towards the use of indiscriminate violence and patterns of violence. Whether it was the Home Secretary, the head of Parliament, a Maoist strategist, or head of the military or Armed Police Force during certain operations, all respondents were a piece of a larger puzzle and provided information on the conflict from different viewpoints. Several of the elites were willing to share their knowledge and experience of the conflict and there were occasions were some interviewees were deceitful or refused to continue after I had probed them on a matter. This later required me to drop them from the analysis, hence, why the number of interviewees dropped from 50 interviewed to 38.

To discuss the concept of indiscriminate violence and the strategic positions that an actor can adopt, I would talk to the interviewee before the interview and explain what was meant by indiscriminate violence; namely, by giving examples of violence used against civilians which fitted my conceptualisation of indiscriminate violence in this thesis. When it came to the strategic positions that actors could adopt, I would often describe the example taken from G1's testimony regarding actors who were embedded and deployed. This was accompanied with the thesis' own framework of indiscriminate violence and examples from newspapers or incidents documented by Amnesty international.[66]

One criteria that I did not use for selecting people was ethnicity and caste; the main reason being that the government's policy at the time of the conflict was heavily focused on specific ethnic and caste groups of civilians whom they deemed a threat.

[66] https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/09/11/waiting-justice/unpunished-crimes-nepals-armed-conflict [accessed 12/06/2018]

While I surveyed civilians and selected people to be interviewed from these ethnic areas, I did not interview many of these civilians because I felt this would have heavily biased the research. For interviews with elites, I only interviewed those who were more balanced and honest about their reflections of the conflict. The other reason for not using caste and ethnicity as a selection criterion was methodological. I was interested in understanding the strategic positions and its links to indiscriminate violence, so my priority was to gain the widest representation of responses possible (regardless of the actors' ethnicity, not knowing people's ethnicity also had its advantages). It forced me to ask questions I would not otherwise have asked; the fact that no-one told me upfront what their caste and ethnicity was did not mean that I did not make assumptions about people's ethnic identity. In fact, I made assumptions daily. It was through asking a person about a topic other than ethnicity that I would discover my assumptions were wrong; not knowing helped me to unmask mistaken assumptions. This process of unmasking, in turn, gave rise to richer forms of data than those I would have collected had I simply known the person's ethnicity beforehand.

Two key methods were used to recruit elite interviewees for the interviews, systematic sampling and the snowball approach. The systematic method involved the support of the two main research assistants - master's students in history and political science. The research assistants and I produced an extensive list of potential interviewees who, we felt, could make a strong contribution to the investigation. Once compiled, the research assistants, a well-respected international Nepalese newspaper editor, and I carefully selected 100 potential interviewees from the list, based on their background and ability to contribute to the study. We also aimed to ensure that the voices of senior level women were heard. The newspaper editor brought a different

understanding of who the key government stakeholders were during the conflict and could identify who among the warring actors controlled which areas.

The second method, the snowball approach, relies on referrals from the initial interviewees to generate additional interviewees. Due to the level that the elites operate in, I largely relied on this method. The snowball approach also allowed me to gain access to additional interviewees who were either on our comprehensive list or were not considered at all. When asked whether they knew someone that I could benefit from cross-examining, interviewees often provided names that were on our list, but interviewees had direct contact with them.

4.5.2 Face-to-face Interviews

Prior to the interviews, I read from the information and consent sheets in English and/or Nepalese and explained the aims of the study. Interviewees were then given the opportunity to ask questions and clarify any uncertainties about the research project. Consent forms were signed electronically (Apple iPad) or by hand, and later scanned and uploaded to a cloud server. Each interviewee was given a unique field number after the interview.[67] These unique numbers helped to conceal the interviewees' identities.

Face-to-face interviews largely involved the interviewee and me, and on a few occasions, a research assistant was also present to support the interview process when translation and interpretation was needed. I always ensured that the research assistants and interviewees were seated together and interacted face-to-face with me. This body

[67] Please refer to the codebook in Appendix C, IndRespDistrCode.

position ensured interviewees were comfortable and created a safe environment to discuss the different topics. Initial interviewees included: politicians, the former Home Secretary, the Defence Minister, serving and retired military generals, police chiefs, a conflict negotiator, a former house of parliament leader, and journalists.[68] Over a nine-month period, the range of interviewees expanded to activists, civil society leaders, politicians, victims, rebels, and combatants. Most interviews were conducted in English, in locations chosen by the interviewees. I conducted interviews in peoples' homes, offices, or in the home of a centrally-located resident where people felt comfortable. No matter the location, I always asked anyone within earshot (including household members) to leave - a request people always honoured. Everyone seemed to understand our need for privacy; my high social status may also have made it difficult for people to refuse.

The interviews with the elites generally involved a pre-interview or relationship-building session in which interviewees were given the chance to ask questions about the research objectives. This helped to build trust, which was important to the success of the interviews, and helped me understand the interviewees' ability and limitations. The advantage of the face-to-face interviews was that they allowed interviewees to respond to questions in-depth and choose their words carefully. This increased their confidence in the study and provided clarification on certain topics. The interviews helped me to develop a deeper understanding of embeddedness, the movement of actors, and the use of indiscriminate violence in the conflict. The disadvantage of the interviews was that they were often time-consuming, and many of the interviewees tended to digress and required redirection.

[68] Please see Appendix B for a list of interviewees

Interviewees were asked selected questions but were given the option of not responding to any of the questions. Interviewees were asked to answer all questions, but their ability to answer them depended on their knowledge and experience of the conflict. Interviewees were permitted to focus their responses on their past experiences, or those of others, in connection to the questions. Relatively few interviewees chose to focus on one period over another, and often covered the course of the conflict and the events that took place in their responses. Interviewees that digressed from the question were not interrupted; however, once they had finished their line of thought, I would return to the question or ask a different question to clarify their answers. The interviews lasted 55 to 90 minutes, on average.

4.5.3 Addressing Bias and Ethics of the Elite Sample

To avoid bias in the elite interviews, I employed four mechanisms. The first was to repeat similar questions to help probe the interviewees' memory. The second was to encourage interviewees to rely on their own experience and judgements and not the views or opinions of others. This involved encouraging interviewees to complete their answers and freely ask questions when needed. The third was to avoid referring explicitly to the subject matter from the outset. The fourth was to reassure interviewees that 'there were no right or wrong answers,' to reduce any concerns about being judged for their responses.

Any field of investigation has its limitations, and one of the central limitations in this study was funding. The research project could not rely on paid staff to assist in the analysis of the interviews, and I conducted the analysis alone. This inherently

provides opportunity for bias. To address this issue, I implemented three methods to assess the analysis. The first was to check the interpretations I developed thus far with the interviewees during and after each interview. The second was to code while I was transcribing the interview recordings, creating pre-codes to categorise interviewees' answers. The third was to maintain a reflective journal in which I recorded numerous analytic memos (see: Bernard, 2006, p. 512–15; Boyatzis, 1998, p. 144–59; Hruschka, et al., 2004). These three mechanisms helped reduce bias in the results, but do not fully eliminate all biases.

I became quickly aware of how my own subjectivity shaped the kinds of questions I could ask and the kind of access I was able to gain with certain people. By subjectivity, I mean my own background and status vis-à-vis the people I was interviewing and interacting with at elite level. The facts that I was British-Ghanaian and a black man, but many people still saw me as African, which sometimes produced moments where people would make remarks such as "the conflict in Nepal, was not the same type of conflict you see on the African continent." Being an outsider allowed me to ask questions that might have seemed too obvious, and thus suspicious, if posed by a Nepali. In the aftermath of the conflict, talking about the past was a very open act. As an outsider, I believe people did not expect me to know as many things as an insider. This assumed ignorance allowed me to ask the most basic kinds of questions, which enabled me to probe the foundational logics underlying people's understanding of the world and how things were and what people's true experience of the conflict was like.

Owing to the vagaries of memory, the passage of time, and incentives to deviate from or adhere to certain narratives, I cannot judge the quality of the data by the truth or

accuracies contained within them. Instead, I treat the data as repositories of collective meaning and understanding about how the world works according to the respondent. Interpreting data from interviews involves identifying patterns of meaning and understanding within people's statements about the conflict, as well as daily life and how indiscriminate violence was displayed. How a person talks about the world, whether true or false, gives clues as to how they make sense of that world. This helps to form understanding about the causal inferences they may make even when they are lying. Thus, even within the bounds of the data, it is possible to identify and analyse the system of meaning that people used to navigate daily life as well as the extraordinary events of the decade-long conflict.

4.5.4 Pre-Coding

Pre-coding is a tool used to understand and clarify the responses of interviewees during any research process. Pre-coding also helps the researcher to identify the key areas of focus and what can be eliminated from the analysis. While it is important to use words and short phrases to code, it is equally important to pre-code interviews to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon (Layder, 1998). In this study, pre-coding involved transcribing interviewees' recorded interviews and simply circling, highlighting, bolding, or underlining significant quotes that appeared critical for the analysis. I reviewed the raw data two to three times before creating a pre-code. To avoid bias, as I analysed this data alone, it was important to use this method (See: Boyatzis, 1998). Due to the geographic distance between the interviewees, and the time that transpired between interviews, I had time to reflect on each interview and commence pre-coding using a field book (See: Creswell, 2007, p. 168-9). The pre-codes were tentative but provided me with direction for further analysis and reduced my reliance on memory when examining the data.

Several pre-codes were later used as codes in the analysis. New codes were created to clarify interviewees' responses when needed. Table 4.0 below illustrates an example of the pre-coding process. This process provides a transitional link between the raw data or interview transcripts and initial pre-codes, and the final pre-codes used for creating the initial codes.

Table 4.0 Example of Pre-coding

COLUMN 1	COLUMN 2	COLUMN 3
Raw Data	Initial Pre-codes	Final Pre-Codes
After the ambush on our vehicle…immediately after, five people were approaching the ambush site, and my people (APF) were about to kill them, and I stopped them. I said to them "No," because those people who ambushed us have already left. These people are unknown civilians; they are not the insurgents, and they did not lay the ambush on us.	An attack on APF Potential loss of control Accountability Bystander Confusion	Indiscriminate violence Temporarily-deployed actors

4.5.5 Designing and Using Codes

A code can summarise or condense data, not simply reduce it. This depends on its meaning and relevance to the analysis. Ultimately, it depends on theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study. When codes are applied, and reapplied to qualitative data, the process of coding allows the data to be "segregated, grouped, regrouped, and relinked to consolidate meaning and explanation" (Grbich, 2007, p. 21). In this study, I used the process of coding to understand the narratives discussed in the interviews. The process of coding involved three cycles where I reviewed the

interview transcripts and considered the pre-codes. The codes used were often words or short phrases; however, several of the codes were originally pre-codes. The pre-codes were not fixed and not all were transformed into codes, but some were changed during the coding stage to fit the analyses and provide further clarity. The codes created during the primary cycle of coding ranged from a single word to a full sentence or an entire page of text and depended on its focus. During the second coding cycle, I reconfigured and refined codes; and by the third cycle, I clarified and finalised the codes used to analyse the interviews and identify themes. Table 4.1 illustrates an example of the process of coding in this study.

Table 4.1 Example of coding, final codes, and thematic area selection

COLUMN 1	COLUMN 2	COLUMN 3	COLUMN 4
Raw Data	Initial Pre-code	Final Code	*Thematic Area*
After the ambush on our vehicle…immediately after, five people were approaching the ambush site, and my people (APF) were about to kill them, and I stopped them. I said to them "No," because those people who ambushed us have already left. These people are unknown civilians; they are not the insurgents, and they did not lay the ambush on us.	An attack on APF Civilians Potential loss of control Accountability Confusion, Revenge	Frustration by actors Indiscriminate violence Temporarily-deployed actors	Frustration by temporarily-deployed combatants Combatants groups and attacks

4.25 Categorising and Coding Filter

To avoid bias, I ensured that the coding conducted remained linked to the questions that aid in testing and exploring the study hypothesis. When interviewing the elites, I used questions from the survey and follow-up questions, which tended to be more open-ended and were systematically linked to the study aims. This helped to prompt

the interviewees, clarify their statements, and add clarity to the inquiry. Using the theoretical framework helped place the pre-codes and codes in the relevant thematic area.

4.6 Triangulation Methods

In social sciences research, the use of triangulation can be traced to Campbell and Fiskel (1959). The method involved mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic. The mixing of data types, known as data triangulation, is often thought to help in confirming the claims that might arise from an initial pilot study. The mixing of methodologies, e.g. mixing the use of survey data with interviews, is a more profound form of triangulation.

The method was later developed by Web (1966) and elaborated on by Denzin (1970). Web (1966), Campbell (1966), Denzin (1978), and Smith and Kleine (1986), have argued that triangulation increases the accuracy of a study and the validity of its measures, using different sources and methods in the study. O'Donoghue and Punch (2003), argue that triangulation is a "method of cross-checking data from multiple sources" to search for regularities within a research project. For some researchers (Altrichter, et al., 2008), triangulation is a way to balance the various sources used within a research project, whether qualitative or quantitative, and to give "a more detailed and balanced picture of the situation." According to Olsen (2004) triangulation provides a broader and deeper understanding of a study's phenomenon. Cohen and Manion (2000) define triangulation as an attempt to map out, or clarify more fully, the fruitfulness and complexity of human conduct by examining it from more than one viewpoint.

The perspectives on triangulation presented above demonstrate the ways in which triangulation can assist me in bringing together the study results and provide a broader and deeper understanding of indiscriminate violence and the impact of embeddedness. Triangulation allows me to cross-reference the results and solidify my answers to the study hypothesis. Using the method of triangulation, I combine the results from the process tracing analysis, the survey cross tabulations, and the content and narrative analysis of the interviews. Triangulation reduces the limitations of single-method research and provides a richer and more comprehensive understanding. Triangulation is not only a method of combining multiple observations and empirical analyses; it can also be used as a mechanism to bring together the investigations undertaken in this study, to provide a coherent narrative and robust answers to the questions raised. Triangulation can help address inherent biases, scrutinise the study results, and provide an overall picture derived from the different sources. Triangulation further allows me to interpret causal mechanisms in the use of indiscriminate violence to provide a robust and collective understanding of embeddedness.

Figure 8.0 illustrates the process of triangulation used in this study and highlights the different methods used throughout this project, including process tracing analysis of datasets and relevant materials (Chapter Five); a survey conducted with 517 civilian respondents in Nepal, analysed using cross-tabulation (Chapter Six); and interviews with the 38 elites, analysed using content and narrative analysis (Chapter Seven). All the study results are included in the triangulation process, which provides the combined findings of this study.



Figure 4.2: The process of triangulation and the sources used

In the triangulation process conducted in this study, I examined all study results collectively to determine whether they correspond with the study hypothesis. Table 8.0 shows a simplified version of the triangulation of findings in this study. The results show strong evidence for hypotheses one, but not for hypothesis two; results for hypothesis two were varied. Since the findings presented in each chapter may not be sufficiently strong to stand-alone, I consider the results collectively.

Table 4.2: Simplified triangulation of study results

	Chapter Five	Chapter Six	Chapter Seven	Overall Result
Hypothesis One	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hypothesis Two	Y/N	Y/N	Y/N	N

Note: Y=confirmation of the hypothesis; N=no confirmation; Y/N=partial confirmation

Rather than viewing triangulation solely as a method to validate or verify the study results, I use triangulation to ensure that the interpretations of the results presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven are rigorous; and I can provide conclusive answers to the study questions. I used different methods to collect and analyse the study data to explore and assess the same hypothesis. Triangulation helps to increase the validity of the study results, by collectively examining the results presented in each chapter. This process furthers the understanding of the impact of indiscriminate violence used against civilians during the decade-long conflict in Nepal (1996-2006) and provides an important perspective on what occurred during the conflict.

This chapter began with a description of the methods used to bring existing data together with other relevant sources through the process tracing analysis to understand how embeddedness operated, functioned, and was implemented during the Nepalese conflict. In the second section, I examined the design and administration of field surveys to 517 respondents in 16 districts of Nepal, to capture the views of a sample of Nepal's diverse population on the conflict. I examined the issue of bias and the steps I had taken to reduce this issue. In the final section, I discussed the design and implementation of interviews, with 38 Nepalese elites and the process of pre-coding and coding the interviews to develop a deeper understanding of embeddedness, the

movement of actors, and the use of indiscriminate violence in the conflict. And examined the use tool of triangulation and how it can assist this research to understand the use and movement of indiscriminate violence from the various sources used in this thesis.

In the next chapter, I explore the results of the process tracing analysis with the combined datasets. This chapter provides an in-depth understanding of the conflict in Nepal. I explore the use of indiscriminate violence through embeddedness during the different periods of the conflict and summarise the initial findings of the analysis. The chapter reveals that indiscriminate violence occurred during the conflict, and temporarily-deployed actors on the side of the state used higher levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians in the zones in which rebel actors were embedded.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CASE OF NEPAL

5.1 Chapter Overview

In this chapter, I apply a process tracing method to show how embeddedness influences the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the decade-long Nepalese conflict (1996-2006). The chapter uses three distinct datasets[69] in conjunction with an in-depth analysis of various sources, including newspapers, articles, online journals, reports, UN documents, and institutional documentation, to understand the use of indiscriminate violence during the conflict. The process tracing analysis presented in this chapter supports the understanding of the movement of indiscriminate violence with actors from zone to zone in the conflict, the strategic position which actors adopt, the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by various actors, and the triggers of indiscriminate violence and why it was used.

The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part (Section 5.2), I briefly review the concept of embeddedness, the study hypothesis, and the potential of process tracing analysis to detect embeddedness. In the second part (Sections 5.4-5.10), I examine the conflict in Nepal and evaluate how indiscriminate violence unfolded. I explore how the Maoist actors embedded themselves amongst the civilian population before the conflict began. I also demonstrate that various actors, assuming different strategic positions (embedded, temporarily deployed, or fixed), used indiscriminate violence. In the final section (5.11), I summarise the findings, highlight the actors most implicated with using indiscriminate violence, and attempt to explain why it was

[69] See Chapter Four for a detailed breakdown of the datasets used for this analysis.

used against civilians. The final section also provides initial findings on what triggers the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians.

5.2 Piggy in the Middle: The Concept of Embeddedness

In Chapter Three, I developed a theoretical framework to explain why civilians experience indiscriminate violence during conflicts. I argue that actors in a conflict (i.e., internal parties, including combatants, defectors, rebels, army, police, spoiler groups, local militia, and perpetrators) can assume three strategic positions (embeddedness, temporarily-deployed, and fixed) that contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. I further argue that the strategic positions actors assume render civilians "piggies in the middle" (between temporarily-deployed or fixed actors and embedded actors). The strategic position of embeddedness is briefly defined as the position and time when an actor is deeply rooted in a surrounding population of civilians during the conflict. Temporarily-deployed is defined as the position and time when an actor is sent to a zone to either assist their allies or to combat warring actors who may be embedded or fixed in these zones. Finally, fixed is defined as the position and time when an actor is recruited locally or stationed in zones for intermediate or extended periods of time (see Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion and definition of the terms).

In Chapter Three, I focused on the strategic position of embeddedness and proposed that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians through the practice of embeddedness occurs under two conditions: when an embedded actors resorts to using indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population and when fixed, but largely temporarily-deployed actors use indiscriminate violence against

civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. A key distinction is made between embedded actors and the targets of indiscriminate violence. In Chapter Three, I presented the following hypothesis on the two conditions under which indiscriminate violence occurs through embeddedness:

> H1: *Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?*
>
> H2: *Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations?*

In Chapter 5, I explore this hypothesis in the context of the Nepalese conflict through process tracing analysis. I focus on understanding whether actors assume one of the three strategic positions, and whether the strategic position of embeddedness triggers the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Above all, I seek to understand whether the embedding of actors increases the likelihood that temporarily-deployed actors will use indiscriminate violence against civilians.

5.3 Process Tracing of the Nepalese Conflict

To understand what occurred during the different stages of the Nepalese conflict, I divided the conflict into four periods. This division facilitates the assessment of various actors' activities and behaviours and how they impact the use of indiscriminate violence. The four periods also allow me to identify the events, positions, and strategies used by actors during each period. This provides the opportunity to identify changes in the actors' strategic positions and their use of

indiscriminate violence and brings me closer to understanding whether embedded actors triggered its use on civilians. For process tracing analysis, I have identified the following four periods in the Nepalese conflict:

- Period 1: The onset or initial phase of the conflict (*1996-1999).*
- Period 2: The halfway mark in battle-related deaths, changes in leadership, or the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians (*2000-2002).*
- Period 3: The peak in the number of battle-related deaths until the decline of the conflict, and a peak in recorded incidences of indiscriminate violence (*2003-2004*).
- Period 4: The decline of the number of deaths, a peace agreement, and the end of the conflict (*2005-2006).*

These periods guide the exploration of the relationship between the use of indiscriminate violence by actors and the condition of embeddedness, and why embeddedness increases the potential for temporarily-deployed actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians.

5.4 Overview of the Nepalese Conflict (1996-2006)

On February 13, 1996, the Maoist insurgents of Nepal launched an attack on the state, declaring a "People's War." Prior to this, on February 4, 1996, Dr Baburam Bhattarai, one of the leaders of the Maoist party, submitted a 40-point petition to Prime Minister (PM) Sher Bahadur Deuba, demanding that all points be met by February 17, 1996 (Marsh, 2007). However, PM Deuba instead travelled to India. The Maoists, viewing this as an insult, ignored the deadline and attacked police posts in Rolpha, Rukum,

Jajarkot, Gorkha, and Sindhuli (Thapa & Sijapati, 2003, p. 85). The conflict intensified at a rapid pace that took the government by surprise. It would later spread to 68 of Nepal's 75 districts;[70] while 32 districts[71] are believed to have been the hardest hit[72] (see Figure 5.0 for a map of Nepal and its districts).

Figure 5.0: Map of Nepal and the Nepalese districts

By the time the conflict was over in 2006, it had claimed the lives of 15,000–18,000 people, with 1,000 missing.

5.5 The Embedding of Maoist Actors in the Conflict

The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCP-M is a Nepalese political party. It was founded in 1994 and was led by Chairman Pushpa Kamal

[70] According to the Maoists actors in the CPN-M party.
[71] According to the government's own figures.
[72] http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper187 (accessed on 10/02/2014).

Dahal (commonly known as Prachanda).[73] The Maoist belief is based on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao. Maoists draw much of their inspiration from other rural insurgencies, such as the conflict involving the Sendero Luminoso or "Shining Path" group in Peru. The Maoists were well-organised in Nepal and exercised authority through a United People's Committee (UPC). The UPC had four levels of authority: sub-regional, district, village, and ward. The Village United People's committee functioned as the main agency of the rebel government. A Village Committee usually consisted of three wards. Ward Committees generally had five to seven members, including two members of the proletarian class, two or three members representing poor peasants, and one or two members of the petit bourgeois class. Committees were formed by "general consensus of the masses," and were organised into three zones and 27 districts (Crane, 2002).

The Maoist actors avoided detection by embedding themselves amongst the civilian population (in Rolpha and Rukum) before the conflict began. Maoist actors set up base areas in remote, isolated, and mountainous districts of Nepal (the mid-western regions) and embedded themselves amongst the civilian population (Karki & Seddon 2003, p. 13). Their intention was to surround cities, create guerrilla zones (in small teams), and establish deep roots amongst the civilian population (Li-Onesto, 2006). According to an interview with a Maoist strategist, this occurred as early as 1994.

Before the conflict, the Maoists built a support base with the civilian population and launched a "hearts and minds" campaign to encourage them to join their cause.[74] The Maoist actors organised several community events and launched several campaigns to

[73] https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/nepal1004/2.htm (accessed on 19/8/2017).
[74] http://www.hoover.org/research/hearts-and-minds-counting-costs

embed their actors amongst the civilian population (Pyakuryal, et al., 2007, p. 77). Campaigns, such as "Sija," helped organise a centralised Maoist force that was then deployed in small groups to civilian areas to become embedded. These groups were largely composed of party members, insurgents, and leaders who had initially focused on the Rolpha and Rukum districts. The Maoist actors organised the people, propagated the party line, and held study sessions on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (Thapa, 2003, p. 155). The Maoists embedded themselves in the following areas: Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot, Salyan, Pyuthan, and Kalikot, as Figure 5.1 illustrates.



Figure 5.1: Initial conflict areas 1996-2002.[75]

According to Hunt (2004), these districts were the epicentre of the Maoist movement, as Maoist presence was stronger there than the state's presence. According to Hunt's analysis, the district of Rolpha provides a good example of the Maoists' strength and

[75] Sources: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/272185543_The_Strategic_Revolutionary_Phases_of_the_Maoist_Insurgency_in_Nepal

the embedding of Maoist actors. In 1998, the number of police posts in Rolpha decreased from a total of 39 to two. Rukum's police force decreased from 1998, from 23 posts to two. The Maoist rebels selected these districts because they were in remote areas, with little state presence; however, the districts were underdeveloped and lacked basic infrastructure for locals (Hunt, 2004, pp. 43-44). The Maoist actors became like common civilians; they dressed like civilians and integrated with the civilian population. When state actors sought the Maoists actors out, it had become difficult to differentiate between them and the civilian population.

Prior to the Maoists' launch of the "People's War" in February 1996, the government had begun efforts to root-out its most radical critics. The government launched a police campaign entitled, "Operation Romeo," in the Rolpa district. Officially, the aim of Operation Romeo was to control a rise in criminal activities in Rolpha, but the operation focused on defeating the Maoist actors who were embedded amongst the civilian population in Rolpha (Amnesty International, 1997).[76] Operation Romeo involved temporarily deploying 1,500 police officers, including specially-trained commando forces from Kathmandu and local police units, to villages to kill the Maoist actors. Many of the police actors were assured of promotion for killing Maoists by whatever means possible (Chautari, 2003, pp. ix-xiii; Karki & Seddon 2003, p. 58; Lohani-Chase, 2008, Thapa, 2003). This resulted in severe violations of human rights, arbitrary arrests, detentions, rapes, executions, and "disappearances." Amnesty International (1997) stated that this violence drove many of the impoverished rural population to support the Maoist actors. The embedded Maoists actors gained considerable support from the local population, many of whom joined

[76] See Amnesty International's, "Human rights violations in the context of a Maoist peoples' war" (December 1997), for a detailed discussion of the human rights abuses committed during Operation Romeo.

the Maoists and helped launch the "People's War," with homemade bombs and farming tools used as weapons.

The first point of the Maoists six-point plan had already been initiated[77] before the "People's War," allowing the Maoists to move to the second point and increase their attacks when the conflict began (Pyakuryal & Sainju, 2007). As the conflict progressed, the fighting encompassed several districts in Nepal, as Figure 5.2 illustrates in the number of casualties across the districts.



Figure 5.2: Map of Nepal with 100 or more causality from 2004.[78]

5.6 The Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M): Philosophy and Aims

The Maoist Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M) aimed to implement the Maoist philosophy using a "protracted armed struggle" to gain the support of the people and

[77] http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2006/09/200841014505997624 3.html (accessed on 13/4/2015)
[78] Source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/272185543_fig3_Figure-7-The-Geographic-Scope-of-the-War-in-2004

decimate the state. According to Mao, a "protracted armed struggle" occurs in three phases: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate or equilibrium, and strategic offensive. In the strategic defensive phase in Nepal, people began fighting the "reactionary state;" they were lightly armed and fought under the leadership of the CPN-M party. "Grievance guerrillas," who were politically and ideologically equipped with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, seized weapons from the security forces and led the guerrilla fighters to build a People Liberation Army (PLA) in 2002. The PLA aimed to reach political and military strength to lead the war and create a centre for the revolution and people's political power.

The central aim of the CPN-M armed struggle was to capture state power and establish a "new people's democracy" (naulo janbad). The concept of "new democracy" was taken from Mao Zedong's doctrine, which in turn was built on the views of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. The "new democratic revolution" marks the transition from the classical Marxist stages of bourgeois hegemony ("old democracy") to proletarian hegemony ("new democracy").

The Maoists allied with other factions in the communist party and leveraged the grievances of different groups, not all of whom were communist. Ethnic, regional, and tribal groups, as well as those concerned with educational and class issues, mobilised under the CPN-M. Prior to initiating People's War, the CPN-M disbanded the United People's Front[79] and replaced it with a "revolutionary united front." In a 1998 issue of The Worker, Prachanda pronounced that through the People's War, "oppressed nationalities," such as the Magars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Newars, Tharus,

[79] The United People's Front of Nepal was the mass front of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) or the CPN. They participated in the 1991 election, but did not win more than a handful of seats. The party would later be spilt along hardliners and moderates (In Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia)

Rais, Limbus, and Madhesis were fighting for their own rights. He also championed the rebellion of the Dalits against the "feudal state of high caste Hindus." In this respect, the Maoist insurgency took on a populist tone, through the united front, based on diverse socio-cultural interests. The grievances of these groups fitted well with the aims of the communists. The common enemy was a self-serving state apparatus that had perpetuated an unjust caste system and had failed to bring development or freedom to the population.

5.7 The Conflict, Period 1 (1996-1999)

The behaviour of the state police actors at the start of the conflict was a contributing factor in the Maoists' success during the first period. During this period, the Maoists grew in numbers and established three divisions, nine brigades, and 29 battalions (Pyakuryal & Sainju, 2007), largely by recruiting locals and embedding Maoist actors amongst civilian populations. On February 27, 1996, six people were killed, and a young girl (aged 14) was raped by police actors deployed to defeat the Maoists in a village (INSEC data, 1996, p. 434, Nepali Version). On the night of April 11, 1996, during a search operation by temporarily-deployed police actors, Vice Chairman Tikaram Budha (aged 38) was arrested and taken to Madichaur, because he refused to oppose the "People's War" and reveal where the Maoists were hiding (Kattel, 2000, p. 34). Consequently, the police actors cut off his nose and ears and later shot and killed him (Kattel, 2000, p. 34).

In 1998, the government launched "Operation Kilo Sierra II," which lasted for two months between mid-June and August. The operation involved the temporary deployment of police actors from Kathmandu and neighbouring districts to the heart

of the Maoist zones. Operation Kilo Sierra II caused an estimated 200 deaths (15 in Rolpa, 20 in Rukum, over 50 in Jajarkot, and the remainder in areas surrounding the Maoist zones) (Li Onesto, 2006, p. 159). The Maoist actors retaliated with "hit-and-run" and "hide-and-seek" attacks in small units, with civilians at the frontlines, later returning to their zones and re-embedding themselves amongst the civilian population. In the game of hide-and-seek, having a limited and mutually agreed upon physical space in which both the hider and the seeker participate is essential. However, in a conflict situation the opposite is required. When authorities or armies – be they domestic or international – "hunt" for suspects, they deduce a territory where the suspect may be found – often based on information or troop movement. In complex cases, the area may be vast, complicating efforts to detain the wanted suspect but the complexity of the situation itself is considered. In short, while I would not expect a warlord or an international criminal to make it known where they are hiding, the actors "hunting" them down should have an idea of where they could be. As importantly, we wouldn't expect them to ignore a potential hiding location they know could be used – especially if it has been used before. However, a key problem plaguing any chance of success is the fact that CPN-M leaders may not be in any of the places that state temporarily-deployed actors had access to or assumed Maoist actors where hiding.

In the case of Nepal this made it exceedingly difficult for the police actors to differentiate between the Maoist actors and the civilians, which led to the use of indiscriminate violence (Karki & Seddon, 2003. P. 429). The police also used techniques, such as "search marches" in uncontested (later switching to contested when state actor entered) Maoist zones, which often led to indiscriminate violence,

particularly killings, against the local population (Karki & Seddon 2003, p. 430). Search marches involved large convoys of police officers searching from home-to-home for Maoist actors in civilian areas.

The movement of actors on both sides within the conflict zones contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence. During this period, many of the police actors resorted to sporadic acts of violent actions, especially when the Maoists attacked police posts and fled to re-embed themselves amongst the civilian population.[80]



Figure 5.3: Nepalese conflict with battle-related deaths, and one-sided killing.[81]

Period 1 was recorded as one of the least violent periods in the conflict. Figure 5.3 shows that by 1999, almost 1,000 people had been killed by state actors[82] (Khimlal Devkota, 2012, p. 152; Stevenson, 2001). In early 1997, as the Informal Sector

[80] http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/sa/8234.htm (accessed on 10/3/2017).
[81] Sources: UCDP: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP; Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC): Violence against civilians: http://www.inseconline.org.
[82] This only included the police and security forces during this period.

Service Centre (INSEC) and UCDP datasets reveal, the levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians perpetrated by both parties increased. However, indiscriminate violence by state actors was higher than any other actors.

In response to the Maoists' campaign, the state launched counter attacks, including "Operation Kilo Sierra II" and "Operation Shoot to kill." Police actors were temporarily deployed on missions to Maoist zones to root out and kill embedded Maoists actors. Operations "Jungle Search" and "Search and Destroy" were designed to seek out and suppress embedded Maoist actors; however, many of the state's temporarily-deployed actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians, because they could not differentiate between the embedded Maoist and civilian population during combat.[83] A series of minor failings on the side of the state contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. These included an ill-equipped police force, with no prior experience in counterinsurgency, and a significant lack of security intelligence.[84]

The harsh behaviour of the police actors resulted in greater support for the Maoists, which provided the Maoist actors with early-warning intelligence systems through the civilian populations and new recruits. "Operations "Romeo" (1995) and "Kilo Sierra II" (1998) drove approximately 10,000 civilians into the jungle to escape police violence. Many of them joined the Maoists and returned as embedded or fixed actors (INSEC, 2002, p. 45). The remaining Maoist actors went on missions from village to village (Thapa, 2003, p. 101).

[83] http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper199 (accessed 25/08/2014).
[84] http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 25/08/2014).

The Maoist actors had initially formed fighting groups of 3–4 embedded actors. During the second point of the six-point plan (1998), the Maoist actors increased the size of their embedded units to 7–9 members; and during the third point, group numbers increased to 30–32 actors in each area or zone (Baldev, 2014; Li Onesto, 2003, p. 157; Thapa, 2003). State operations, such as "Kilo Sierra II" (1998), allowed the Maoists to increase the size of their embedded units to 40 actors and to focus on expansion into other districts. Established base areas, such as Rolpa (uncontested territory), made it difficult for the state's temporarily-deployed actors to distinguish between the rebels and the civilians.[85]

5.8 The Conflict, Period 2 (2000-2002)

In the second period, the conflict continued to escalate, while changes in state leadership and inconsistent policies contributed to the further embedding of Maoist actors and the use indiscriminate violence against civilians. This period was one of the most eventful and included an intervention by the King on October 4, 2002; the appointment of four successive prime ministers; a royal massacre on June 1, 2002; and the formation and deployment of the Armed Police Force (APF) to combat terrorism in 2002.

On April 2001, Police Inspector Dhruba Kumar Dulal was killed during a Maoist attack, which later resulted in major disagreements between police chiefs and government officials. In response to the attack, temporarily-deployed police actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians in the contested zones. Many civilians reported that state actors' behaviour had become more violent and erratic during this

[85] http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/paper187 (accessed 28/04/2014).

period (INSEC, 2002; Sushil Pokharel, 2014).[86] The Maoists changed their strategy as well. In one instance, Maoists rebels, who were wandering between villages as they fled from state actors, came across a Unified Marxist–Leninist (UML) member, named Nim Lai Rokka, from Jhenam-Rolpa. They beat him to death because he refused to provide them with food. Many locals recalled that the Maoist actors appeared frustrated during the increased attacks by state actors (Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 561). On June 8, 2001, 12 policemen and seven civilians, including a three-year-old, were killed when Maoists attacked a police post in Panchkatiya village. The police post had been newly installed, and there were repeated demands for its removal. Many villagers claimed that the "post was used to confuse the Maoists" (Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 52) because it was based near civilian area. Embedded Maoist actors also increased the use of indiscriminate violence[87] against civilians in their areas to regain the control they had lost.

On July 26, 2001, after five years away, Sheur Deuba became Prime Minister again and appealed for dialogue and a ceasefire. On August 3, 2001, the first round of peace talks was initiated. After several rounds of talks, Deuba agreed to release arrested Maoists actors.[88] Nevertheless, on November 23, 2001, Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Daha (known as Supremo Prachanda) issued a statement asserting that the government had rejected the main demands of his party, which marked an end to the ceasefire. The Maoists then simultaneously launched a major attack on police and army posts in 42 districts, killing 186 Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and police

[86] http://www.insec.org.np/ (accessed on 12/03/2017).
[87] The use of violence, disappearances, and killing as a method.
[88] (http://www.ekantipur.com/tkp/ (accessed 23/06/2014).

personnel.[89] In one instance, on November 22, 2001, in the Ghorahi of Dang District, an army base was attacked killing 14 soldiers, and trucks loaded with hundreds of weapons were stolen (Marsh, 2007, p. 60). Overnight, the army was unleashed against the insurgents, mobilising both tanks and artillery to respond only to the Maoist attacks.

On November 26, 2001, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba declared a nationwide state of emergency and suspended parts of the constitution.[90] State actors were temporarily deployed to engage in battle with the Maoists. In early 2002,[91] the RNA was deployed under operation "Unified Command." Operation "Unified Command" was launched after attacks on army posts in Doramba village in central Nepal, consisted of 4,000 police actors,[92]a unit of 15,000 paramilitary combatants, and the Armed Police Force (APF), who later assisted the RNA actors. The APF was newly formed by an RNA chief and included many former police and RNA officers who had left their positions due to Maoist attacks during the early years of the conflict.[93] The state also established Terrorist and Disruptive Ordinance (TADO) laws, which provided state actors with broader powers to arrest people for suspected terrorist activity (Karki & Seddon, 2003, p. 35). TADO allowed the RNA to detain suspects without trial for up to a year, fostering an atmosphere of license among state actors.

During operation "Unified Command," state actors were temporarily deployed to Maoist-held regions and civilian areas. This often included sending state actors on

[89] See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/18/nepal and http://www.gurkhabde.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Kukri_2011.pdf (accessed on 05/7/2016).
[90] Sub clauses (a), (b) and (d) of Article 12, Clause 1 of Article 13 and Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23.
[91] http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 24/08/2014).
[92] http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060704/asp/foreign/story_6434825.asp (accessed 23/07/2014).
[93] https://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 03/08/2014).

temporary-deployment to infiltrate the Maoists zones; but the actors were unable to distinguish between embedded Maoist actors and civilians, which led to indiscriminate violence. The RNA also used armed helicopters to fire on suspected Maoist zones. On November 30, 2001, in Meldhara, Rolpha district, RNA actors fired from an army helicopter, reportedly killing five civilians who were observing Baraha Pooja, a religious festival (Thapa, 2003, p. 268). From this period onward, many of the state operations to target Maoist actors became significantly more militarised in nature.[94] When RNA actors caught Maoist actors, they also killed innocent civilians because it was extremely difficult to differentiate between the embedded Maoist actors and civilians. In the districts of Nepalgunj, Pyuthun, Raraodi, Jajrakot, Lamjung, Gulmi, Surhkhet, and Dunai,[95]state actors struggled to differentiate between civilians and embedded actors. This resulted in civilians being "piggies-in-the-middle" between Maoist embedded actors; this led many of the civilians in these areas to experience indiscriminate violence.

On January 21, 2002, the Maoists declared a central People's Government with Barburam Bhattarai as its head. However, operation "Unified Command" led to the capture and killing of several embedded Maoists. To increase their numbers and respond to these attacks, the Maoists chose to implement forced recruitment of civilians on a "one-child-per-home" basis. Many of the newly recruited actors were under-aged, according to United Nations Integration and Rehabilitation Programme (UNIPR),[96] at the time. Those who refused to join were often killed as a display of

[94] http://www.scribd.com/doc/105969888/Internal-Conflicts-in-Nepal-Transnational-Consequences (accessed 18/05/2014).
[95] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1801813.stm (accessed 07/07/14).
[96] See http://www.unirp.org.np/Home.aspx (accessed on 10/3/2017). See also Interview no: 005 conducted on 15/07/2014.

strength and to regain control in the zones in which they were based. Prior to this period, Maoist actors were not commonly known to forcefully recruit civilians.

According to INSEC data, in 2000, there was an increase in the number of civilians killed by the Maoist and state actors. In 2001, the total number of civilians killed by the state accounted for approximately three quarters of the overall deaths, almost 4.5 times higher than the number of civilians killed by Maoist actors. INSEC data also shows an increase in the number of killings by the state (over 3,000 recorded deaths) between 2002 and 2003. The number of battle-related deaths between actors and non-civilians progressively rose during this period.

The level of indiscriminate violence experienced during Period 2 reflects the involvement of new state actors[97] in the conflict and their "take-no-prisoners" approach towards the Maoists (Thapa, 2003, p. 306). This weakened the legitimacy of the state, led King Gyanendra to dismiss the Deuba Government and assume executive power on October 4, 2002.[98] Changes in leadership during this period (four prime ministers in total) contributed to the confusion and frustration of state actors, allowing Maoist actors to expand and increase their use of "hit-and-run" and "hide-and-seek" tactics. Maoist actors also regarded the government as weak and aimed to exploit this position. Counterinsurgency efforts by the APF and RNA, contributed to the increase in indiscriminate violence by state actors. In an interview with a police officer from Dang, he remarked:

[97] The inclusion of the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and the Armed Police Forced (APF).
[98] http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/conflict_resolution/KBNepal2005.pdf (accessed 15/08/2014).

> Soldiers are taught to engage the enemy differently than the police, the police live amongst the communities and are selective, even when we shoot to kill; while RNA, on the other hand, will shoot first and ask questions later.[99]

The Maoists' strategy of embeddedness made it increasingly difficult for APF and RNA actors to distinguish between Maoists and civilians. Once the APF and RNA were activated, state actors were temporarily deployed to Maoist areas. This strategy failed and caused many of the state actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. State actors found it especially difficult to distinguish between Maoist actors and civilians, because the Maoists had been allowed to spread throughout the country. Techniques, such as shooting from helicopters and ongoing "search and destroy" operations added to the increase in indiscriminate violence cases (Thapa, 2003, p. 308).

The Maoists intensified their efforts by expanding fixed and deployed missions to increase their control in contested and uncontested zones. This included expanded operations and attacks on RNA, police, and government infrastructure in the eastern and western regions. An increase in "hide-and-seek" attacks frustrated fixed and temporarily-deployed, RNA and APF actors. The Maoists also launched other tactics, such as sending women and cows (considered gods in Hindu culture) ahead before they attacked state actors. Increased state pressure and attacks under "Unified Command" caused the "cat and mouse" situation to continue.

[99] http://www.ucmo.edu/cjinst/issue3.pdf (accessed 15/05/2014).

5.9 The Conflict, Period 3 (2003-2004)

The violence continued during the third period. The King dismissed the political parties in 2003 and there was an increase in military spending to defeat the Maoists (Kumar, 2003). The suspension of some fundamental human rights during the earlier period appears to have led to an escalation in indiscriminate violence by state actors under TADO. Districts, such as Panchthar, Tehrathum, Sunsari, Morang, and Jhapa, also witnessed the deployment of newly-recruited and poorly-trained APF actors to Maoist uncontested zones.[100] Maoist tactics included evening ambushes on APF and RNA bases. State actors often searched for temporarily-deployed Maoist actors but were unable of differentiate between them and civilians. As a result, RNA and APF actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians.

In August 2003, in Doramba Ramechhap District (under Maoist control), a platoon of RNA actors entered the village and forcibly moved unarmed Maoist activists to Dandakateri (a contested area). That month, the RNA and APF also attacked and illegally shot and killed 19 unarmed, suspected Maoist actors and civilians in Doramba village, Ramechhap District.[101] As a result, scheduled talks between the state and the Maoists were cancelled.[102] Indiscriminate violence increased during this period, creating uncertainty and hostility when state actors entered villages on operations.[103]

A small decline in the number of battle-related deaths between actors occurred during this period. At the same time, there was an increase in the use of indiscriminate

[100] http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/485a63912.pdf (accessed 03/06/2014).
[101] http://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/nepal-new-report-says-illegal-killings-increasing-security-forces-hiding-evidence (accessed on 10/3/2017).
[102] http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2012/08/16/oped/remember-doramba/238475.html (accessed 03/06/2014).
[103] http://old.himalmag.com/himal-feed/53/1658-the-royal-nepal-army.html (accessed 03/06/2014).

violence against civilians. While the combined datasets show a small decline in the number of indiscriminate violence incidents perpetrated by state actors, the state is indicated as the highest perpetrator of violence during this period. Indiscriminate violence was also used by Maoist actors in 2004. This seems to have been the result of Maoist actors' response to increased state operations under "Unified Command," which contributed to an increase in their use of indiscriminate violence.

The deployment of more than 4,000 APF actors to uncontested Maoist zones may have contributed to the number of civilians killed. The RNA also changed its tactics, including firing from helicopters, retaliating against attacks, and increasing temporarily-deployed operations in contested and uncontested zones. Under operation "Unified Command," several camps were set up within and outside Maoist-controlled zones, and state forces patrolled in and around civilian communities during the day. "Unified Command" placed increased pressure on the embedded Maoist actors who became progressively frustrated with the conflict. The death of fellow Maoist actors and the new tactics used by RNA and APF actors required the Maoists to recruit and resupply by any means possible to address the changes in their security (Marks, 2003). Throughout this period, the Maoists actors continued to use "hit-and-run" and "hide-and-seek" tactics. Maoist's actors also became more violent and began using methods, such as "disappearance" and forced recruitment of locals to fight in the conflict (Paudel, 2014).

5.10 The Conflict, Period 4 (2005-2006)

In late 2005, King Gyanendra declared martial law, causing the political parties and the Maoists to unite in protest against the King's rule in Nepal. Political protests were

staged in the capital against the monarchy's consolidation of power. On the evening of April 4, 2005, hundreds of Maoist actors attacked a police outpost in Yadukuwa, Jadukhola, killing 13 policemen and wounding seven, with 35 listed as missing. Witnesses claimed between 400-500 Maoist actors attacked the police post and began firing assault rifles and rockets; the fighting lasted over two hours, before they dispersed back to civilian areas.[104]

On the evening of August 7, 2005, 1,200 Maoist actors were deployed to attack the Pili army base in an uncontested zone, set up for the construction of the Surkhet-Jumla part of the Karnali Highway, at Pakha village, Kalikot District.[105] It was a direct attack on a major, fortified RNA base. The Pili base was established near the village of Pakha, close to the headquarters of Kalikot District in the valley of the Tila, a branch of the Karnali River in the western hills of Nepal. Establishing the base was an RNA advance into liberated territory and was part of a strategy to increase the RNA's mobility. They aimed to create a military corridor, along the lines separating the heart of the revolutionary zone, between the two RNA-controlled and fortified airstrips of Surkhet and Jumla.

On January 14, 2006, the Maoists launched coordinated attacks on five military and parliamentary bases in the Kathmandu valley. This was their first successful attack on the capital and resulted in the introduction of curfews. The attack demonstrated that the Maoists' operations had extended beyond their controlled zones. In April 2006, the newly-appointed Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala called for a ceasefire and a

[104] (Rebels storm police post, kill nine officers" Gulfnews (accessed on 06/04/2014). (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/nepal/1385259/Maoists-kill-more-than-120-in-Nepal.html (accessed on 12/04/2014).
[105] http://nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Jumla-gets-nearer,3358 (accessed on 10/11/2017).

new round of negotiations began. On April 27, 2006, the Maoists agreed to unilateral talks after several weeks of protests and strike action in the capital. These talks led to the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on November 21, 2006.

According INSEC data, the number of attacks on civilians during this period declined and the levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians throughout the country decreased significantly (See Figure 5.3). The UDCP data revealed that the number of battle-related deaths among the Maoists were lowest; while the state was indicated in the highest levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians. The number of battle-related deaths among the Maoist actors eventually rose above the number of civilians killed by the state. This suggests that the state's efforts to defeat the Maoists were effective, since the number of battle-related deaths between actors was, for the most part, lower than the instances of indiscriminate violence used against civilians.

This period marked several changes in state behaviour and the strategies used by the King. These directives added to the confusion and frustration of state actors and resulted in the further embedding of Maoist actors amongst civilians. The complexity of indiscriminate violence used against civilians grew during this period, as temporarily-deployed state actors were often confused when attempting to identify the Maoist actors. Pressure by the security forces may have caused the Maoists to force recruit civilians as part of their new offensive strategy. Maoist actors continued their strategy of embeddedness, while attacking state posts and infrastructure. The Maoists also intensified their attacks on the state by trying to take over the capital and launching rallies and strikes (Bandha) that crippled the country's financial hub.

Outside the capital, “hit-and-run” and “hide-and-seek” tactics continued to be used, and many state bases experienced increased attacks.

5.11 Summary of Findings

This chapter described some of the events and behaviours that shaped the use of indiscriminate violence by actors in the conflict. Both state and Maoist actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians during the different periods. Embedded actors on the rebel’s side often used indiscriminate violence when they were losing control of their zones, but also when the APF and RNA increased their efforts. On the state side, police actors used indiscriminate violence to overpower the Maoist actors and civilians who wanted or attempted to join the insurgency. The use of indiscriminate violence by police actors appeared to occur during the first period of the conflict. The findings reinforce arguments made in Chapters Two and Three, that while information was important, it was not the only crucial element triggering the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. In fact, what this chapter has illustrated is the peaks in indiscriminate violence against civilians during the initial period by state police; appear to be linked to the state’s strategic and operational response to deal with Maoist rebels. The patterns in the state’s response and Maoist behaviour show traits to those observed during the first few years of the Peruvian conflict by state police, and later the army. The state Peruvian police incurred problems with differentiating between civilians and the SP. Despite the presence of the police amongst the civilian populations and their access to information as suggested (Kalyvas, 2006), Nepal’s state actors should have had little incentive to use indiscriminate violence.

However, the analysis in this chapter demonstrates a different outcome. I found the police were involved in operations to extinguish the Maoist. Operations such as "Operation Romeo" only led to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians as a last resort, which seems to match Valentino et al., (2004), argument that indiscriminate violence appears to be an instrument of last resort. Valentino, et al., (2004) analysis is correct to suggest that indiscriminate violence is costly. However, what remains unanswered is when this moment of last resort occurs, and whether each actor assuming a different strategic position will use indiscriminate violence as a last resort, or whether this will be observed from embedded actors only. The analysis in this chapter implies while information plays a role, there are other impinging factors at hand – strategic movement and positions of actors – which a lack of information does not account for or help, explain in the case of Nepal. Indiscriminate violence in Nepal often occurred when the Maoist hit state police posts, even though they were centrally-located within civilian areas.

At the end of the second period, the APF was formed and commenced operations and the RNA would later join the conflict. The APF continued the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians initially perpetrated by the police. The APF would later be indicated in high levels of indiscriminate violence, while the RNA may have used a more systematic approach.

Overall, the results indicate that state actors collectively used indiscriminate violence against civilians more frequently than their Maoist counterparts. The process tracing analysis also reveals that the Maoist actors resorted to the use of indiscriminate violence in the latter periods of the conflict. Towards the end of Period 3, the Maoist actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians when the RNA increased its

attacks on Maoist positions. However, the process tracing analysis did not reveal whether embedded Maoist actors used indiscriminate violence at the start of the conflict.

Table 5.0 below summarises the study hypothesis and the results from each of the four periods.

Table 5.0 Summary of the hypothesis and findings for Nepal's periods of conflict

Hypotheses	H1: Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?	H2: Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations?
Period One	Yes	No
Period Two	Yes	No
Period Three	Yes	Yes
Period Four	Yes	Yes

Table 5.0 shows that the first condition in the hypothesis was observed during all four periods. The second condition was observed only during Periods 3–4 and not in Periods 1 or 2. It may be that the impact of embeddedness and the use of indiscriminate violence were undetectable in the early periods due to limitations in the process tracing method.

The analysis in this chapter provides insight into the difficulties state actors encountered in rooting-out rebel actors in the civilian areas. The operations they were involved in placed pressure on the state actors and caused several to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The analysis further reveals that the strategic

position of embeddedness triggered the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in the areas and zones in which rebel actors were embedded. In several areas, embeddedness resulted in the death of many civilians, because state actors were unable to differentiate between the civilians and the embedded actors. The use of indiscriminate violence was significantly higher during the period when operations, such as "Kilo Sierra II," "Jungle Search," "Search and Destroy," and "Unified Command" occurred. "Operation Romeo," in 1995, for example, caused many civilians to take up arms and support the rebel actors (Marks, 2003).

The strategic position and tactics the Maoists rebels employed made it exceedingly difficult for state actors to distinguish between rebel actors and civilians; mainly because, like the strategies of Mao Zedong, they involved embedding actors amongst civilians. The Maoist went out of their way to embed themselves amongst the civilian populations, before, and during the conflict. A similar strategy was detected in Chapter Three during the Peruvian and the second Sudanese conflicts. The Maoist also put in place a recruitment system which required recruiting locals as fixed actors to support their local activities and operations against the state. The Maoists rebels not only embedded themselves amongst the civilian population, but also used civilians as covers for their tactics. During the day, they worked as civilians in their local communities, and at night they became rebel actors and attacked security forces (Interview no: 007, Lily Thapa, 2014). According to a Maoist strategic planner, 30 per cent of the Maoist actors hid in the jungle and moved from village to village every five or six days on temporarily-deployed patrols; while the remaining 70 per cent were embedded amongst civilian populations. This would often change depending on the zones and strategic needs (Interview no: 005, Baldev, 2014). At the start of the

conflict the police were under-resourced and deployed to previously unknown battlefields after just six weeks of training.[106] Many of the state actors, deployed to embedded Maoist zones, aimed to survive by any means necessary. The Maoists would later expand their areas of control and embed themselves in rural areas, because the government had lost its support-base and withdrew its personnel from the districts.[107]

In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that embeddedness occurred during the Nepalese conflict and may have occurred before it began (possibly as early as 1994). Employing several sources, historical accounts, and articles, I attempt to shown that the strategic positions actors assumed, and the embedding of actors triggered the use indiscriminate violence. Additional statistical research is required to examine the hypothesis further and determine whether other factors may have played a significant role. Throughout the conflict, temporarily-deployed state actors who experienced tactics, such as "hit-and-run," appear to have been the most impacted. These attacks seem to have had a profound effect on all three state actors, but more so the APF and RNA.

In the next chapter, I attempt to explore and understand these findings further. I further explore the findings of the process tracing analysis by examining the data from 517 completed surveys. The 517 survey respondents were sampled from 16 of Nepal's 75 districts to better understand what occurred during the conflict. In Chapter Six, I continue to explore how and under what conditions indiscriminate violence was used against civilians in the Nepalese conflict.

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[106] Nepal Police Web Site: "An overview of terrorist activities in Nepal" 22 Feb 2002.
[107] http://www.berghof- foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Other_Resources/NEP_Local_Conflict_Resolution_Mechanisms.pdf (accessed on 10/3/2017).

CHAPTER SIX

EMBEDDEDNESS AND THE USE OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE

6.1 Chapter Overview

In Chapter Five, I used process tracing to evaluate the hypothesis presented in Chapter Three. The purpose of the process tracing analysis was to determine whether the predictions and other exploratory questions derived from the hypothesis were supported. I further investigated how the identified actors distributed and used indiscriminate violence throughout the conflict. Results of the process tracing analysis support the first hypothesis: *Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?* This was detected throughout the conflict periods and, thus, demonstrates support for this hypothesis. Partial support was also found for the second hypothesis: *Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations.*However, this was only detected during the third and fourth periods of the conflict (2003-2004 and 2006-2006). No evidence was found to support this hypothesis during the first and second periods. As a result, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis and will further test its veracity in Chapter Six.

In Chapter Six, I present the results of several cross-tabulation trials using the data collected from 517 surveys. To further test the study hypothesis, I examine the strength of association between selected variables, which provide a further test of the hypothesis outlined in Chapter Three. I start the chapter by conducting cross-tabulation to test the study hypothesis. This offers me an opportunity to add new evidence and further account for the use of indiscriminate violence. I later conduct

inferential statistical analysis using logistic regression analysis to examine the findings and the cross-tabulation results. The survey analysis helps to contribute to understanding the use, trends, and distribution of indiscriminate violence. Assessing the study hypothesis, using different methodological approaches, provides the thesis with statistical and evidence-based conclusions. Since there are advantages and disadvantages to both quantitative and qualitative research methods, by employing a mixed-methods approach, I can provide additional evidence and support for the overall study findings. By using an original dataset that captures the accounts of 517 respondents (civilians) who experienced indiscriminate violence during the Nepalese conflict (1996-2006), this chapter furthers the findings presented in Chapter Five. Later in Chapter 8, I examine the combined results from the survey (Chapter 6), the process tracing analysis (Chapter 5), and the elite interviewees (Chapter 7) to further understand the use of indiscriminate violence.

The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part (Section 6.2), I outline the field research methods used to implement the survey in Nepal.[108]I present the study objectives and describe the theoretical expectations in this chapter, following the findings presented in Chapter Five. In the second part (Sections 6.2–6.5), I explain the dependent and independent variables used to test the study hypothesis, and why they are best-suited for the cross-tabulation. I then explain the use of cross-tabulation to study the survey data. Then, I conduct logistic regression analysis using logit models (Sections 6.6), which further investigates the relationship between the dependent and independent variables selected for the analysis. Logitic regression is used in this chapter to model and determine the causal effect or relationship between the

[108]See Chapter Four for a detailed description of the methods used to conduct the survey in Nepal during 2014.

variables. In the final part (Sections 6.7), I present the survey findings in relation to the study hypothesis and explore whether the results of the different trials and regress analysis modelling support the hypothesis. I then provide a summary of the results from the overall analysis.

6.2 Field Research

The field research was conducted in Nepal over a one-year period in 2014. A tendency in the literature on violence is to privilege the centre over the periphery when conducting analysis on the use of violence. This of course, will never provide a researcher with a deep understanding of what occurred and the various dynamics at hand. This urban bias does more than simply ignore the periphery; it assumes that what goes on inside the capital is the same as what goes on outside - that politics outside of the centre will mirror or mimic politics in the centre. As numerous ethnographic and micro-level studies have shown, violence rarely flows from the centre (Kalyvas, 2006, Chap. 2; Migdal, 1988). As a work-around to this concern, survey distribution reached 16 districts and 517 respondents, with 20–60 respondents per district all outside of the centre of the capital. To distribute the survey, I used three methods: random, systematic, and snowball sampling. The districts sampled included: Banke, Bardiya, Bajhang, Doti, Dadeldhura, Dang, Dolpa, Jumla, Kailali, Kailkot, Kanchanpur, Kathmandu, Panchihar, Rolpa, Rukum, and Rupenidehi. The survey was conducted using a traditional pen-and-paper response to interact with respondents and provided the opportunity for respondents to complete the survey independently from the researcher.

6.3 Theoretical Expectations

In the analysis of the survey responses, I demonstrate how the embeddedness as a strategy in the accounts of civilians who were present and surveyed during the conflict accounts for some use of indiscriminate violence. I reveal the consequences of this strategic position and test whether the presence of embedded actors increased the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in those areas or zones. I determine whether actors used embeddedness to control civilians, to further confuse the enemy or cause differentiating issues and whether embeddedness caused temporarily-deployed actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. I show that all actors used indiscriminate violence and that most respondents confirmed the existence of embeddedness by rebel actors. I expect to find that embeddedness increases the likelihood of temporarily-deployed actors using indiscriminate violence against civilians, largely because of challenges in distinguishing between actors and civilians and due to the strategic positions, which interact with one another.

Results in Chapter Five confirm the existence of embedded actors during the decade-long conflict and show that actors on the rebel side continually assumed the strategic position of embeddedness. In addition, temporarily-deployed actors on the state side[109] often used violence against communities because it was difficult for the government forces to distinguish between rebels and civilians. This supports the theoretical hypothesis presented in Chapter Three (see Table 6.0). In this chapter, I further examine the theoretical hypothesis using the survey data collected in Nepal.

[109] State actors were the Nepalese Royal Army, Police, and the Armed Police Force.

6.4 Survey Analysis Methods

To analyse the survey responses and test the hypothesis outlined in Chapter Three, I assess the respondents' perspectives about what occurred during the conflict. I also explore whether embeddedness contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by actors in the conflict. I divide the conflict into four periods, to explore and understand the use and transformation of indiscriminate violence throughout the conflict (see Table 6.1): The first period covers the first six months of the conflict (0–6 months); the second period from 6 months–3rd year of the conflict; the third period from the 3rd–8th year; and the fourth period from the 8th year–the end of the conflict. Dividing the conflict into four periods overcame the challenge to require every civilian to recall the year and month of each incident of indiscriminate violence which they encountered. This is not to say that all civilians surveyed had difficulty remembering. However, there is no way of guaranteeing that the same data could be collected across the different types and categories of respondents, given the time that had lapsed since the conflict commenced. I was aware that by asking civilians to recall every incident of indiscriminate violence, I might be asking a tall order. This would have skewed the results and created an opportunity for bias to filter through to the analysis. To avoid this, I focus the questions in the survey on capturing each respondent's first interaction with the various actors, the length of time they experienced indiscriminate violence and what caused the occurrence of indiscriminate violence. Thus, the analysis in this chapter only assesses the onset of indiscriminate violence, its traits for those surveyed, when it occurred, how long for, who used it, how frequently it was used, and what the causes were for each respondent.

Since each individual respondent's interaction with the conflict occurs at different times during the length of the conflict, the analysis conducted in this chapter only

provides an overall average time of when indiscriminate violence interacted with individual civilian's entrance into the conflict. This gives an indication of the time each respondent felt indiscriminate violence occurred for them. The analysis in Chapter Five has already provided me with an understanding of the trends and patterns of when indiscriminate violence occurred from the different sources. Therefore, this chapter is designed to take the analysis in Chapter Five a step further by exploring the links with the strategic positions and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, from the perspective of the respondents only and not the overall conflict.

Table 6.1: Breakdown of the Decade-long Conflict in Nepal

Period	Time Frame	Key Events
Period One	0–6 months (1996)	The launch of the Maoists' "People's War."
Period Two	6 months–3 years (1996-1999)	The launch of state operations, such as "Kilo Sierra II" and "Shoot to Kill," in response to the Maoists' campaign.
Period Three	3 years–8 years (1999-2004)	Mid-way through the conflict; the launch of the state operation "Unified Command;" the formation of the APF; and the introduction of the RNA to the conflict.
Period Four	8 years–the end of the conflict (2004-2006)	The spread of the Maoist-controlled zones; King Gyanendra declares martial law; and the end of the conflict.

This division differs from the four periods employed in Chapter Five and assists in understanding the use of violence during the initial and latter periods of the conflict and testing the studies hypothesis. When assessing the initial data results of respondents, I find strength for the use of indiscriminate violence during the first 6 weeks of the respondent's interaction with the conflict; I conduct further analysis to

understand this dynamic. Dividing the first period into shorter time periods allows me to capture the use of violence at the initial stages of the respondent's interaction with the conflict and clarify indiscriminate violence distribution and use by both embedded and temporarily-deployed actors. The first period helps to test the second hypothesis on the impact of embeddedness in the initial period of the conflict. Table 6.1 presents the time periods and key events that transpired during these periods. These events were identified as significant in the analysis presented in Chapter Five.

While the respondents were impacted at different times throughout the conflict, as the conflict moved and spread across Nepal, I was unable to capture the entire conflict in this analysis. Mapping the data onto the varying details of the conflict was not feasible in the timeframe of the study, and I believe, would be confusing to the reader. Instead, I provide a glimpse of when the respondents interacted with the conflict. The process tracing in Chapter Five provides a more detailed view of what took place during the conflict and can be used in reference with the analysis presented in this chapter.

6.4.1 Cross-Tabulation

To analyse the data collected in the survey, which reached 517 respondents from 16 of Nepal's 75 districts, I employed the method of cross-tabulation. Cross-tabulation analysis is used to examine categorical (nominal measurement scale) data, and the relationships between the dependent and independent variables selected for the examination. Using two (or more) dimensional tables, which record the number of respondents and explore the relationships between the selected variables, cross-tabulation allows the comparison of one or more variables with another. This enables

the researcher to explore relationships within the data that may not be apparent otherwise and to examine hidden trends within the data.

To test the study hypothesis, I operationalize various dependent and independent variables. All questions selected for the cross-tabulation analysis are derived from the survey questions. The questions can be operationalized into measureable variables using the respondents' collective answers to the questions. The questions within the survey are grouped into sections that link the key concepts I was aiming to measure in this research project, with an understanding of the respondent's interactions with the conflict. For example, each part of the survey was divided into sections with a heading. Each section of the survey (which had dedicated questions) was labelled according to the definitions used in this thesis. If I wanted to understand the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors during the conflict, once the respondent arrived at the section of the survey *"collective violence against civilians by actors on short mission"*, the respondent was provided with a set of questions to provide an understanding of what indiscriminate violence under this actor entailed. This section of the survey refers to the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors only. The process for understanding the survey was delivered by me, after going through the consent form, and before the respondent started the survey. Thus, when testing the relationship between variables using the selected questions as indicators, I can select a variation of best fit questions that relate to violence because this section is designed to understand the violence and actions of temporarily-deployed actors only. In this section of the survey, there are 18 questions dedicated to the use of indiscriminate violence, it's time frame, frequency of violence, and types of attacks by these actors. To simplify the survey for respondents and not to complicate

each respondent, the title heading “short-term mission” was used instead of the term “temporarily-deployed.” When conducting the field test survey respondents noted it was difficult to remember this term. I found replacing the term “temporarily-deployed” for “short-term mission” helped respondents to separate the actors. This assisted the respondents to make clear distinctions between the different positions and the actors that can assume any of these positions.

The section of the survey dedicated for understanding indiscriminate violence by embedded actors, length of embeddedness, types of violence used, who was embedded the longest etc., did not require this amendment.-Most respondents during the test survey found the concept of embeddedness/embedded easy to understand. I continued to use and label the question and title with *“embedded combatants/actors.”*

The sections of the survey featured 13 questions devoted to the various aspects of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors, embeddedness length, time frames, and what the consequences of embeddedness were on the civilian population. Just as featured in the section designated for temporarily-deployed actors, owing to the segregation in the survey, I can operationalize suitable questions to provide an understanding of the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors or understand how long embedded actors were embedded amongst civilians.

Survey questions are designed to evolve from one question to another; providing supplementary understanding each time a new question is asked and added. Therefore, if the first question asks “How long were combatants living amongst your community?” the next question would probe further and ask, “Did combatants stay behind once the main group left?” The preceding question goes on to ask, “If so, how long did they stay for?” Respondents are given the option to choose between 17 different multiple-choice options, from under a month to 10 years and over. This

assists me in pinpointing the behaviour of actors and when embeddedness was likely to trigger their use of indiscriminate violence.

6.4.2 Hypothesis One: Dependent and Independent Variables

The variables used to test the first hypothesis were measured by the responses to two survey questions. These questions appear in a section of the survey on the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors sent on short missions to the respondents' communities. The section aims to decide whether temporarily-deployed actors used indiscriminate violence collectively or individually, and whether there was a link between its use and embeddedness. The answers provide understanding into the experiences of 517 respondents' views on temporarily-deployed actors' use of indiscriminate violence only.

The first selected question, "Were members of your community targeted using violence?" refers to the use of violence by temporarily-deployed actors when they arrived in the respondent's community. The selected question appears in the fifth section titled ("Collective violence against civilians by actors on short mission") and is aimed at understanding the violence against civilians by actors on a short mission. The question in the survey is followed by the proceeding question: "If yes, why do you think this was so?" This question is designed to follow earlier questions intended to understand respondents' experience of violence. Since respondents would have indicated when starting the survey: a) the job they did during the conflict; b) what their conflict experience was; c) their personal experience of the conflict; and, d) which groups of actors they (respondent) personally disliked, the selected question is a follow up of earlier questions that inquire into actors' behaviour. When answering the question "Were members of your community targeted using violence?" the

respondent was given five multiple choice options to select from which included: a) yes; b) no; c) maybe; d) unknown; or e) refused to answer? The results omit the answers for options c, d and e - maybe, unknown or refused to answer - The omission is done for two reasons: first, to better capture the direct responses; and second, I did not conduct further qualitative assessment on the same surveyed individuals which would have provided me with richer context into the answers provided.

The second question, "Did actors use violence against civilians because they could not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?" is designed to understand whether temporarily-deployed actors used violence against civilians because of their inability to distinguish between combatants and civilians. The question is selected from the fourth section of the survey, designed to understand "*violence and frustration by an actor on a short mission*". This question follows a series of four questions on the behaviour of actors. The question is seeking to understand whether actors used violence because of differentiation issues and is directed at capturing the experience of indiscriminate violence through the eyes of the respondents, relative to temporarily-deployed actors. Because different questions are asked of respondents at the start of the section linked to their experience of violence the question is not designed to establish the use of indiscriminate violence, but whether there was a differentiating issue (between civilians and embedded actors) for actors on short missions. The preceding question is intended for respondents to identify which actor specifically used this violence because of differentiating issues. For me to decipher whether differentiating was an issue, this question was established as a leading question. While this brings a level of bias that I cannot remove from the

results, this had to be done so that when translated into Nepalese, respondents would understand the context in which the question was being asked.

The independent variable "embeddedness"[110] and the dependent variables "indiscriminate violence,"[111] and "inability to differentiate actors,"[112]are selected to identify the association of embeddedness with the use of indiscriminate violence that civilians experience and were perpetrated by temporarily-deployed actors.

The independent variable "embeddedness" is further expanded to include the periods in the conflict pertaining to embeddedness within a community and is measured using the responses to the survey question "How long were combatants living amongst your community?" The question appears in a section dedicated to the embedding of actors and refers to the length of time embedded actors lived amongst the respondents' communities. This variable helps to understand whether there is a link between the length of embeddedness (measured in conflict periods) and the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors. When examining the second hypothesis, this variable enables the researcher to pinpoint when embedded actors were likely to use indiscriminate violence. Table 6.2 summarises the variables selected to test hypothesis one across two trials.

[110] Variable name combtntembd_Q2
[111] Variable name violagnstcvln_Q1
[112] Variable name catcombtntfrstn_Q5

Table 6.2: Summary of hypothesis one and selected dependent and independent variables.

Hypothesis One	Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?	
	Dependent Variables	Independent Variables
Trial 1	Temporarily-deployed actors and the use of indiscriminate violence[113]	Embeddedness and conflict periods in a community[114]
Trial 2	Temporarily-deployed actors, inability to differentiate actors, and the use of indiscriminate violence[115]	Embeddedness and conflict periods in a community[116]

To test the second hypothesis, I use variables that capture the embedding of actors and the use of indiscriminate violence experienced by embedded actors. The selected variables are presented in the next section.

6.4.3 Hypothesis Two: Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable used to test the second hypothesis was measured by the responses to two survey questions. These questions appear in a section of the survey on the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors. The first question, "Did combatants[117] use violence against anyone in your community?" The question was designed to determine whether embedded actors (i.e., Maoist rebels or combatants) used indiscriminate violence against members of the respondents' communities. The question is selected from the third section of the survey designed to understand the behaviour of embedded actors, the length of embeddedness, types of violence used by embedded actors, and whether embeddedness led to violence against

[113] Variable name violagnstcvln _Q1- Were members of your community targeted using violence?
[114] Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community?
[115] Variable name catcombtntfrstn _Q5- Did actors use violence against civilians because they could not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?
[116] Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community?
[117] The term combatant is historically associated with the Maoist rebels was used by the Maoists, the state, and civil society in Nepal to describe the rebel actors. It was also the official word used by the UN to identify rebels (See for example, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/08/nepalese-child-soldier-un-threatened; https://reliefweb.int/report/nepal/nepal-un-chief-calls-early-integration-former-rebel-combatants (accessed on 10/03/2017)

civilians. The section *"embedded combatants/actors"* has 13 questions, of which the selected question above is number six and intended to focus on embedded actors only. Respondents were given five multiple-choice options to select from: yes, no, maybe, unknown, and refused to answer. This specific question is intended to understand violence in the community that may have been used at the start; continuously or sporadically used by embedded actors only. This question is linked to indiscriminate violence because it tries to understand the condition under which it can or is used by embedded actors only.

The dependent variable, "use of indiscriminate violence,"[118] is, in this case, specific to the use of violence by embedded actors. This variable helps to understand whether there is a trend in the use of indiscriminate violence by actors who are embedded amongst civilians. The second question, "Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your family?" aims to understand whether embedded actors used violence to gain control. The term "forceful" was used to replace the term "gain control," since "gain control"[119] has a different meaning in Nepalese (i.e., to defeat) than the one intended in this research question.

The selected question is linked to the section of the survey titled *"embedded combatants/actors".* The question allows respondents to select from a range of four multiple-choice options. The preceding question explores how long actors were embedded amongst civilians. Thus, allowing the selected question to understand if embedded actors (during the period shown in question five of this section) used forceful violence against the respondents or any members of the respondent's family. This provides me with an opportunity to understand embeddedness from respondents' perspective because the questions are geared toward the embedded actor's overall

[118] Variable name combtntembd_Q6- Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community?
[119] Variable name combtntembd_Q5- Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your family?

behaviour. Therefore, the selected question supports me to capture forceful violence that may be linked to controlling civilians over time.

The dependent variables "to gain control" and "use of indiscriminate violence" are used to determine the association between embedded actors and their use of indiscriminate violence, and whether the use of indiscriminate violence is linked to the need/wish to gain control.

The independent variable, "embeddedness,"[120] is used again to test the second hypothesis. This question measures how long embedded actors lived amongst the civilian community in terms of their presence during different periods of the conflict. The variable attempts to understand whether the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors was specifically linked to embeddedness. The variable enables the researcher to pinpoint whether embedded actors were likely to use indiscriminate violence to gain control at the start of the conflict. Table 6.3 summarises the selected variables and the two trials conducted to test the second hypothesis.

Table 6.3: Summary of hypothesis two and the dependent and independent variables

Hypothesis Two	*Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations?*	
	Dependent Variables	Independent Variables
Trial 1	Use of indiscriminate violence[121]	Embeddedness and conflict periods in the community[122]
Trial 2	Use of indiscriminate violence to gain control[123]	Embeddedness and conflict periods in the community[124]

[120] Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community?
[121] Variable name combtntembd_Q6- Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community?
[122] Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community?
[123] Variable name combtntembd_Q5 - Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your family?
[124] Variable name combtntembd_Q2- How long were combatants living amongst your community?

6.5 Survey Analysis Results

6.5.1 Bivariate Analysis: Hypothesis One, Trial One

The results of the first trial of the first hypothesis, on the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors, are presented in Table 6.4. Results show that 233 of the 342 respondents to the question, "Were members of your community targeted using violence?" with "how long were combatants living in your community" answered "Yes;" while 109 of the respondents answered "No." Of the respondents who answered "Yes," 83 per cent indicated that in the last period of the conflict (the longest period for an actor to be embedded in the community) the relationship between the use of indiscriminate violence and temporarily-deployed actors was the most significant. 64 per cent of respondents indicated Period One, with a slight decrease in Period Two (60 per cent), and an increase during Period Three (75 per cent). Among the respondents who answered "No" (i.e., that members of the community were not targeted using violence); 39 per cent indicated that Period Two was the most significant when it came to no relationship between violence and temporarily-deployed actors, followed by 35 per cent in Period One, 24 per cent in Period Three, and 17 per cent in Period Four.

Table 6.4: Results of hypothesis one, trial one

Use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors[125]	Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community[126]				
	Period One (0–6 months)	Period Two (6 months–3 years	Period Three (3–8 years)	Period Four (8 years –end of conflict)	Total (N= respondents)
Yes	127 0.645	31 0.608	31 0.756	44 0.830	233
No	70 0.355	20 0.392	10 0.244	9 0.170	109
Total	197 0.576	51 0.149	41 0.120	53 0.155	342

Pearson chi2 = 8.951999 Pr = 0.02993595

The results from the first trial are statistically significant (95 per cent confidence level; p=0.03) and partially confirm the first hypothesis. The results demonstrate a possible relationship between the dependent and independent variables: Embeddedness was linked to the use of violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. Furthermore, as embeddedness continued throughout the conflict, the likelihood of violence being used by temporarily-deployed actors increased. Period Four (8 years to the end of the conflict) was indicted by respondents as the most significant, at 83 per cent. The results suggest that the longer embeddedness occurred, the more likely it was for the community to be targeted with violence. As the conflict continued, the violence increased. Based on the analysis in Chapter Five, this occurred because of increases in embedded Maoist and their control of zones and the joint tactics of the APF and the RNA under operation Unified Command.

However, it should be noted that the conflict affected only some of the respondents' communities throughout different periods of the conflict, while others were not directly affected. In addition, specific actors were not necessarily embedded in the

[125] Variable name combtntembd_Q1- Were members of your community targeted using violence?
[126] Variable name combtntembd_Q5- How long were combatants living amongst your community?

same community throughout the conflict. This may be due, in part, to the arrival of rebels in some communities during later periods, or the death or movement of actors who were replaced by new actors.

6.5.2 Bivariate Analysis: Hypotheses One, Trial Two

The results of the second trial of the first hypothesis, on the use of violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors due to their inability to differentiate embedded actors, are presented in Table 6.5. Results show that 206 respondents answered the question, "Did actors use violence against civilians because they could not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?" with "how long were combatants living in your community" and answered "Yes;" while 66 answered "No." Those who answered "Yes," indicated that Period One was the most important. As can be seen by the frequencies cross-tabulation, 88 per cent of respondents indicated there is a significant relationship between violence and the inability of temporarily-deployed actors to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians, because of the presence of embeddedness during the first period.

This decreased to 51 per cent in Period Two and decreased further in Period Three to 32 per cent. The proportion rises again in Period Four to 70 per cent. A distinct difference is found in the results of the respondents who answered "No." In the First Period, 11 per cent of respondents indicated no relationship between violence and the inability to differentiate between actors and civilians. This proportion increases in Period Two to 49 per cent, and further in Period Three to 68 per cent. In the final period of the conflict, it decreases to 29 per cent.

Table 6.5: Results of hypothesis one, trial two

Use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors, unable to differentiate actors[127]	Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community[128]				
	Period One (0–6 months)	Period Two (6 months–3 years)	Period Three (3–8 years)	Period Four (8 years – end of conflict)	Total (N= respondents)
Yes	162 0.885	24 0.511	8 0.320	12 0.706	206
No	21 0.115	23 0.489	17 0.680	5 0.294	66
Total	183 0.673	47 0.173	25 0.092	17 0.062	272

Pearson chi2 = 58.12194 Pr = 1.480402e-12

Results of this trial are statistically significant (99 per cent confidence level; p=1.480402e-12), and we can reject the null hypothesis. The results demonstrate a relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Trial 2 further confirms the relationship between the use of violence against civilians and embeddedness, and the length of time actors lived amongst the civilian community. As can be seen by the frequencies cross-tabulation, this indicates there is a relationship between the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors, who are unable to differentiate actors and between embedded actors.
The highest number of respondents indicated Period One (0-6 months) as the most important; with 88 per cent of respondents indicating that there is a significant relationship between violence and the inability of temporarily-deployed actors, followed by Period Four.

Trials 1 and 2 confirm the presence of embeddedness and that the embedding of actors maybe associated with temporarily-deployed actors' use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, due to their inability to differentiate between actors and

[127] Variable name combtntembd_Q1 and Variable name combtntembd_Q2
[128] Variable name combtntembd_Q5

civilians. The tests found that the first six-months of a respondents' interaction with the conflict were important, as were the latter years of the conflict. The results show that embeddedness may have an impact on the likelihood of temporarily-deployed actors using indiscriminate violence against civilians, due to differentiation issues.

6.5.3 Bivariate Analysis: Hypothesis Two, Trial One

In trials 1 and 2, I try to determine the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors at the start of the conflict and whether they used indiscriminate violence to gain control. Results of the first trial of the second hypothesis on the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors are presented in Table 6.6. Results show that 218 respondents replied to the question, "Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community?" with "how long were combatants living in your community" answered "Yes;" 129 answered "No;" and 61 "Maybe." The results show a relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 40 per cent of respondents indicated that the relationship between the use of indiscriminate violence and embedded actors was the least important during the First Period. The proportion increased in Period Two to 50 per cent and 70 per cent in Period Three; later decreasing to 56 per cent in Period Four. Among those who answered "No," 33 per cent indicated that Period One was meaningful. This was followed by Period Two at 26 per cent, Period Four at 25 per cent and Period Three at 10 per cent. Respondents who answered "Maybe," demonstrated a dissimilar pattern. Those respondents indicated that Period Two was the most important, at 16 per cent. Period One followed with 14 per cent, Period Three at 6 per cent, and Period Four at 11 per cent.

Table 6.6: Results of hypothesis two, trial one

Use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors[129]	Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community[130]				
	Period One (0–6 months)	Period Two (6 months–3 years)	Period Three (3–8 years)	Period Four (8 years–end of conflict)	Total (N= Respondents)
Yes	103 0.402	34 0.507	41 0.706	40 0.563	218
No	87 0.339	18 0.268	6 0.103	18 0.253	129
Maybe	36 0.140	11 0.164	6 0.103	8 0.112	61
Unknown	30 0.117	4 0.597	5 0.862	5 0.070	44
Total (N= Respondents)	256	67	58	71	452

Pearson chi2 (9) = 24.0068 Pr = 0.004

The results of this trial are statistically significant (99 per cent confidence level; p=0.004), and we can reject the null hypothesis. However, while the number of respondents indicating "Yes" was higher during Period One, the importance of the relationship appeared during Period Three. The use of violence by embedded actors in the first period is explored further in the second trial. Results suggest that embedded actors did use violence against civilians, but it is not significant during the initial periods as estimated by this thesis, but violence rises over the periods of the conflict. Results here support the analysis in Chapter Five, which found Period Three to be the most active.

6.5.4 Bivariate Analysis: Hypotheses Two, Trial Two

In the second trial, I test whether embedded actors used violence against the respondents or the respondents' families in the First Period to gain control. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 6.7. Results show that 191 respondents

[129] Variable name combtntembd_Q1- Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community?
[130] Variable name combtntembd_Q5- How long were combatants living amongst your community?

to the question, "Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your family?" with "how long were combatants living in your community" answered "Yes;" while 182 answered "No." Period Three was the most significant period with 57 per cent indicating this as the most important. This was followed by 47 per cent during Period Two, 43 per cent during Period Four, and 37 per cent during Period One. The results for those who answered "No" reveal that the last period was the most significant for respondents, at 44 per cent. This is followed by Period One at 42 per cent, Period Two at 38 per cent and Period Three at 26 per cent. In Period Four, the results show an increase to 44 per cent. Among those who answered "No," the highest number of respondents appeared in Period One.

Table 6.7: Results of hypothesis two, trial two

Use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors to gain control [131]	Embeddedness during conflict periods in the community[132]				
	Period One (0–6 months)	Period Two (6 months–3 years)	Period Three (3–8 years)	Period Four (8 years–end of conflict)	Total (N= Respondents)
Yes	95 0.374	32 0.470	33 0.578	31 0.430	191
No	109 0.429	26 0.382	15 0.263	32 0.444	182
Total (N= Respondents)	204	58	48	63	373

Pearson chi2 (12) = 14.0776 Pr =0.296

The results of this analysis demonstrate that there is no link between embedded actors' use of violence against civilians and their need to gain control in the initial periods of the conflict. However, results show a link between violence and the need to gain control in the latter periods of the conflict. While the results demonstrate curvilinear in the data; the t-test results are not significant and show no links. Having obtained chi-squared 14.0776, this yields a p-value of 0.029; thus, I am unable to

[131] Variable name combtntembd_Q6 and Variable name combtntembd_Q1
[132] Variable name combtntembd_Q5

reject the null hypothesis. The results show that indiscriminate violence by embedded actors was not likely to occur during the initial or first period of the conflict to gain control.

6.6 Logistic Regression Analysis

In the previous section, I discussed the importance of the results from the cross-tabulation analysis using survey data. I found strength for hypothesis one in both trials and a relationship between the process of embeddedness and the occurrence of violence used by temporarily-deployed actors. For hypothesis two, I only find partial support for the second trial but not during the first. As a result, I accept the null hypothesis.

In this section, I further the survey data analysis using logit models to examine whether there is a causal relationship between one dependent binary variable and selected one or more nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio variables. The section is organised into three subsections; Firstly, I briefly provide a description of additional dependent (DV), independent (IV) variables used to conduct the logit model in the main section. Secondly, I present the results of the logit models using additional variables— selected DV and IV using a control variable for fixed effect—in the model(s) to understand if there is a causal effect. The results for hypotheses one and two show no statistical significance and I accept the null hypothesis. Finally, I briefly conclude and describe some of the shortfalls of the data.

6.6.1 Dependent variables

To answer the main research question and to test the hypotheses I select the dependent variable "violence used against civilians by actors." This variable was

previously used during the cross-tabulation trials. The *use of violence against civilians*[133]— asks respondents whether indiscriminate violence was used against members of the community. Respondents were given the option to select from "yes, no, maybe or unknown." I select the categorical response of "yes"—creating a dummy variable—as an indication of the presence of violence. The number of respondents who indicated yes was 249.

Supplementing this variable I use the variable *violence against civilians by temporarily deployed actors*[134]— which explores the use of indiscriminate violence explicitly used by temporarily deployed actors. The question asks' respondents whether frustrated actors entered the community and used indiscriminate violence against civilians. The categorical variable provides respondents with "yes, no, maybe or unknown." options. Using respondents' options of "yes" as an indicator of the presence of indiscriminate violence by temporarily deployed actors I can create a dummy variable for modelling the presence of violence. There are 213 observations obtained from this new variable.

6.6.2 Independent variables

Within the survey analysis, there are several independent variables that I can select. This is largely due to the way I asked similar questions within the survey. The first independent variable is a categorical variable that derives from *how long embedded actors were living amongst civilians.*[135] I create a dummy variable using the respondents indicated periods of embeddedness and create *0 to the first 6 months*[136] by clustering respondents' selections for periods *0 to the first 6 months*. The variable

[133] Variable named *dum1*
[134] Variable named *catcomfr1*
[135] Variable named as *catcombtembd_Q2*
[136] Variable named as *catcomem4*

allows me to assess whether embedded actors during the initial periods of the respondents' interaction with the conflict led to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. The number of respondents who selected this option was 74 respondents.

The second independent variable —*6 months-3 year measure of embeddedness*[137]—is categorical variable and derives from the same question *how long were embedded actors were living with the civilians*.[138] The variable is used as a dummy variable and taken from the part of the survey that examines the time length of embeddedness by an actor. However, with this variable, I cluster the results of actors being embedded for 6 months to 3 years providing me with a total of 231 observations.

6.6.3 Fixed effect (Control variable)

To complement the analysis within the model, I include a control variable which is used as a fixed effect to ensure that the relation between the presence of violence and embeddedness which is not spurious. To regulate for this effect, I use the categorical variable *region*[139]—the location identified by the respondent—where violence was experienced to apply a fixed effect. By clustering the districts into a variable covering the far western regions of Nepal, I can use this variable as a fixed effect. The clustered districts under the new dummy variable—*highest districts with violence*[140]—were indicated by the UN, UCDP and INSEC as the highest locations for the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. By controlling for the variation in

[137] Variable named *catcomemQ42*
[138] Variable named *catcomembed_Q2*
[139] Variable indicates all 16 districts surveyed as part of this field research.
[140] The variable is named regi5

the location of violence I can reduce some of the bias but further focus the analysis. *Highest districts with violence*—have 325 observations. In the next section, I present the findings of the logit models for each hypothesis.

Table 6.8: List of dependent and independent variables for logit models

Hypotheses	Dependent Variable	Independent Variable
Hypothesis one: Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?	*Violence against civilians by temporarily deployed actors*[141]	*How long embedded actors were living amongst civilians.*[142]
Hypothesis two: Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations?	*The use of violence against civilians*[143]	*0-6 month measure of embeddedness*[144] *6 months- 3 year measure of embeddedness*[145]

6.6.4 Findings

6.6.4.1 Logistic Regression Analysis: Hypothesis Two

In this section, I present the result of the logit models to further the examination conducted earlier in this chapter. I present three models to test *hypothesis one: Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the use of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors?* The statistical output from the logit models suggests that there is no relationship between the presence of embeddedness and the use of violence against civilians by temporarily deployed actors. I regulate for the possible effect by using —*highest districts with violence*— as a fixed effect variable in my logit model. Model 6.1.1 in table 6.9 demonstrates that there is no relationship between embedded actors and the use of violence against civilians by temporarily

[141] Variable named *catcomfr1*
[142] Variable named as *catcomem4*
[143] Variable named *dum1*
[144] Variable named *catcomemQ41*
[145] Variable named *catcomemQ42*

deployed actors. Despite having 431 observations in model 6.1.1, the r-squared results come in at 0.0146 which is not significant.

Table 6.9: The use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily because of embeddedness

Variables	*Model 6.1.1*	*Model 6.1.2*	*Model 6.1.3*
The use of violence against civilians	0.477*	0.451	
	(0.272)	(0.296)	
Violence against civilians by temporarily deployed actors		-1.608***	1.847***
		(0.351)	(0.221)
Highest regions with violence	-0.412	-0.365	0.361
	(0.267)	(0.288)	(0.225)
Constant	-1.687***	-1.197***	-0.790***
	(0.262)	(0.291)	(0.196)
Observations	431	404	428
R-squared	0.0146	0.0936	0.1445

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model 6.1.2 in table 6.9 uses the variable that examines whether frustrated actors used violence against civilians because of the attacks they received. I continue to use the variable the use of violence to explore whether this also has an impact on temporarily deployed actors using violence against civilians. The results from model 6.1.2 show a negative relationship between the variable selected for the logit model.

Model 6.1.3 in table 6.9 drops the variable the presence of violence because of the negative effect in model 6.1.2. Model 6.1.3, shows improvement in the negative correlation from model 6.1.2, but the results are not significant. Model 6.1.3 shows that there is not strong in the relationship between the variables but the results are better in this model than model 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. The r-square results are 0.1445 and are not significant. All three logit models show that there is a relationship between the dependent and independent variables according to the logit models. In essence, the embedding of actors did not have an effect on the use of violence against civilians

during the Nepalese conflict. The same applies to the interaction between the presence of embeddedness and the frustration by temporarily deployed actors and their use of[146] violence. Thus, I accept the null hypothesis because of the results models 6.1.1-6.1.3 in table 6.9.

6.6.4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis: Hypothesis Two

In this subsection, I present three models to test *hypothesis two in* table 6.10, which examines *Is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of conflict to gain control over civilian populations.* The results in table 6.10 overall show no significance between the selected variables and the expected outcome. For model 6.2.1, I use a categorical variable which measures the time that an embedded actor was embedded with civilians. The variable captures the respondent's first interaction with the conflict up until their first 6 months with the conflict. This variable is run against the presence of violence in the respondent's community. In model 6.2.1, I regulate for bias by using the variable *highest districts with violence*[147]—as a fixed effect for the logit models for hypothesis two. The r-squared in table 6.10 comes in at 0.0112 and there is no relationship between the variables selected. For model 6.2.2 I use the first period of embeddedness —0-6 months—of respondent's interaction with the conflict to understand whether this has a relationship with the use of violence by embedded actors. The results in model 6.2.2 do not show any relationship between the dependent and independent variables and the r squared results are further away in model 6.2.3 then in model 6.2.1. This means there is actually a negative relationship. Despite the fixed effect being present the

[147] Variable named *regi5*

result shows no causality.

Table 6.10: Violence against civilian by embedded actors at the initial stage

Variables	*Model 6.2.3*	*Model 6.2.3*	*Model 6.2.3*
The use of violence against civilians	-0.166	0.0884	-0.328*
	(0.197)	(0.189)	(0.189)
Highest districts with violence	0.490**	0.216	0.517***
	(0.202)	(0.196)	(0.198)
Constant	0.0395	-0.556***	-0.433**
	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.187)
Observations	431	468	468
R-squared	0.0112	0.0022	0.0157

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, I select the variable *6 months-3 year measure of embeddedness*[148] with the use of violence against civilians. Model 6.2.3 shows no relationship between the selected variables. Despite using the variable *6 months- 3 year measure of embeddedness* with the *use of violence against civilians* to see if there was any residual effect the model shows no relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The r-squared results come in at 0.00157 and the number of observations is 468.

6.7 Summary

In this section, I have attempted to use logit models to understand whether there is a relationship between the select dependent variables and independent variables. The logit models were largely unable to understand whether embeddedness impacted the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the Nepalese conflict. For hypothesis one, there was not much difference between combatants that were

[148] Variable named *catcomemQ42*

embedded for a relatively short period (the baseline) and those that were there longer. Only those in model 6.1.1 appear somewhat less prone to use violence. Model 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 seem to have led to more (not less) violence, but the differences are not significant. For both hypotheses the results seem to indicate that it is quite likely that as combatants spend a longer period in a village the likelihood that violence rises. However, the probability of using violence in any given day may stay the same or even go down, but as more time passes it becomes more likely that violence was committed during the whole period. Even if actors stayed in a village for a long time or at some point only recently arrived and maybe committed violence during this period rather than later on. The data does not allow me to distinguish between these possibilities. It is important to note, that I do not try and state this as something that the results fully support in both hypotheses. The results of all models show no relationship with any of the IV and DV for hypotheses one and two. As a result, I have to accept the null hypothesis for both hypotheses. One of the weaknesses of the logit models above is that my data does not have good controls or fixed effect variables which would have been more meaningful for the logit models above. Fundamentally, variables like socio-economic status, ethnic minority and the general levels of violence in the region would have provided me with a more interesting analysis. Finally, an inherent fault with my data is my ability to select different variables with similar meaning does not provide a good measure for further analysis.

6.8 Summary of Findings

The cross-tabulation analyses presented in this chapter were used to explore and test the study hypothesis. Using a new and extensive dataset collected during my field work in Nepal, I have brought the investigation a step further in understanding the use

of indiscriminate violence during the decade-long conflict in Nepal. The results confirm hypothesis one. The p-values for the two trials of the first hypothesis reject the null hypothesis and shows strong support for the intended outcomes. However, the trials to test the second hypothesis show varying results. The first trial shows strong support for the hypothesis, but the second demonstrates no support.

The analyses found significant support for the hypothesis that actors were embedded and the presence of embedded actors may have increased the likelihood of temporarily-deployed actors using indiscriminate violence. The findings demonstrate that temporarily-deployed actors were more likely and may have responded to embedded actors with the use of significant levels of indiscriminate violence during the conflict. The results show that during the early periods of fighting, the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors was high, and this correlates with the periods actors were embedded amongst civilians. At the same time, the results suggest that actors, who were embedded for longer periods, may have triggered the use of violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. Period Four was the most significant period for respondents when they interacted with the conflict. This appears to be due to temporarily-deployed actors' retaliation to attacks by embedded actors. While it is not unequivocal, it is a strong possibility. In the next chapter, I explore this proposition further.

The logit models were largely unable to understand whether embeddedness impacted the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the Nepalese conflict. For hypothesis one, there was not much difference between combatants that were embedded for a relatively short period (the baseline) and those that were there longer. Only those in model 6.1.1 appear somewhat less prone to use violence. Model 6.1.2

and 6.1.3 seem to have led to more (not less) violence, but the differences are not significant.

Although Maoist actors were more likely to be embedded, and government actors were more likely to be temporarily-deployed, I was unable to determine which actors used higher levels of indiscriminate violence during the conflict. This issue is explored further in the next chapter. Furthermore, I was unable to confirm the second hypothesis in this analysis. Trial 1 results support the relationship between embeddedness and the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors; but trial 2 results do not support the link between the use of violence in the initial period of the conflict to gain control. Nor is the second hypothesis supported in the results of the process tracing analysis (Chapter 5), for the first two periods of the conflict. In the next chapter (Chapter Seven), I explore the second hypothesis further. In Chapter Seven, I analyse the data collected from the interviews conducted with 38 elite interviewees in Nepal. The chapter further investigates the two hypotheses and tries to further understand the findings presented in Chapters Five and Six. Based on the analysis in next chapter, I determine whether these findings indicate systematic or sporadic behaviour by all actors. In the final chapter, I provide conclusive results for the overall investigation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE

7.1 Chapter Overview

In the previous chapter, I presented the analysis of 517 completed surveys that I collected in Nepal. Results revealed that a process of embeddedness had occurred during the Nepalese conflict, and that embeddedness may have increased the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. The results partially confirmed hypothesis one, *is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors* but provide evidence for the concept of embeddedness underlying this process. There appears to be a relationship between the strategic position of embedded actors and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. The findings suggest a causal link that will need to be tested further in this chapter. The findings presented in Chapter Six suggest that the Maoist actors where often the most embedded and this increased the opportunity for temporarily-deployed state actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The findings did not provide strong support for hypothesis two, *is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations.* The results demonstrate that Maoist embedded actors used indiscriminate violence throughout the conflict. Embedded actors also used indiscriminate violence during the early periods of the conflict; but, according to the results, this was not significant. Indiscriminate violence was commonly used during Period Three (3–8 years) of the interviewee's interaction with the conflict. Chapter Six furthered the analysis presented in Chapter Five and confirmed the key characteristics of the concept of embeddedness.

In this chapter, I explore the in-depth, face-to-face interviews that I conducted with 38 elite members of Nepal civil society. The perspectives of decision makers and observers provide insight into the strategies that led to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. This included interviews with Maoist leaders who openly and candidly spoke about killing and giving orders to kill civilians. The interview primarily gave me information on actors' strategic positions and how this triggered the use of indiscriminate violence but also leader's deployment decisions. I use content and narrative analysis to better understand the interviewees' accounts. Results of the analysis presented in this chapter show that the Maoist rebels embedded their actors amongst civilians as a tactic before, during, and after attacks. The embedding of Maoist actors often led state actors on temporary-deployed missions to use indiscriminate violence against civilians due to their inability to differentiate between actors and civilians. The results show strong support for hypothesis one and partial support for hypothesis two. The results reveal that indiscriminate violence was used by embedded actors throughout the conflict to gain control. However, this was only significantly used during the latter periods of the conflict.

The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part, I summarise the methods used to conduct the face-to-face interviews with 38 elite members of Nepalese civil society (Section 7.2) and review the methods used to analyse the interviews (content and narrative analysis) (Section 7.3). In the second part, I present the results of the content analysis and the themes that emerged in the narrative analysis (Section 7.4). In the final part (Section 7.5), I provide a summary of the key findings from the interviews.

7.2 Interview Methods

In this section, I explore the face-to-face interview methods used to collect interviews with elites and explore how questions were selected as part of the interview process. As detailed in Chapter Four, I conducted all 38 interviews myself. To align the interviews with the study hypothesis, I ensured the interview questions contained similar thematic questions to those used during the survey. To this end, I extracted questions from the survey. This ensured that the questions I asked interviewees and the answers they provided could be used to evaluate the hypothesis and offer new insights. Thus, the interviews could further my understanding of the strategic positions, the use of embeddedness, and allow me to delve deeper, solidify pervious results, and clarify conflicting perspectives. Above all, the interviews can clarify conflicting perspectives that arose in the previous analyses and allow me to draw inferences linked to the study hypothesis.

The interview questions were open-ended, and there were no restrictions on interviewees' potential answers. The open-ended questions allowed the interviewees to express their views on the subject matter freely and without filters or restrictions. The interviewees determined the locations and times of all interviews, further enabling them to be open. To fully understand the use of indiscriminate violence, it was important for me to collect as much information as possible from the interviewees. The open-ended questions allowed the interviewees to elaborate on their feelings, attitudes, and understanding of the subject. This allowed me to obtain answers to the complex issues under investigation and understand the interviewees' accounts. The subject areas covered during the interviews included, personal accounts of the conflict, and duration of the conflict, the embedding of actors, the behaviour of

temporarily-deployed actors on short missions and fixed actors, and indiscriminate violence against civilians and its use.

The face-to-face interviews allowed me to capture the interviewees' verbal and non-verbal cues, including body language, which can indicate a level of discomfort with some questions. This allowed me to maintain the interviewees' focus on the subject matter and control the interview. Capturing their behaviours and emotions allowed me to understand the interviewees' responses more deeply.

7.2.1 The Sample

The aim of the interviews with elites was to collect perspectives from a variety of civilians who reflected a high level of knowledge, themes, and understanding. This required me to collect information from well-informed and credible Nepalese observers, writers and academics, who understood the issues I was seeking to explore. The individuals I interviewed included, among others: the president of a media group; the president of a women's network; a legal officer; the president of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation charity; the founder of a charity; a unit manager at UN Women Nepal; the head of the UNIRP; a general; Nepal's chief negotiator; a former head of parliament; a former home secretary; a journalist; and several Nepalese members of congress.[149]

[149] For a detailed list of elite interviewees please see Appendix B.

7.3 Analysis Methods

In this section, I present the content and narrative analysis methods selected to analyse the interviews. The content analysis was conducted using MAXQDA,[150] which converted the audio recordings of interviewees into quantitative data for analysis. Content analysis enables researchers to sift through large volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion. It is a useful technique to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or social attention (Weber, 1990). Furthermore, it allows inferences to be made that can then be corroborated using other methods. Content analysis offers an empirical basis for monitoring shifts in views of the elite interviewees. The method was selected because it allowed me to explore the elite interviews and examine patterns in the interviewees' responses. Finally, the method allowed me to code the different responses and examine the overall results of the codes.

Following the content analysis, I used narrative inquiry to understand the ways in which people make and use stories to interpret what occurred during the conflict (see Burr, 2004, p. 46-62). Narrative inquiry is an umbrella term that captures the study of personal and human dimensions of experiences over time and accounts for the relationship between individual experiences and cultural context (Clandinin and Connelly, 2000). In this thesis, narrative inquiry is used to understand the stories of groups and individuals that are linked to events in which embedded and temporarily-deployed actors used indiscriminate violence. This approach permits me to provide a rich and detailed account of the interviewee's experiences. Narrative inquiry also allows me to combine different narratives and provide a more coherent understanding

[150] https://www.maxqda.com/what-does-maxqda-do (accessed 23/02/2017).

of the overall story and the themes that emerge. This helps to capture the everyday activities of actors that can be used to analyse the context of the conflict. A downside to this method is that the researcher is limited to the interpretations of the interviewees. While interviews may provide additional information or multiple story-lines on the subject under investigations, the researcher discovers information only as the interviewee perceives it. This can be restrictive depending on the person or victim interviewed. In the next section, I present the results of the content and narrative inquiry of the interviews conducted with the 38 elites in Nepal.

7.4 Interview Analysis Results

7.4.1 Content Analysis

To assess the first hypothesis, *is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors*, I asked interviewees to describe what they thought the embedding of actors amongst civilian's population led to. Interviewees were given the options to list as many effects as they deemed necessary. The results of interviewees' answers are presented in Figure 7.0. It is important to note that interviewees could give more than one effect and multiple answers if they felt necessary. This option was given for each respondent with no limitations on how they responded to the question.



Figure 7.0: Interviewee responses to "What did embeddedness lead to?"

58 per cent of the interviewees' responses indicated that embeddedness led to attacks on civilians by state actors. 20 per cent of the responses mentioned that embeddedness led to the control of fighting zones, while 12 per cent of the responses said it led to torture. The term "attacks" here refers to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the period indicated by the interviewee. As Figure 7.0 demonstrates, an overwhelming number of the interviewee responses indicated that embeddedness increased the chances of an actor using indiscriminate violence against civilians. This shows that the elites perceived that the embedding of actors led to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Furthermore, 20 per cent of interviewee responses indicated that the act of embeddedness led to the control of fighting zones. The findings show that there may be some evidence to support hypothesis one.

To further understand why embeddedness occurred, I asked interviewees for their perspectives on why rebel actors were embedded. Results are presented in Figure 7.1.

A large majority of interviewee responses (66 per cent) indicated that embeddedness was used by the rebel actors to hide amongst the civilian populations.



Figure 7.1: Interviewee responses to "Why were rebel actors embedded?"

18 per cent of interviewee responses indicated that the need to ascertain information was the reason for actors being embedded amongst civilians. The findings support the concept of embeddedness and demonstrate how complex it would have been for temporarily-deployed state actors to distinguish between the embedded rebel actors and civilians. Interviewees were further asked to share their thoughts on why indiscriminate violence was used by temporarily-deployed actors against the civilian populations. Results show that many interviewee responses (51 per cent) indicated that indiscriminate violence occurred because temporarily-deployed actors were unable to differentiate between actors and civilians. 42 per cent of responses claimed that violence occurred because of attacks against them; while only 6 per cent stated that it was because of confusion (See Figure 7.2). The term "to hide amongst civilians" means that actors are concealing themselves within the civilian population and often carry out operations during this period. This often revolved around using

civilians as human shields when the army entered a city or zones. According to interviewees, this involved the tactic of moving undetected through the ranks of civilian populations. They hide in plain sight by wearing civilian clothes rather than uniforms or distinctive emblems. They may be farmers by day and fighters by night as was observed in Chapter 5. Violence will often encompass periods where civilians are wedged in the middle of the different actors and killed.

For example, ISIS is known to have used civilians as human shields, and to have shot and killed Iraqi residents trying to flee. In one three-day period in June 2018, the U.N. reported that ISIS killed at least 204 civilians trying desperately to get out of the city. The total number of their victims is unknown.[151] The protection or shelter indicated in the results mean that civilians may offer food and shelter to enemy soldiers and during this process civilians are insinuated to be linked to the enemy. This can also be done when civilians who are being used as a shield to protect combatants.



Figure 7.2: Interviewee responses to why temporarily-deployed actors used violence

[151] https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/battle-against-isis-syria-iraq-civilians-suffer-most-n779656 [access on 12/07/2018]

Results show that interviewees perceived that the use of indiscriminate violence was often linked to embeddedness and its effects on temporarily-deployed state actors. Results show that interviewees perceived two main reasons for the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors: first, temporarily-deployed actors' inability to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians; and second, attacks against temporarily-deployed actors by embedded actors.

The term confusion describes the disorientation of an actor during the time when this actor may experience a violent attack upon his/her unit or group of actors from where the actor is serving. The confusion comes when the actors do not know who attacked them or the reason why the attack occurred. Opposing actors might see these attacks as unfair and may feel actors do not respect the rule of engagement or the laws of armed conflict. This attack may lead to some form of a reaction towards those in the vicinity. In the case of Nepal, interviewees often claimed this confusion was experienced directly after the Maoist rebel laid an unexpected attack on state actors.

Finally, I asked interviewees to describe the forms of indiscriminate violence most widely-used by temporarily-deployed actors. Figure 7.3 illustrates the various forms of violent acts used by temporarily-deployed state actors during the conflict.



Figure 7.3: Interviewee responses on forms of violence used by temporarily-deployed actors

Results show that 40 per cent of interviewee responses identified killings as the most widely-used form of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors during the conflict. This was followed by kidnapping at 21 per cent, rape and physical abuse at 13 per cent, verbal abuse at 6 per cent, and sexual abuse at 5 per cent.

To assess the second hypothesis, *is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations*, I asked the interviewees several questions. As Figure 7.0 demonstrates, some interviewees' responses indicated that embeddedness led to the control of fighting zones. To further assess the second hypothesis, I asked interviewees, "Which actors lived amongst civilians the longest?" Results show the Maoist rebels, more than all other actors, embedded their fighters amongst the civilians the longest. The findings presented in Figure 7.4 suggest the reason temporarily-deployed actors may have resorted to attacking civilians during the conflict. When attacked by embedded rebel actors, temporarily-deployed state actors sought the rebel actors amongst the civilian population.



Figure 7.4: Interviewee responses to "Which actors lived amongst civilians the longest?"

Results show that embedded actors were significantly embedded during the first month of the conflict. Figure 7.5 presents the results of interviewee responses to the questions "How long were rebel actors embedded (from the beginning of the conflict)?" According to the results, 48 per cent of interviewee responses showed that actors were embedded for under a month. 31 per cent of responses indicated that actors were embedded for the entire length of the conflict, and 18 per cent for over a month; while 4 per cent indicated a 2–4-year period. The findings here correspond to the survey findings presented in Chapter 6.



Figure 7.5: Interviewee responses to "How long were rebel actors embedded?"

The results presented in Figure 7.5 establish that, according to interviewees, rebel actors were more frequently embedded with civilians for a period of under a one-month.

Combining the results presented in Figure 7.5 with those presented in Figure 7.0 suggests that embedded actors may have used indiscriminate violence to control civilian populations and this may have been more significant during the initial periods of the conflict. However, only 20 per cent of interviewee responses indicated that embeddedness led to control of fighting zones (See Figure 7.0). As such, it is only possible to say that embeddedness may be associated with the need to gain control of a zone and the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors, but I cannot conclusively state that this occurred during the initial periods of the conflict.

The findings from the content analysis in this chapter support (to a degree) the findings presented in Chapters Five and Six concerning hypothesis one. However, while I establish that embeddedness occurred and led to an inability to differentiate

between embedded actors and civilian on the side of temporarily-deployed actors, I cannot claim that indiscriminate violence was fully used by embedded actors to control the civilian populations during the initial periods of the conflict, because there was insufficient evidence from interviewees on this matter. However, there was some partial evidence that embeddedness was often used to control fighting zones. Nevertheless, I note that embeddedness involves some level of control, according to the findings presented in Figure 7.0.

In the next section of this chapter, I present the results of the narrative analysis and describe what occurred during the conflict according to the elites interviewed. Narrative analysis tries to explain what has occurred. The analysis process explores why things are, or have become, the way they are. The narrative analysis provides a view of how interviewees, as individuals, experienced certain events and their subjective perspective of these experiences. The analysis also provides insight into the narrative means (or devices) used to make sense of the interviewees accounts.

7.4.2 Narrative Analysis

Narrative analysis is used exclusively with verbal material, typically stories and accounts of personal experiences. The method studies individuals, groups, cultures, or historical periods by means of either qualitative or quantitative data. The method primarily involves examining the interviewees' comments and responses to certain questions posed during interviews. Narrative analysis not only has constructive and predictive validity, but it is also the best available method to understand what emerged from the data collected in all the interviews. The excerpts from the interviews presented in this section provide a portrait of what occurred in Nepal from

the perspective of elites interviewed. Protecting the anonymity of the interviewees is essential to this research project. Therefore, the interview excerpts presented in this chapter are identified by unique codes with the following prefix, C7RN.[152]

To set the stage for this analysis, I begin with the following comments, taken from interviews with two actors from opposing sides of the conflict:

> When we [the Maoists] established courts in these areas, we had to be amongst the civilian population to be able to give out the justice that the people required. Civilians became combatants, and there was no difference between civilians and combatants (C7RN008).

> Straight after an ambush, those people who are in uniform are defined as your friends; those people who are not in uniform are generally defined as your foes (C7RN014).

Both interviewees were actively involved in the conflict and held senior positions, one within the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and Armed Police Force (APF) and the other within the Maoist People's Liberation Army (PLA). The interviewees describe two different experiences of the conflict, and it is experiences such as these that I aim to explore in this analysis.

Interviewee accounts establish that the process of embeddedness occurred during the conflict in Nepal and led to problems in differentiating between civilians and embedded actors by temporarily-deployed actors. The following interview excerpts demonstrate the interviewees' views of embeddedness and its impact on other actors

[152] See Appendix B for a detailed list of anonymised interviews.

and civilians during the conflict. A former rebel commander, who provided intelligence to the Maoist forces on the ground, stated, "Since the beginning of the war, we were always amongst the people and as it started getting bigger, we even had over 3,000 people living in one village, living amongst civilians." (C7RN004) A member of an NGO, who worked in the rural areas of Nepal, confirmed this.

> The first tactical strategy was hide-and-seek. They [the Maoists] would attack one place and remain silent for a while. The second tactic that they used was to remain and live with the villagers, so whenever the army or police started searching, they could not differentiate between civilians and Maoist (C7RN015).

This account confirms that rebel actors were known to live with civilians and used different tactics to confuse their enemy. This made differentiating between embedded actors and civilians difficult for temporarily-deployed state actors.

> They [the Maoists] were highly mobile and used guerrilla tactics to confuse and distract the security force. They would attack different places at the same time. This would cause nothing but confusion for the security forces (C7RN0023).

> We (Maoist) would often attack the police post by splitting into two groups. The first group would lay the bombs down and the second group would enter the compound and demand weapons… if the police did not surrender then we would kill them…we were also instructed to capture these zones within 45 minutes (C7RN0026).

These citations reveal the tactics that the Maoist used against the state. The first quote, shows how efficient the Maoist were at attempting to not only defeat the RNA and other actors, but also how these tactics may have provoked state forces. The interviewee demonstrates that the Maoist constantly used hit-and-run tactics and this strategy confused many of the security force and contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. The findings also show that the Maoist actors in the field were implicit in using violence against the state forces and civilians. On many instances, Maoist actors killed civilians assumed to be informers and state actors to achieve their objectives.

In another account, the interviewee describes a situation where the Maoist appears to be infiltrated amongst the civilian populations everywhere. The interviewee goes on to describe how difficult it was for anyone who was on the state side to comprehend where the attack was going to occur or whom by.

> The police would not know where their enemy was because they were all around them, they were living in communities and patrolling the community knowing that there are people within that community who could be Maoists, who could attack them, and were watching their movement…there was constant fear (C7RN001).

The extract above demonstrates how difficult it would have been for any of the actors to differentiate between the different actors which the state was facing. It also shows how Maoist actors made it their strategy to live amongst the civilian populations. According to a Maoist rebel's account, embeddedness was not only a strategy; it was Maoist policy to embed their actors amongst the civilian populations.

> Embedding actors in civilian areas was our tactic; this was because we did not have a barrack or anywhere to stay, and so we had to stay with the people. Living amongst civilians was our [the Maoists] base and our home (C7RN004).

Interviewee accounts further confirm that embeddedness led to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. The extract describes what a strategy for the Maoist side was; key to this was the ability to position actors within civilian populations as a community. The SP used this strategic position throughout the two-decade Peruvian conflict. The same interviewee claimed how the Maoist would eventually increase their combatant size in civilian or village areas by increasing their scope to infiltrate civilians and cause further confusion for the state actors:

> Since the beginning of the war, we were always amongst the people and as it started getting bigger. We even had over 3,000 people living in one village, living amongst civilians (C7RN004).

The evidence above describes how the Maoist would embed actors amongst the civilian population as a strategy. The embedding of actors within civilian populated areas appears to have been used as a policy to hide Maoist actors from the state's temporarily-deployed actors.

The following is a passage from an interview with a senior government official,

> The combatants [the Maoists] were mixed up with members of societies. It was often difficult to know who was who. The government security forces were so desperate, so they

> had to do something to react to the attacks. So, they would attack anyone in their vicinity (C7RN003).

According to this interviewee, state actors were left with no other choice but to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The account demonstrates that embeddedness led to indiscriminate violence. The account here draws similarities to the testimony of General Luis Cisneros in 1983, who described the Peruvian government's strategy as one of havoc and retaliation. The accounts also reveal how the mixing of actors [the Maoist] and civilians contribute to differentiating issues which resulted in civilians in the vicinity experiencing indiscriminate violence. Two interviewees further verify the account of embeddedness below. The first account describes how embeddedness manifested itself with the civilian populations and how the partnership between the civilians and the Maoist actors was key to the Maoist survival; the second account proves how the Maoists' fundamental strategy relied on the support of the civilian populations.

> There was no difference between civilians and the Maoist at the local level. We were there side-by side working for the people and for whatever the people needed (C7RN007).

> We [Maoist] were never in the jungle. We were always amongst the civilians. The people always sheltered us…we had no money only 500 rupees a month for expenses and it was not enough, so the local people used to help us with food. It was not forcefully but people willing helped us (C7RN005).

Other interviewees, on the side of the state, noted a similar causal effect on state actors.

> There were definitely times when the Maoists were hidden amongst the civilian populations, and this would lead to attacks on the civilian populations. Many of the people who were killed were not affiliated with the Maoist, but they were still taken and missing (C7RN006).

> We [the RNA] did not even know who the leader was or what he looked like. The security force was fighting a reactive battle. They would counter attack only when they were attacked, so the power was exclusively in the hands of the rebels (C7RN002).

These accounts confirm the impact of the process of embeddedness on the civilian populations. The embedding of actors within areas populated by civilians appears to have been used as a strategy to hide Maoist actors from temporarily-deployed state actors. The evidence also reveals the complexity of differentiating embedded Maoist actors from civilians. The comments presented show the existence of embeddedness and reveal Maoist actors' dependency on civilians, which was necessary for the Maoist actors to continue to fight the state.

This is further confirmed by a senior civil society member who claims the Maoists would blend themselves amongst the civilian populations and the embedding of actors would later lead to attacks on the civilian populations.

> They [Maoist] are in the society without uniform and they can hide themselves in society and camouflage themselves. This provides them with safety and makes it very hard for the security forces to find them immediately after an attack (C7RN014).

These testimonies demonstrate that civilians became "piggies in the middle," caught in the cross-fire. Due to embeddedness, civilians experienced attacks, although they may not have been affiliated with the embedded Maoist actors. Embeddedness, according to the interviewees, generated, facilitated, and increased the opportunity for temporarily-deployed state actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians because they were unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. One interviewee goes further to say, "Many of them (army) were frustrated and killed so many civilians because of not being able to find the Maoist after an attack on their battalion" (C7RN015).

> In several cases, they (Maoist) would live in these places for months and in some cases years amongst the civilian population. One third would be the security force for the community, while others would roam the towns and secure the areas where they were based. The rest of the two thirds would be helping the local communities cooking, cleaning, farming, and undertaking cultural shows (C7RN0028).

The citation reaffirms the earlier evidence above and shows that embeddedness occurred, but there was dependency by the Maoist actors on civilians. Due to embeddedness, civilians did experience attacks, despite having no affiliations to the embedded Maoist actors. One participant even noted how the Maoist rebel actors would split actors in fighting zones amongst civilians. *"One third would provide security… while two thirds would be helping local communities".*

A Maoist strategist further confirms the Maoist strategic positon and their overall strategy of winning civilian hearts and minds. This also includes a layer of

governing locals by creating a governance system designed to compete with the states.

> When we [Maoist] established courts in these areas we had to be fixed amongst the civilian populations to be able to give out the justice that the people required. Civilians became combatants and there was no difference between civilians and combatants (C7RN008).

As an interviewee from the APF commented,

> Immediately after the ambush on our vehicle…five people were approaching the ambush site, and my people [APF actors] were about to kill them, and I stopped them. I said to them, "No" because those people who ambushed us have already left. These people are unknown civilians; they are not the insurgents, and they did not lay the ambush on us (C7RN014).

This account shows how difficult the situation was after an ambush, and how it could have led APF actors to use indiscriminate violence against passers-by. According to one interviewee, a civil society member, "When they were unable to find the Maoists…they started killing local villagers…. Around 15–16 people were killed on that day" (C7RN004). Civilians, who were near embedded Maoist actors, were killed because temporarily-deployed state actors could not find the Maoist actors after an attack. The interviewee further claimed that, "Straight after an ambush, those people who are in uniforms are defined as your friends; those people who are not in uniform are generally defined as your foes" (C7RN014). This account describes how state

actors may have viewed civilians after an attack and reveals the complexities of what temporarily-deployed APF actors underwent when their battalion was attacked. Some interviewees regarded the RNA as more aggressive, heavy-handed, and violent in their behaviour toward civilians. Some accused the RNA of being the worst perpetrator of violence against civilians amongst all the actors. The collection of testimonies presented above strengthens the results of the content analysis and confirms hypothesis one. The interviewee goes on to say that,

> The first thing is they will operate from such a place so that after the incident they can run away and have a clear-cut gap between the security forces and themselves. Secondly, they will pick a place where they can blend in with society. A place where it is difficult for them to be identified…This provides them with safety and makes it very hard for security forces to find them immediately after an attack (C7RN014).

This account shows how exasperating the situation would have been for any temporarily-deployed actors on the states side. The example reveals the complexities and dilemmas surrounding temporarily-deployed actors and indicates the difficulties faced in differentiating between civilians and embedded actors, predominantly because embedded Maoist actors did not wear uniforms during battles.

In response to questions about embedded actors' use of indiscriminate violence against civilians, interviewees confirmed that it occurred and was used in some cases to gain control of the civilian population. According to a Maoist interviewee, "If we [the Maoists] found out that people were informers after an attack or once we arrived, we would either kick them out of the village or in some cases kill them" (C7RN005).

This account demonstrates that the embedded Maoist rebels followed an active policy to not only remove civilians whom they felt posed an issue or could potentially disrupt their position or overall strategy. Many civilians may have experienced attacks from the Maoist because they were a threat to the strategic position and objective. This is confirmed from an interviewee on the state side, who claims:

> Most of the times because of the attacks that were put on the security forces it often led to people [security forces] attacking innocent people…some were raped, abused, and other brutally murdered (C7RN0016).

The above citation shows that states actors were triggered about how to differentiate between civilians and embedded actors after an attack. Participants also suggested that this frustration and confusion with attempting to differentiate did lead to civilians experiencing indiscriminate violence.

> When you [The Royal Nepalese Army] are fighting a symmetry war where the security forces are completely melted into the population, the population mostly because of intimidation are reluctant to share information. This means your information network is not there. This information supports the opportunity to understand the strategy that the enemy is using. This would have led to violence and frustration towards civilians (C7RN002).

According to the above interviewee, civilians were also forced to support the Maoist actors. C7RN002 also suggests that conditions like embeddedness and a lack of

information from the host community would have inevitably led to violence against civilians. The citations reveal the states state actors were frustrated by the conditions of embeddedness and the act of embedding actors by the Maoist did contribute to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians within the zones that TDA where sent to.

This account confirms that embedded rebel actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians, often to stop civilians from sharing information or because they suspected them of sharing information after an attack. It also implies the Maoist actors believed it was important to keep information within their zones, and any threat to that needed to be contained. It further suggests that keeping information secure was also a way of controlling or gaining control after an attack and shows this in collaboration with the strategic position on Maoist were two crucial strategies. The next account demonstrates the experiences of civilians who did not comply with Maoist actors' requests.

> Once they [Maoist actors] first appeared, they were very forceful towards locals who did not join their parades or efforts to win the hearts and minds of civilians. Those who usually did not comply were often beaten or forced to flee (C7RN004).

This testimony shows the Maoist actors' use of indiscriminate violence against civilians to control them. The Maoist actors appeared to not have harmed those who complied but used violence against civilians who did not obey. Another interviewee further said that:

> The Maoist violence against civilians was reactive to what the security force did to them, and they would often blame the local population for this as revenge, especially when they were losing or trying to gain control (C7RN001).

This testimony demonstrates that there may also have been reactive violence against civilians, perpetrated by Maoist actors because of state attacks against Maoist actors or because of their losses to state actors. This suggests that the Maoist actors were as reactive as the state actors to attacks during the Nepalese conflict. This reactive violence appears to be linked to attacks they experienced when losing or when trying to (re)gain control of an area. The attacks on civilians by the Maoist, seems to be linked to the state's awareness of the Maoist location and their counterinsurgency efforts which followed.

> The situation was so tense that often people would act without using their brains…I said to my combatants that we had to use our brains before we acted. I told them that those who had attacked us would run away as this is a basic minimum tactic. This was one of the real reasons for human rights abuses during the conflict (C7RN034).

The citation shows if this senior officer did not control temporarily-deployed actors, the potential for them to use indiscriminate violence against civilians after an attack would be imminent. The respondent goes as far to suggest that if actors do not think after an ambush, then it would be inevitable that indiscriminate violence would be used against civilians. The participant also notes this as a causal explanation for why human rights abuses occurred during the conflict.

> In many cases, they [Royal Nepalese Army] would go back to their barracks, try, and resettle but in some cases, they would get into arguments with locals and completely loose it with the locals (C7RN006).

> Our tactics [The Maoist] made the police and RNA frustrated. Sometimes when they were defeated, they would create excessive violence against the civilian population… Sometimes what they did was to burn people's houses and villages and fire indiscriminately against people. This was because the Maoist would just blend amongst the people (C7RN007).

> Sometimes it would happen where the army would get frustrated because the army was unsure about who was who…this later lead to a catch and kill policy where anyone assumed to be associated was killed by the army (C7RN009).

The citations show that embeddedness contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Many participants revealed how state actors often appeared to be triggered by the attacks and how the attacks contribute to actors using violence against civilians because they were unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians during the fighting. What also materialises from the narratives is that as differentiating between civilians and actors became harder, it became easy to simply resort to violence against the nearest civilian cluster.

However, for one interviewee, violence against civilians was not an official Maoist strategy,

> For the Maoist targeting the civilian population was against their war tactics, they were careful about the crimes they committed and always wanted to give some form of political justification for their crimes (C7RN013).

The following account reveals the extent of the Maoist actors' use of indiscriminate violence, from perspective of a member of civil society,

> The Maoists were by far the most violent for us. They were more in numbers, they were living amongst us, and their ambushes were brutal throughout the conflict…They had a more violent front and used violence throughout the conflict. They always created an environment of fear and were very aggressive (C7RN010).

This account demonstrates the behaviour of embedded Maoist actors who were violent and aggressive towards civilians. The testimony also recounts that the Maoist actors created an atmosphere of fear. Despite higher levels of indiscriminate violence used by temporarily-deployed state actors (See Chapter 5), embedded Maoist actors were also shown to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The accounts show that the Maoist actors, to some degree, created an atmosphere of fear amongst the civilian populations. Fear may have been one of the ways Maoists actors used to gain control over the civilians. Maoist actors also used indiscriminate violence as a way of controlling the civilian populations amongst whom they were embedded.

The testimonies below examine actors and their behaviour during the conflict, and what the analysis continues to show is that Maoist actors did use indiscriminate violence against civilians.

> The Maoist violence against civilians was reactive to what the security force did to them and they would often blame the local population for this as revenge (C7RN001).

> When the Maoist were sure that they were meeting the police, they would place civilians at the front. This is also how some civilians died (C7RN010).

> They (Maoist) would place the civilians in front and use them as human shields. So that the police were confused, as to how they would handle the situation (C7RN012).

> The Maoist would also use the civilians as porters and made them carry things at the front when they were charging against the security forces. This led to an increase in the number of civilians killed (C7RN007).

The violence experience and seen by participants concerning Maoist actors who were fixed and embedded appears to be more forceful in nature and used when the Maoist actors needed certain objectives to be fulfilled by the civilians they populated. This included using civilians as human shields and being forced to give food and shelter. The behaviour of Maoist actors was vastly different to that seen by participants on the state side. State actors tended to use violence in a reactive manner. One participant remarks this was because the RNA was “scared” of the Maoist and unsure of whom they were. This reactive behaviour appears to have provoked and tipped over the security forces to use indiscriminate violence against civilians and may have contributed to the Maoist successful recruitment of civilians.

The findings from this analysis cannot confirm the hypothesis that *is there a relationship between embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages of a conflict to gain control over civilian populations.* The interviews confirm the Maoist actors were known to use violence to control civilians, but there is no evidence that this occurred during the initial periods of the conflict. In fact, most interviewees claimed that embedded actors used indiscriminate violence throughout the conflict, and not during specific periods. The indiscriminate violence perpetrated by Maoist actors and witnessed by interviewees was forceful in nature. The analysis further revealed that both state and Maoist actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians in a reactive manner.

7.5 Summary of Findings

In this chapter, I furthered the investigation by analysing the interviews I conducted with 38 elites in Nepal. The results of the content and narrative analysis of the interviews provide an account of the use of indiscriminate violence in the conflict in Nepal. The results presented in this chapter support hypothesis one and the concept of embeddedness and contribute to understanding why temporarily-deployed state actors used indiscriminate violence against civilians in the conflict. Most interviewees confirmed that state actors were unable to distinguish between embedded actors and civilians when on deployed missions. The effects of embeddedness were often experienced by state actors (RNA actors) who reacted to their losses by attacking civilians.

The results offer minor support for hypothesis two. According to interviewee accounts, actors used indiscriminate violence to gain control over zones or for

retaliation purposes. Results show that the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors was associated with trying to gain control of civilian populations, often after an attack. Interviewees said that when Maoist actors were attacked or under siege by state actors, they often assumed that certain civilians were linked to the state or were state informants. This often resulted in indiscriminate violence against civilians. As the fighting continued, Maoist actors continued to use embeddedness as a strategy to confuse the state actors. Finally, the findings confirm that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians through embeddedness occurs under two conditions: first, when an embedded actor resorts to using indiscriminate violence to gain control over civilian populations; second, when temporarily-deployed actors use indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians.

In the final chapter (Chapter 8), I summarise the results presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven to offer a more holistic understanding to the two hypotheses. In Chapter Eight, I use the method of triangulation to bring the results together and give an overall understanding of the investigation. I then provide recommendations for policymakers who specialise in the protection of civilians and the prevention of indiscriminate violence in conflicts.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Chapter Overview

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to existing knowledge developed by researchers in conflict studies and by peacekeepers, field practitioners, and policymakers who have examined the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in conflict. To explore this problem, I focused on the single case study of the Nepalese decade-long conflict (1996-2006) and employed different methods to understand how and why indiscriminate violence was used. In Chapter Three, I argued that the concept of embeddedness is a useful concept to advance understanding in the field of conflict studies. Exploring the impact of the embedding of actors in a conflict zone has proven helpful to understanding the use of and trends in the use of indiscriminate violence during the decade-long conflict in Nepal (1996-2006). The concept presented in Chapter Three aims to explain how certain conditions can drive actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, I explored the validity of this concept in the context of the Nepalese conflict, using different methods to provide supportive evidence.

In Chapter Seven, I presented the results of the interviews conducted with 38 Nepalese elites, which provide further support for the hypothesis is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors. Interviewee accounts indicated that the Maoist rebels embedded their actors amongst civilians as a tactic. This often-provoked state actors' (i.e., the Royal Nepalese Army, Armed Police Force, and State Police) on temporary-deployment to use indiscriminate violence against civilians.

Chapter Seven demonstrated that indiscriminate violence was regularly used by temporarily-deployed state actors who were unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. The provocative attacks of the Maoist actors against state actors also increased the likelihood of indiscriminate violence. Finally, the results presented in Chapter Seven provide partial support for the hypothesis on the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors. Results show that embedded actors are likely to use indiscriminate violence as a means of gaining control. However, I did not find evidence for the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors to gain control exclusively during the–intial–periods when respondents first interacted with the conflict. Results show that indiscriminate violence was used by embedded actors throughout the conflict for this purpose.

In the final chapter of this thesis, I summarise and verify the results of the analyses presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven using the method of triangulation. Triangulation is a way of ensuring the accuracy of the various results of the study. In this thesis, I use triangulation to bring together the findings presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven and collectively verify them. Triangulation further helps me to understand the overall use of and trends in indiscriminate violence in the Nepalese conflict and to consider whether embeddedness contributed to its use.

This chapter is composed of three parts. In the first part (Sections 8.2-8.3); I present the results of the triangulation of the study findings. I discuss the accuracy of the findings and the validity of the study hypothesis (one and two). In the final part (Sections 8.4-8.5), I summarise the study findings and provide concluding remarks

and recommendations for policymakers, field practitioners and researchers who focus on the protection of civilians in conflicts and peacekeeping missions.

8.2 Triangulation Results, Hypothesis One

In this section, I triangulate the study results and provide a unified explanation and answer for hypothesis one, *Is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors* The results of the process tracing analysis presented in Chapter Five support the hypothesis. Results show that temporarily-deployed actors used indiscriminate violence because they were unable to differentiate between civilians and embedded actors. This occurred when the Royal Nepalese Army assumed command of operations under Operation Unified Command in 2002 and, in the early years of the conflict, when the police were in control of operations. Temporarily-deployed actors often used indiscriminate violence in response to attacks by embedded Maoist actors, but they were unable to differentiate between civilians and the embedded actors. The results suggest that the longer Maoist actors were embedded, the harder it became for the temporarily-deployed state actors to differentiate between them and civilians.

The survey results presented in Chapter Six reveal that the first period of the conflict (0–6 months) was the most significant for the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed actors and that the embedding of Maoist actors increased the likelihood of its use (64%, p=0.03). Survey results further show that embeddedness correlated with an increased use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by temporarily-deployed actors because they were unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians. Results show that Period One (0–6 months) was the

most significant in the use of indiscriminate violence by temporarily-deployed state actors due to differentiating issues (88%, p=0.00). This was followed, in descending order, by Periods Four (8 years–end of the conflict), Two (6 months–3 years) and Three (3–8 years). However, the logistic regression analysis should no support for the hypothesis result in the acceptance of the null hypothesis. There was no relationship detected during the three model conducted during this analysis,

The results of the interviews presented in Chapter Seven, show that embeddedness occurred and contributed to the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. According to the results, temporarily-deployed state actors (e.g., the Royal Nepalese Army) tended to use indiscriminate violence in response to attacks by Maoist embedded actors. The attacks drove state actors to search for Maoist embedded actors; and, as it became difficult to differentiate between civilians and Maoist embedded actors, this led to the use indiscriminate violence against civilians. The interviewees often said that the violence was due to the inability of state actors to differentiate between embedded rebel actors and civilians.

The findings in this study partial support the concept of embeddedness and the hypothesis is there a relationship between embeddedness and the manifestation of indiscriminate violence used by of temporarily-deployed actors. The findings show that embeddedness contributed to confusion on the ground, which, in turn, led to indiscriminate violence against civilians. Results reveal that this occurred, predominantly, when embedded Maoist actors attacked state actors and then embedded themselves among civilians. However, as pointed out in the logit models there was no significance in the results of the modelss. Temporarily-deployed state

actors used indiscriminate violence most frequently. Based on these findings, I reject the null hypothesis and accept the expectations set out in hypothesis one.

8.3 Triangulation Results, Hypothesis Two

In this section, I triangulate the study results to provide a unified explanation and answer for hypothesis two, *Embeddedness increases the likelihood of embedded actors using indiscriminate violence at the initial stages as a means of gaining control.* The results of the process tracing analysis presented in Chapter Five provide partial support for hypothesis two. Results show that during the latter period of the conflict, after being embedded amongst civilians for a length of time, embedded actors used indiscriminate violence as a means of gaining control. This was particularly apparent during Operation Unified Command (2002–the end of the conflict). The losses incurred because of Operation Unified Command triggered the adoption of a violent approach towards civilians by the embedded Maoist actors. However, the use of violence to gain control was not detected during the initial periods of the conflict as anticipated. The results show some indiscriminate violence during the first two periods, but at very low levels. As such, it is not possible, based on these results, to determine whether indiscriminate violence was used as a means of gaining control throughout the conflict.

The results of cross-tabulation analysis, presented in Chapter Six, were varied. Results show that while embedded actors were likely to use indiscriminate violence during the initial stages of the conflict, they were more likely to do so during the latter years. There is significant evidence (0.01 confidence level) that embedded actors used indiscriminate violence as a way of gaining control during the first months (up to six

months) of the fighting; however, the strength of the relationship between the two variables (embeddedness and the use of violence to gain control) was lowest then. During Period Three (3–8 years), the strength of the relationship between the variables was the highest, with a small decrease in Period Four (8 years–end of the conflict). The findings suggest that the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors to gain control was not confined to the initial period of the conflict as expected, but occurred throughout. However, the logistic regression analysis should no support for the hypothesis result in the acceptance of the null hypothesis.

Furthermore, while indiscriminate violence was used against civilians as a means of gaining control, it may not have been a systematic strategy. However, the results of thr logit models show no significance for hypothesis two and I accept the null hypothesis.

For both hypotheses the results seem to indicate that it is quite likely that as combatants spend a longer period in a village the likelihood that violence rises. However, the probability of using violence in any given day may stay the same or even go down, but as more time passes it becomes more likely that violence was committed during the whole period. Even if actors stayed in a village for a long time or at some point only recently arrived and maybe committed violence during this period rather than later on. The data does not allow me to distinguish between these possibilities. It is important to note, that I do not try and state this as something that the results fully support in both hypotheses. The results of all models show no relationship with any of the IV and DV for hypotheses one and two. As a result, I have to accept the null hypothesis for both hypotheses.

The results of the interviews presented in Chapter Seven, confirm that the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors occurred throughout the conflict. Interviewees corroborated that Maoist actors were embedded among civilians for the longest periods during the conflict. Results show that embeddedness often led to attacks on the civilian population (58 per cent of responses). The Maoist embedded actors were more likely to use violence against civilians after a battle with temporarily-deployed state actors. They often assumed that civilians were affiliated with the state authorities or were state informers. However, the reported number of incidences of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by embedded actors was lower than the number perpetrated by state actors. This may be due to the dependence of the Maoist embedded actors on the civilian population, and their need to survive amongst them. Frequent use of indiscriminate violence may not have been conducive to the Maoist actor's overall aims. While the interview results support the occurrence of indiscriminate violence perpetrated by embedded actors to control civilians, it did not occur predominately in the initial periods of the conflict.

Overall, the study results confirm that when embedded Maoist actors lost control of a zone, they often resorted to using indiscriminate violence against civilians. However, this occurred throughout the conflict. The results show some support for hypothesis two, but indiscriminate violence to gain control was not confined to the initial periods of the conflict. Furthermore, both embedded and temporarily-deployed actors used indiscriminate violence to gain control during the conflict. Therefore, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis and accept the expectations set out in hypothesis two.

8.4 Summary

Through the process of triangulation, I have tried to bring together the study findings presented in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. I conclude that the findings' support for hypothesis one was accurate, as was the lack of confirmation for hypothesis two. Throughout the results, I found that embeddedness indeed occurred during the conflict, and that actors on both sides of the conflict used indiscriminate violence. This largely occurred at the initial stages of the conflict but also throughout its different periods. The thesis findings offer evidence that the Maoist rebels embedded their actors as a strategy to confuse state actors. Embeddedness agitated state actors, especially when the Maoist attacked and then concealed themselves amongst civilians. The results show that the process and act of embeddedness increased the opportunity for temporarily-deployed state actors to use indiscriminate violence against civilians. This occurred because they were unable to differentiate between civilians and embedded actors. In areas where the police and state security forces had fled their posts, in the initial period of the conflict, Maoists were able to take control and embed their actors amongst the civilian population. The longer they remained in these zones, the further embedded they became, and the harder it was for the temporarily-deployed state actors to differentiate between civilians and embedded actors. During combat, this caused confusion and led, in some cases, to the indiscriminate killing of civilians. The challenge of differentiation occurred frequently during Operation Romeo (1995) and later under Operation Unified Command (2002).

The study findings reveal that Maoist actors were likely to use indiscriminate violence when they were embedded among civilians. However, its continued use against the

same civilians or community was not observed. There is strong evidence that the use of indiscriminate violence by embedded actors was more likely to occur when temporarily-deployed actors were also deployed to the same zones. This was evident in the latter periods of the conflict, during Operation Unified Command. The state operation resulted in the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians by embedded actors as a means of regaining control. While occasional use of indiscriminate violence occurred throughout the conflict by Maoist actors, it was most common in the latter periods.

Incidences of indiscriminate violence found in this study included, killing, physical abuse, forced recruitment, and disappearances. Indiscriminate violence used by temporarily-deployed actors was recorded as significantly high in the initial periods of the conflict and under Operation Unified Command, when state actors collectively engaged with the Maoist rebels. By 2002, the Maoist actors were firmly embedded among the civilian population, making differentiation between civilians and embedded actors difficult.

While only partially confirming the study hypothesis (accepting hypothesis one and rejecting hypothesis two), based on study the results, I can confirm that that the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians through the practice of embeddedness occurs under two conditions: (i) when an embedded actor resorts to using indiscriminate violence to gain control over the civilian population; (ii) when temporarily-deployed actors use indiscriminate violence against civilians because they are unable to differentiate between embedded actors and civilians.

8.5 Conclusion and Recommendations

This thesis has tried to shed light on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians during the decade-long, Nepalese conflict (1996-2006). Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to clarify how indiscriminate violence was used during the Nepalese conflict. I have tried to demonstrate how indiscriminate violence influenced the everyday lives of Nepalese civilians. I have demonstrated that indiscriminate violence was used during the different stages of the conflict, and was most frequently used by temporarily-deployed actors. The use of indiscriminate violence was also detected when actors were unable to differentiate between civilians and embedded actors. Similar findings were observed during the Peruvian and the second South Sudanese conflict. I have also tried to draw on examples from the conflict in Syria to further highlight this same pattern of indiscriminate violence through the different strategic positions which actors can assume. In both the Peruvian and South Sudanese conflicts, incidences of actors embedding themselves amongst civilian populations were recorded. This later led to the use of indiscriminate violence. During the second South Sudanese conflict, in 1993, the Sudan Council of Churches (located in the south of Sudan) issued a letter asking the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), John Garang, and the SPLA soldiers, "To move their rebels out of populated civilian areas, toward the front lines, and to make sure those rebels were visible and under strict discipline."[153] The use of indiscriminate violence through embeddedness has also been detected in more recent conflicts, such as the 2013 South Sudanese conflict where I served as a United Nations Civil Affairs Officer. According to a United Nations spokesperson in South Sudan, the reason why violence against

[153] Church Leaders of Southern Sudan Appeal, "Letter of Appeal to the SPLA/M Leaders", Nairobi, Kenya.

civilians continued in parts of South Sudan was that "It is impossible to tell the difference between a rebel and a civilian."[154]

This thesis provides important insights for the United Nations peacekeeping operations, policy advisors, and field practitioners. The UN peacekeeping missions have greatly expanded over the past decade and are playing an increasing role in the protection of civilians. Pressure has grown for the military, which are part of the peacekeeping units, to develop capacities and approaches to respond to the ever-changing nature, location, and scope of conflicts. This is particularly pressing, since there has been an increase in the number of internal conflicts worldwide that are fought by irregular armed groups. Recent conflicts in Syria and South Sudan have revealed that actors do not abide by international war conventions, nor do they follow treaties put in place to govern them. As a result, many civilians continue to suffer severe conditions due to the conflicts in their countries of origin.

As I have tried to demonstrate in this thesis, indiscriminate violence is used during the initial periods of the conflict by temporarily-deployed actors. As such, the UN and the UN Security Council must be aware when deploying troops to conflict affected areas because this I believe will be the pattern of violence in future conflicts. Peacekeeping troops should be ready to be deployed as soon as possible, particularly in situations where there is an active UN mandate which has a combat mission attached to it. The readiness of the UN in moments when violence is or can be set to rise is crucial, as this thesis has demonstrated. This could greatly reduce the use of indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians by temporarily-deployed actors. This will need the

[154] Source: http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/civilians-targeted-southern-soldiers-militias-south-sudan-fighting; (accessed on 12/03/2016).

UN to move from a position of reaction to a position of troop readiness. Practically, this would involve nation states agreeing to deploy troops with the necessary combat skills to deter civilian violence. If violence is to be deterred, it will need states who contribute to peacekeeping missions having troops on standby in case the situation deteriorates. Strategically, this will require regional peacekeepers from bordering countries to be trained and ready to be deployed once authorisation has been given by the Security Council. Overall, it will require the UN to revisit its approach on troop deployment through neighbouring partners or organisation like Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Finally, it will take collective action from regional states to not sit by and allow mass atrocities to take place across borders.

More needs to be done by the international community to prevent national governments, fighting rebels or militant groups, from fighting within established civilian areas. This increases the chances of actors being embedded and the chance that troops will be placed in conditions that facilitate the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. This could be done by supporting regional blocks like ECOWAS. Drawing on the skills of peacekeepers from these countries could help mitigate violence against civilians. These states often have the legitimacy and links with neighbouring states to support a peaceful transition. It is also important that peacekeepers are sent to areas populated by civilian to protect civilians and prevent actors from becoming embedded amongst them.

It is also important that UN peacekeepers are utilised to not only show a presence on the ground, but to strengthen existing buffer zones between civilians and warring parties. This can help reduce the process of embeddedness and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. In addition, UN peacekeeping missions

should implement stronger protections for civilian mandates and mechanisms, as part of their overall directives, to prevent actors from embedding themselves among civilians and creating conditions for the use indiscriminate violence. This could be achieved by setting up well-facilitated protection of civilian (PoC) sites around, not within, UN compounds.

The UN mission in South Sudan has set up several PoC sites within UN bases. These PoC sites were designed to shelter civilians fleeing fighting and provide them with protection. There have been several challenges at these sites, including an SPLA attack on the UN camp in Malakal Upper Nile[155] and other UN bases. Such sites may also increase the potential for differentiating issues when unarmed actors flee from fighting into UN PoC sites. While these sites may serve as one of the quickest ways of preventing atrocities and genocide the best option continues to be the deployment peacekeepers to civilian areas to create buffer zones between civilians and actors who may attack civilians. This will reduce the numbers of civilian causalities witnessed during the initial stages of a conflict. Rapidly deploying peacekeeping troops will also decrease the opportunity for the process of embeddedness to occur and reduce the potential for actors to use civilians as human shields. The UN also must be aware of the use of indiscriminate violence be temporarily-deployed actors and ensure they are also held to account. Another suggestion is to reinforce the Chapter VII mandate which will give peacekeepers the opportunities to use necessary force without having to worry whether they will be pulled in front of the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

[155] http://www.turkishweekly.net/2016/03/03/op-ed/as-bleak-as-hell-the-political-dynamics-of-south-sudan-s-upper-nile-state/ (accessed on 16/07/2016).

While this research project has touched the surface of how the strategic positions which actors adopt can impact the use of indiscriminate violence, there are several shortcomings that I faced throughout. First, funding was a limitation; although this project was self-funded, with more funding the project could have reached more actors and victims, and tried to capture the context of embeddedness and other positions in more current conflicts. This would have helped me to provide further evidence of how the strategic positions impact the use of indiscriminate violence. The scale of the research project was something I underestimated. Coupled with this issue were the time constraints that were placed on me which meant there were restrictions on what I could do and how much this project focus could cover. While further funding would have helped, research assistance could have assisted with other aspects like reaching out to more survey respondents. Second, while the mixed method approach was rich in data collection, the very nature of triangulation from different sources of data was difficult since the perspective I received from different collection points varied. It often became difficult to follow up nuances that emerged from the research. For example, the information that I received from elites provided me with a wealth of understanding. However, the method I used to collect data from civilians did not enable me to further examine civilians selected. This meant I only understood the selected answers and not the context that derived from the answers selected. While the two methods are rich and enable me to understand what occurred within a framework for quantitative analysis, it is still limited in its ability to capture respondent narrative and the context of that narrative. Finally, the mixed method approach can be an effective tool to use but only if the researcher is well versed in both quantitative and qualitative research methods and knows how to avoid the major challenges of the design (e.g., collinearity). For a researcher to be able to understand

all these different methods and approaches it would become very time-consuming and expensive, which discouraged me on several occasions.

When it came to conducting field research in South Sudan, I was unable to conduct similar field research (as in Nepal) with respondents due to the on-going fighting and the literacy levels of civilians. This carries restrictions on this thesis that I must acknowledge. First, I was unable to generalize the findings at the different levels of analysis from similar sources. Second, this, in turn, restricts the inferences and claims I can make across the cases I have selected as part of this study. While I do highlight examples from Peru and the second Sudanese conflicts, I am unable to make these inferences at the different levels of analysis as I do with Nepal. For example, surveys in Nepal with surveys in South Sudan and Peru. A third shortfall in my research was the ability to capture other controlling effects as part of my overall data collection process. Capturing for other controlling variables would have given me cause to make stronger inferences from my research findings in Chapter Six. This is partially because many of the civilians that I surveyed in Nepal had not been surveyed or spoken to since the end of the conflict. Many had never had their stories heard and were longing to add clarification and understanding to this research project. It is also the case that INSEC data does not cover a wider range of aspects like geographic locations of incidents of killings or the levels of violence at the location which could be used as controls when conducting further analysis. As a result, I was not able to make the statistical inferences and answer all the arguments I set out to do at the start of this project. Finally, while there are numerous civilians surveyed in this thesis. All of whom contributed immensely, there is still not enough data collected to make the

strong inferences which I expected to make when I first started this project. Considering over 19,000 civilians were killed and disappeared during the Nepalese conflict, the number of those surveyed only amounts to 2.72 per cent of the total number of civilians killed and disappeared. Thus, while there are patterns in this thesis that future researchers should consider, these results should be taken with the aim of conducting further analysis. I do believe that some of the mechanisms seen in this thesis are generalizable to other conflicts that we see today. This includes the strategic positions assumed by actors and the cost of these interactions on the lives of civilians during conflict.

Future research will need to further examine the strategy of embeddedness deployed in conflicts (specifically in urban cities) and explore what the potential impact of this strategy will be for future conflicts. Future avenues for research should try to first, better understand whether the strategy of embedding actors in urban cities, during a conflict, impacts on the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians living in populated urban areas (cities). The world's population is predicted to flock to urban areas,[156] and megacities in large numbers, with 70 per cent of the world's population expected to live in cities by 2045, across Africa and Asia. The predicted fluctuation of civilians to urbans areas suggests the nature of future conflicts may be fought differently. When states go to war, the enemies they now encounter are irregular actors (combatants), not troops organised into armies but often freedom fighters, guerrillas, splinter groups and terrorists (actors). Some are easily grouped by common purpose as they are disbanded. Others engage in wars with no end in sight. Irregular actors (combatants) are at their most effective in cities (Sassen, 2017). They draw the

[156] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-prospects-2014.html

enemy into cities, and undermine the key advantage of today's major powers, whose mechanised weapons are of little use in dense and narrow urban spaces. This will impact the nature of future conflicts and the level of violence that civilians will experience during conflicts. And, it is likely that much of the fighting in future conflicts is likely to take place in and around urban cities, further impacting the dynamics of a conflict and the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in urban areas. Second, researchers should examine how the strategy of embedding actors will impact the approaches of peacekeeping missions carried out by the UNDPKO, ECOWAS and AU. Given the nature of irregular conflicts on the rise in today's societies, the predicted rise of civilian populations to urban cities means the way the peacekeeping missions respond to conflicts will need to change. If we do see a rise in urbanization then peacekeepers will need to enter these urban areas to create buffer zones between civilian and urban fighters. Third, researchers should explore whether embedded actors, irregular fighting forces, and urban warfare will impact on the protection of the civilian mandate at the UNSC.[157]

In a world where conflicts are increasingly localised, an ever-increasing number of actors can play a role in the use and movement of indiscriminate violence against civilians. The significance of understanding the makeup of actors, who splinter into smaller militia groups or work as sponsored contractors, is essential to understanding the use and movement of indiscriminate violence. As the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and South Sudan have all shown, when fighting continues over time, there is increasing potential for groups to break away from the main opposition group or the state to hire militias who use indiscriminate violence against the civilian

[157] For e.g. will this require Chapters 6 and 7 of the United Nations Charter to be adjusted or will new mechanisms be needed in the future to protect civilians in armed conflicts?

population.[158] Thus, it is important for the UN Security Council to be aware of the potential of deploying robust and rapid response peacekeeping units to protect civilians from the use of indiscriminate violence. Without this protection, innocent civilians, particularly women and children, will continue to experience the harshest impacts of conflicts. While the recommendations presented in this chapter will not solve all the issues of the protection of civilians, future research will need to consider this dynamic which will change the way in which indiscriminate violence is distributed towards civilian populations.

[158] https://theconversation.com/south-sudan-crisis-deepens-as-main-rebel-groups-fragment-and-realign-76240 (accessed on 10/3/2017)

APPENDIX A

Survey Research Questions

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Q: What is your age? _____
- Don't know
- Refused

2. Q: How many years of school have you had? ____ Years
- Don't know
- Refused
- None
- Unsure

3. Q: What is your current family situation?
- Married (have a husband or wife)
- Single
- Live together with someone (in a permanent relationship)
- Divorced (or separated)
- Spouse of missing person
- Widow(er)
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

4. Q: Do you have children? If Yes how many?
- No children
- Yes ___ children
- I did but they passed
- Unsure

5. Q: What is your job now or are you not working?
- Farmer
- Manual worker
- Skilled worker
- Self-employed
- Housewife / home care
- Soldier (combatant)
- Government employee
- Private sector employee
- Teacher / professor / intellectual
- Pensioner / retired
- Unemployed (but looking for work)
- Unemployed (not looking for work)
- Student
- Other [SPECIFY]
- Don't know / refused

PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONFLICT

1. Q: What job did you do during the conflict?

- Farmer
- Manual worker
- Skilled worker
- Self-employed
- Housewife / home care
- Soldier (combatant)
- Rebel fighter
- Government employee
- Private sector employee
- Teacher / professor / intellectual
- Pensioner / retired
- Unemployed (but looking for work)
- Unemployed (not looking for work)
- Student
- Other [SPECIFY]
- Don't know / refused

2. Q: What is your conflict experience?

- War took place where they lived
- Lost contact with close relative
- Forced to leave home and live elsewhere
- Serious damage to property
- House was looted
- Was a combatant
- Combatants took food away
- Tortured
- Knew somebody well who was raped by combatants
- Wounded by fighting
- Knew somebody who was imprisoned
- Sexually assaulted
- Kidnapped or taken hostage
- Family member killed
- A member of the rebel group
- A member of the army

3. Q: Which two of these words best describe the conflict for you personally?

- Horrible
- Hateful
- Disruptive
- Humiliating
- Confusing
- Uncertainty
- Powerless

- Challenging
- Exciting
- Remote
- Hopeful
- Don’t know

4. Q: When combatants attack to weaken the enemy, should they…

- Attack enemy combatants and civilians
- Attack enemy combatants and avoid civilians as much as possible
- Attack only enemy combatants and leave civilians alone
- Don't know / refused

5. Q: Which of the following group do you personally dislike the most?

- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbour(s)
- Households / member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

TIME /DURATION OF THE CONFLICT

Q1: Which of the following people do you remember the most from the conflict?

- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbour(s)
- Households / member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

Q2: How many times do you remember seeing the following people during the conflict?

- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbour(s)
- Households / member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don't know
- Refused to answer
- Repeatedly

EMBEDDED COMBATANTS/ACTORS

1. Q: When did the combatants first arrive? What did they do once they arrived?

2. Q: How long were combatants living amongst your community?
- Under a month
- Over a month
- 2-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months
- 9-12 months
- 1-2 years
- 2-3 years
- 3-4 years
- 4-5 years
- 5-6 years
- 6-7 years
- 7-8 years
- 8-9 years
- 9-10 years
- 10 years and over
- Repeatedly

3. Q: Did any of the combatants stay behind once the main group had left?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown

4. If so how long, did they stay for?
- Under a month
- Over a month

- 2-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months
- 9-12 months
- 1-2 years
- 2-3 years
- 3-4 years
- 4-5 years
- 5-6 years
- 6-7 years
- 7-8 years
- 8-9 years
- 9-10 years
- 10 years and over
- Repeatedly

5. Q: Did combatants use forceful violence against you or any members of your family?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown

6. Q: Did combatants use violence against anyone in your community?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown

If so what sort of violence did they use?

7. Q: Did combatants continue to violate you, your family and community members after the first incident of violence?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown

8. Q: Did combatants who were amongst you seem to be tired from the conflict?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Q: If yes when did you notice this?

9. Q: Were combatants frustrated with civilians and with the conflict?
- With civilians
- With the conflict
- With each other
- With the government

- With rebels only
- With the women only
- With men only

10. Q: Did combatants ever return to your community to violate the same people in your community?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

11. Q: Which of the following were in your community the longest?
- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbour(s)
- Households / member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

12. Q: Do you recall the location of combatants?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

If yes, can you state where they were located on the map?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

13. Q: Please specify the number or the district on the map.

VIOLENCE AND FRUSTRATION BY ACTORS ON SHORT MISSION

1. Q: What was the behaviour of actors like?
- Perfect
- Very good
- Good

- Bad
- Very bad
- Extremely bad

2. Q: Did actors seem frustrated and angry when they came into you community?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

3. Q: Did actors appear to be tired or frustrated? If so, did they use violence against civilians?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

4. Q: If [YES] what forms of violence did actors use?
- Rape
- Killing
- Verbal abuse
- Physical abuse
- Kidnapping
- Torture
- Psychological abuse
- Sexual abuse
- Other [SPECIFY]

5. Q: Did actors use violence against civilians because they could not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?
- Code 1: Yes
- Code 2: No
  Code 3: Maybe
  Code 4: Unknown

6. Q: What other things did you notice about the behaviour of actors? [SPECIFY]

7. Q: Which of the following TWO were the most frustrated and fatigued during the conflict?
- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbour(s)
- Households / member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners

- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

8. Q: If combatants were angry or upset which groups of people were targeted. Please state two.

- Women
- Men
- Children
- Elderly
- Teenagers
- Ethnic groups
- Poor people
- Rich people
- Middle class

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS BY ACTORS ON SHORT MISSION

1. Q: Were members of your community targeted?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

2. Q: If yes, why do you think this was so?

3. Q: If members of your community were attacked was this at the initial periods of the conflict?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

4. Q: Which community or ethnic groups were targeted on?

5. Q: How long did the targeting and random attacks last for?

- Under a month
- Over a month
- 2-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months
- 9-12 months
- 1-2 years

- 2-3 years
- 3-4 years
- 4-5 years
- 5-6 years
- 6-7 years
- 7-8 years
- 8-9 years
- 9-10 years
- 10 years and over

6. Q: Were these attacks done by individual members or by a collective of people?

- Individual
- Groups
- The whole group
- Unknown
- Collective of people

7. Q: Did actors continue to use violence against civilians after the first incidence of violence against residents?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

If [YES] how long did this last for?

- Under a month
- Over a month
- 2-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months
- 9-12 months
- 1-2 years
- 2-3 years
- 3-4 years
- 4-5 years
- 5-6 years
- 6-7 years
- 7-8 years
- 8-9 years
- 9-10 years
- 10 years and over

8. Q: Did actors start attacking members before or after armed fighting ceased in your area?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe

- Unknown
- Refused to answer

9. Q: If yes how long was this for?
- Under a month
- Over a month
- 2-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months
- 9-12 months
- 1-2 years
- 2-3 years
- 3-4 years
- 4-5 years
- 5-6 years
- 6-7 years
- 7-8 years
- 8-9 years
- 9-10 years
- 10 years and over

10. How many times did these repeated attacks take place?

11. How long did this last for?
- Under a month
- Over a month
- 2-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months
- 9-12 months
- 1-2 years
- 2-3 years
- 3-4 years
- 4-5 years
- 5-6 years
- 6-7 years
- 7-8 years
- 8-9 years
- 9-10 years
- 10 years and over

12. Q: Attacking the enemy in populated villages or towns knowing many civilians/women and children will be killed is…
- Okay
- Not okay
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

13. Q: Which of the following best describes the consequences of the conflict?
- Produces too much hate and division
- Causes too much psychological damage
- Produces too much destruction
- Causes too much physical suffering
- People have too much hate inside
- Other [SPECIFY]
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

Please answer the following scenarios.

14. Q: Version 1: Attacking civilians who voluntarily gave food and shelter to enemy combatants. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?
- Okay
- Not okay
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

15. Q: Version 2: Attacking civilians who were forced to give food and shelter to enemy combatants. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?
- Okay
- Not okay
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

16. Q: Do you consider rape a violent abuse?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

17. Q: Which one of the following best describes the use of rape?
- Physical abuse
- Verbal abuse
- Psychological abuse
- Sexual abuse
- Refused to answer

18. Q: Do you consider rape a….
- Physical abuse
- Verbal abuse
- Psychological abuse
- Sexual abuse
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

19. Do you consider rape to be?

- Right
- Wrong
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

20. Q: When you say, “its wrong,” is it primarily wrong because it is...?
- Against human rights
- Against your religion
- Against the law
- Against personal code
- Against your culture
- Against people’s beliefs
- Don’t know
- Other

Please answer the following scenarios.

21. Q: Version 1: Attacking civilians who voluntarily transported ammunition for enemy combatants defending their town. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?
- Okay
- Not okay
- Wrong
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

22. Q: Version 2: Attacking civilians who were forced to transport ammunition for enemy combatants defending their town. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?
- Okay
- Not okay
- Wrong
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

23. If a man forces himself onto a woman is that wrong?
- Okay
- Not okay
- Wrong
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

24. Q: When you say, “it is wrong.” is it primarily wrong because it is...?
- Against human rights
- Against your religion
- Against the law
- Against personal code
- Against your culture
- Against people’s beliefs

- Other [SPECIFY]
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

Please answer the following scenarios.

25. Q: Attacking civilians who voluntarily gave food and shelter to enemy combatants. Would it be okay or not okay to attack them to weaken the enemy?
- Okay
- Not okay
- Maybe depends
- Refused to answer

26. Q: What about depriving the civilian population of food, medicine, or water to weaken the enemy. Is that wrong?
- Okay
- Not okay
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

Or just part of war?
- Wrong
- Right
- Part of the War
- Expected

Please answer the following scenarios.

27. Q: When attacking enemy combatants and avoiding civilians as much as possible, is it…
- Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy combatants
- Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine or water
- Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women and children would be killed
- Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them accidentally

28. Q: When attacking only enemy combatants and leaving civilians alone, is it…
- Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy combatants
- Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine or water
- Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women and children would be killed
- Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them accidentally

29. Q: Which three of the following reasons best explain why combatants attack or hurt civilians; even though many people say it is not okay or may be against the law?
- Win at any cost
- Don't care about laws
- Tired of the conflict
- Frustrated with the conflict
- Hate the other side

- Fatigued with the conflict
- Are told to do so
- Been amongst civilians for too long
- Lose all sense
- Alcohol / drugs
- Don't know the laws
- No discipline amongst fighting
- Combatants were amongst civilians for long periods
- Other side doing same
- Are too young
- Are scared
- Committed to cause
- Abuse of power

30. Q: Did individual members conduct violence against people within your community?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

If yes which warring side were they a part of?
- Government army
- Soldiers.
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals.
- Neighbour(s)
- Households / member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

31. Were you ever forced to kill a family member or friend
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

32. Were you forced to betray a family member or friend?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure

33. Q: Did your household experience severe losses of income since the onset of the conflict?
- Yes
- No
- Do not know
- Refused to answer

34. Q: When exactly did you experience it for the first time?

35. Q: When exactly did this occur?

36. Q: What was the overall value of the item at the time that it was lost? (SPECIFY CURRENCY)

37. Q: Who was responsible for the destruction or theft?
- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbours(s)
- Household member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

38. Q: Have you or your household members changed your economic activities because of violence?
- Yes
- No
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

39. Q: Were any of the following assets considerably destroyed, lost, or robbed because of the violence or displacement?
- Dwelling / Mattress
- Bicycle Motorcycle/car
- Radio / TV
- Clothes
- Documents / certificates
- Jewellery
- Cell phone
- Blankets
- Rifle / machete

- Cultivation tools such as hoe, plough, etc.
- Tractor
- Torch / flashlight
- Equipment for education
- Shelter material
- Clothes
- Computer
- Others

40. Q: Who was responsible for the destruction or theft?
- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbours(s)
- Household member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

41. Q: Have you or people in your household experienced any of the following?
- No
- Was verbally threatened
- Was verbally insulted, but not threatened
- Was threatened with knife, gun or other type of weapon
- Was attacked with knife, gun or other type of weapon
- Was beaten / assaulted / kicked
- Was strangled or burned
- Was injured or killed in gun shootings
- Was injured by a landmine / UXO
- Was physically forced to have sexual intercourse
- Was forced to perform other sexual acts that the person did not want to do
- Lost body parts
- Was forced to labour
- Was robbed
- Was kidnapped / abducted
- Was extorted for money or other goods
- Don’t know others

42. Q: Who was the person experiencing the harm?
- You
- Mother

- Father
- Sister
- Brother
- Cousin
- Grandmother
- Grandfather
- Aunty
- Uncle
- Step-brother
- Step-sister
- Step-mother
- Step-father
- Husband
- Wife

43. Q: Where did the incident occur?
- On the battlefield/in a combat operation
- At home
- In a refugee camp
- In the neighbourhood
- In your community
- At work (if other than home and not military service)
- While combatants were amongst the community
- During transit (e.g. migration)
- Other location
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

44. Q: Has the person suffered from any physical or psychological illness of prolonged nature or death, or any afflictions due to the experiences described?
- Yes, illness of prolonged nature
- Yes, injury
- Yes, handicap
- Yes, psychological distress
- Yes, immediate death
- Yes, death at scene of incident
- Yes, disappeared
- Yes, tortured
- Yes, death in hospital
- Yes, death after discharge from hospital
- Yes, other
- No, don't know
- Refused to answer

COMBATANT/ACTORS GROUP AND ATTACKS

1. Q: Which groups do you think committed the worst violence against community members?

- Government army
- Soldiers
- Rebel group
- Militia members
- Bandits / criminals
- Neighbour(s)
- Households / family member(s)
- Do not know / stranger
- Foreigners
- Other(s)
- None of the following
- Nobody
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

2. Q: Were groups targeted and used as weapons of warfare?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

3. Q: Why were these groups targeted?

- Bored
- For resources
- Poorest people
- Because the combatants were sent to the area
- Combatants were frustrated
- Because they were protecting the enemy
- Because they were helping the enemy
- Associated to the enemy
- Because of their ethnic origins
- Because of their cultural background
- Because of religious beliefs

4. Q: Did security forces use groups as human shields during the conflict?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown

If so were these areas in opposition strong holds?

- Yes
- No

- Maybe
- Unknown

5. Q: Which of the following were used the most by combatants?
- Rape
- Harassment
- Sexual Violence
- Abuse
- Discrimination
- Torture
- Killing

6. Q: Which groups experienced violence the most [SPECIFY]:

7. Q: Why do you think this is?
- Because of their association
- Because of where they lived
- Because of the length of the conflict
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

8. Q: How often did they experience this violence?
- 0-5 times
- 5-10
- 10-15
- 15-20
- 20-30
- 30-40
- 40-50
- Repeatedly

9. Q: How long did this violence last for?
- 1-2 weeks
- 2-3 weeks
- 3-4 weeks
- Over a month
- 1-3 months
- 3-6 months
- 6-9 months
- 9-2 months
- 1 year and over

10. Q: Was there a difference in the violence that occurred on different groups?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Refused to answer

11. What were the differences?

- Some were harmed more than others
- Violence was the same
- Violence depended on your gender
- Violence depended on your income
- Violence depended on how long combatants were in the community

COMBATANT/ACTOR BEHAVIOUR

I: I will now describe some situations that may happen during a [conflict/armed conflict]. For each situation, I would like you to imagine that you are part of that situation. Tell me how you think you would behave if the decisions were completely up to you. Here comes the first imaginary situation.

1. Q: Would you save the life of a surrendering enemy combatant who killed a person close to you?

- Would save
- Would not save
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

2. Q: Would you help a wounded enemy combatant who killed a person close to you?

- Would help
- Would not help
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

3. Q: Did enemy combatants imprison you or were you living in an area that came under enemy control?

- Imprisoned
- Imprisoned but free to move
- Lived under enemy control but restricted
- Lived under enemy control but free to move
- Did not come under enemy control

4. Q: What about taking civilians hostages to get something in exchange? Is that wrong or just part of conflict?

- Wrong
- Part of war
- Both [Volunteered response]
- Don't know
- Refused to answer

5. Q: Please tell me whether any of the following happened while you were under enemy control:

- You were personally mistreated
- You were physically injured

- You had contact with a representative from an independent organization to check on your well-being

6. Q: Would you help a wounded enemy combatant / save the life of a surrendering enemy combatant who killed a person close to you?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unknown
- Refused to answer
- Would help a wounded combatant
- Would save a surrendering combatant

7. Q: Are there rules or laws that are so important that, if broken during war, the person who broke them should be punished?
- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Do not know

(IF YES) What are these laws based on?
- Country's laws
- International law
- Religious principles
- The values people hold
- Other
- Don't know

8. Q: When the conflict is over, should people who have broken these rules...?
- Be put on trial
- Be exposed to the public but not put on trial
- Be victimised themselves
- Be granted amnesty
- Be forgiven after the war
- Be forgotten when the war is over
- Don't know

9. Q: Who should punish wrongdoers?
- International criminal court
- Own government
- Own courts
- Victims of violence
- The military itself
- Own political leaders
- The civilian population
- Other
- Don't know

10. Q: Who should be responsible for punishment?
- International criminal court
- Own government
- Own courts
- The military itself
- Own political leaders
- The civilian population
- Other
- Don't know

11. Q: Are international organisations making it better or worse, or is it not making any difference?
- Better
- Worse
- No difference
- Don't know

12. Q: In the future, would you like to see intervention from the international community to deal with these kinds of issues (civilian areas attacked or cut off from food, water, medical supplies and electricity)?
- Want more intervention
- Want less intervention
- Unknown

13. Q: Let me ask what can be done if during the war civilian areas are attacked, towns, or villages are cut off from food, water, medical supplies, and electricity? To whom would you turn to get help or be protected?
- Government
- UN organizations (e.g. UNHCR)
- Humanitarian organizations
- No one
- Religious leaders
- International organizations
- Local government leaders
- Other
- God / church
- Army / military
- The people
- Don't know / refused to answer

14. Q: When the conflict is over, should people who have broken these rules...?
- Be put on trial
- Be forgiven / forgotten after the war
- Be exposed to the public but not put on trial
- Be granted amnesty
- Don't know

15. Q: When thinking about favouring one side in a war, which is more important to you,

the reasons each side is fighting or how each side acts during the war?

- What each side is fighting for
- How each side acts during war
- Both
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

16. Q: Do you think victims of the conflict have the right to revenge?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Don’t know
- Refused to answer

17. Q: What if they were forced to kill a family member or friend?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure
- Refused to answer

18. Q: What if they were you forced to betray a family member or friend?

- Yes
- No
- Maybe
- Unsure
- Refused to answer

APPENDIX B

List of Interviewed Elites

Name	**Position**	**Organisation**	**Interview type**
[redacted]	President	Media Advocacy Group (MAG)	Open interview
[redacted]	President	Shantimalika/ National Network for Women, Peace and Security	Open interview
[redacted]	Legal Officer	Transitional Justice Resource Centre (TJRC)	Open interview
[redacted]	President	TJRC	Open interview
[redacted]	Founder/President	Action Works Nepal	Open interview
[redacted]	Unit Manager (Peace and Security)	UN Women Nepal	Open interview
[redacted]	Programme Specialist	UN Women Nepal	Open interview
[redacted]	Founder	Women for Human Rights, single women group (WHR) / Organization in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)	Open interview
[redacted]	Regional Dialogue coordinator	UNDP Conflict Prevention Programme	Open interview
[redacted]	Head of UNIRP programme	UNDP Integration rehabilitation programme	Open interview
[redacted]	President	Institute of Human Rights Communication Nepal	Open interview
[redacted]	Opted not to provide this information	Opted not to provide this information	Open interview
[redacted]	Opted not to provide this information	Opted not to provide this information	Open interview

[redacted]	Opted not to provide this information	Opted not to provide this information	Open interview
[redacted]	Opted not to provide this information	Opted not to provide this information	Open interview
[redacted]	Political analyst and associate professor of political science at the Tribhuvan University	Tribhuvan University	Open interview
[redacted]	Advocate Supreme Court, Nepal	Supreme Court Nepal	Open interview
[redacted]	Opted not to provide this information	Opted not to provide this information	Open interview Telephone
[redacted]	Supervisor of UNIRP	UNIRP and Former training police officer	Open interview
[redacted]	Chief Executive	Nepal Peacebuilding Initiative	Open interview
[redacted]	President	Alliance for Peace	Open interview
[redacted]	Executive Director	Institute of Human Rights Communication Nepal	Open interview
[redacted]	Consultant	Former Commissioner. National Human Rights Commission, Nepal	Open interview
[redacted]	Project Manager - Women Peace and Security	Search for Common Ground	Open interview
[redacted]	Chief Negotiator between the Government and Maoist -CPA.	UNDP SF	Open interview
[redacted]	Former head of Parliament of CA	UNDP SF	Open interview
[redacted]	Former Head of election Commission and Home Secretary	UNDP SF/ Government Advisor	Open interview
[redacted]	Journalist	UNDP SF	Open interview

[redacted]	Women's Activists	UNDP SF	Open interview
[redacted]	Political Scientist	Tribhuvan University/ UNDP SF	Open interview
[redacted]	Chairman	INSEC	Open interview
[redacted]	Maj General (retired)	Nepal Army	Open interview
[redacted]	Lt General (Now retired) Co-ordinator of Technical Committee on Supervision, Integration, Rehabilitation of Maoist Combatants	Nepal Army	Open interview
[redacted]	Political Analysis	Former Maoists	Open interview
[redacted]	Former AIG	Nepal Police	Open interview
[redacted]	UML	CA Member	Open interview
[redacted]	Maoist	CA Member	Open interview
[redacted]	Nepal Madhesh Foundation	Executive Director	Open interview
[redacted]	IGP (Former)	Armed Police Force	Open interview
[redacted]	Youth Activist and Maoist candidate for CA	Pasa Yard	Open interview
[redacted]	Deputy Commander	Maoist	Open interview Telephone
[redacted]	Colonel	Nepal Army	Open interview
[redacted]	Senior member	CPN-Maoist	Open interview
[redacted]	Nepali Congress	CA Member/ Nepali Congress Syangia	Open interview
[redacted]	(AKA Prabhakar) Deputy Commander of the Maoist PLA	CA Member of the Maoist and Former Peace Minister	Open interview

[redacted]	Former Police Sargent	Nepal Police/ Casino Star Hotel Hyatt Regency	Open interview
[redacted]	Member of National Interest Preservation Committee/ Constituent Assembly Member Maoist/ Head British Gorak College	CA Member/ Maoist Integration Official working with UN	Open Interview
[redacted]	Former Police Chief in Banke and Bhiratnaglha/ Chief Executive Office Norvic International Hospital	Former Police Inspector	Open Interview
[redacted]	Former Division commander Maoist	Local Political leader Rolpha	Open Interview

APPENDIX C

Research Project and Codebook

A new dataset on the use and movement of indiscriminate violence during Nepal's Civil War, 1996-2006.

Codebook

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Data introduced in this codebook was collected and quantified from the field research and documentation collected by the main researcher in 16 districts over a period of 11 months. Specific information on victims, actors, and elites interviewed is archived at the University of Essex, United Kingdom.

1. RegionCode

Region code: A national code given to Nepal's five development regions by the United Nations.
Code 1: Mid-Western
Code 2: Far Western
Code 3: Central
Code 4: Eastern
Code 5: Western

2. Region
Region: Nepal is divided into 5 Development Regions, 14 Administrative Zones, and 75 Districts:

Eastern Development Region, Central Development Region, Western Development Region, Far Western Development Region, and Mid-Western Development Region

3. DistrName
District Name: There are seventy-five districts in Nepal. Some districts are district headquarters.

1	MANANG
2	JHAPA
3	ILAM
4	PANCHATHAR
5	TAPLEJUNG
6	MORANG
7	SUNSARI
8	DHANKUTA
9	TERHA THUM
10	BHOJPUR
11	SANKHUW ASABHA
12	SAPTARI
13	SIRAHA
14	UDAYPUR
15	KHOTANG
16	OKHALDHUNGA
17	SOLUKHUMBU
18	DHANUSHA
19	MAHOTTARI
20	SARLAHI
21	SINDHULI
22	RAMECHHAP
23	DOLAKHA
24	RAUTAHAT
25	BARA
26	PARSA
27	CHITAWAN
28	MAKAWANPUR
29	LALITPUR

30 BHAKTAPUR
31 KATHMANDU
32 KA VRE
33 DHADING
34 SINDHUPALCHOWK
35 NUW AKOT
36 RASUW A
37 TANAHU
38 GORAKHA
39 LAMJUNG
40 SY ANGJA
41 KASKI
42 NAWALPARASI
43 RUPANDEHI
44 PALPA
45 KAPILVASTU
46 ARGHAKHANCHI
47 GULMI
48 BAGLUNG
49 PARVAT
50 MY AGDI
51 DANG
52 PYUTHAN
53 ROLPA
54 SALYAN
55 RUKUM
56 BANKE
57 BARDIY A
58 SURKHET
59 JAJARKOT
60 DAILEKH
61 DOLPA
62 JUMLA
63 KALIKOT
64 MUGU
65 HUMLA
66 KAILALI
67 ACHHAM
68 DOTI
69 BAJURA
70 BAJHANG
71 KANCHANPUR
72 DADELDHURA
73 BAITADI
74 DARCHULA
75 MUSTANG

4. IndiSurvCode

Individual Survey Code: A unique number given to each respondent. This number pertains to a code given to all respondents together and is not the same number given from the field.

5. IndRespDistrCode
Individual Respondent District Code: Respondent location was abbreviated and the researcher used this abbreviation plus a rolling number to collect and code information while in the field.

6. Gender
Gender: Gender is the range of characteristics pertaining to, and differentiating between, masculinity and femininity. Depending on the context, these characteristics may include biological sex (i.e., the state of being male, female).
Code 0: Female
Code 1: Male

7. personal_Q1
Personal Question One: The respondent's age
Code 1: Don't know
Code 2: Refused to answer

8. personal_Q2
Personal Question Two: The number of years the respondent attended school
Code 1: Don't know
Code 2: Refused to answer
Code 3: None
Code 4: Unsure
Code 5: Number of years_

9. ***personal_Q2A***
Since personal_Q2 only reports that the respondent refused, did not know, or was unsure of the years in education, personal_Q2A is the variable we use to measure the education level.

10. personal_Q3
Personal Question Three: Marital Status
Code 1: Married (have a husband or wife)
Code 2: Single
Code 3: Live together with someone (in a permanent relationship)
Code 4: Divorced (or separated)
Code 5: Spouse of missing person
Code 6: Widow(er)
Code 7: Do not know
Code 8: Refused to answer

11. personal_Q4
Personal Question Four: Family Status
Code 1: No children

Code 2: Yes ___ children
Code 3: I did but they passed away
Code 4: Unsure

12. personal_Q5
Personal Question Five: The respondent's current working position.
Code 1: Farmer
Code 2: Manual worker
Code 3: Skilled worker
Code 4: Self-employed
Code 5: Housewife / home care
Code 6: Soldier (combatant)
Code 7: Government employee
Code 8: Private sector employee
Code 9: Teacher / professor / intellectual
Code 10: Pensioner / retired
Code 11: Unemployed (but looking for work)
Code 12: Unemployed (not looking for work)
Code 13: Student
Code 14: Other [SPECIFY]
Code 15: Don't know / refused to answer

13. indvconfexp_Q1
Conflict experience: Working position during the conflict.
Code 1: Farmer
Code 2: Manual worker
Code 3: Skilled worker
Code 4: Self-employed
Code 5: Housewife / home care
Code 6: Soldier (combatant)
Code 7: Government employee
Code 8: Private sector employee
Code 9: Teacher / professor / intellectual
Code 10: Pensioner / retired
Code 11: Unemployed (but looking for work)
Code 12: Unemployed (not looking for work)
Code 13: Student
Code 14: Other [SPECIFY]
Code 15: Don't know / refused to answer

14. indvconfexp_Q1 and indvconfexp_Q1A
Since indvconfexp_Q1A has only 10 observations, we can use indvconfexp_Q1 as one variable to represent both in telling the job status of respondents during the conflict period. indvconfexp_Q1A is used to observe any secondary roles.

15. Status
Personal Question One: The status of the respondent during the conflict (Written option).

16. indvconfexp_Q2

Individual Conflict Experience Question Two: The individual conflict experience of the respondent during the conflict.
Code 1: War took place where they lived
Code 2: Lost contact with close relatives
Code 3: Forced to leave home and live elsewhere
Code 4: Serious damage to property
Code 5: House was looted
Code 6: Was a combatant
Code 7: Combatants took food away
Code 8: Tortured
Code 9: Knew somebody well who was raped by combatants
Code 10: Wounded by fighting
Code 11: Knew somebody who was killed
Code 12: Imprisoned
Code 13: Sexually assaulted
Code 14: Kidnapped or taken hostage
Code 15: Family member killed
Code 16: A member of the rebel group
Code 17: A member of the army

17. indvconfexp_Q2 A-Q: Dummy variables created to reflect each individual variable listed and the distribution
The research created dummy variables for each option available for respondents to choose for this question. It is still fine to use **indvconfexp_Q2** as our variable for this question, but for detailed information the dummy variables below are useful here.

New (dummy) Variables Created:
18. indvexp_warinarea- War took place where they lived
19. indvexp_lostcontact- Lost contact with close relatives
20. indvexp_leavehome- Forced to leave home and live elsewhere
21. indvexp_damageproperty- Serious damage to property
22. indvexp_lootedhouse- House was looted
23. indvexp_combatant- Was a combatant
24. indvexp_foodtaken- Combatants took food away
25. indvexp_torture- Tortured
26. indvexp_someoneraped- Knew somebody well who was raped by combatants
27. indvexp_wounded- Wounded by fighting
28. indvexp_someone- Knew somebody who was killed
29. indvexp_imprisoned- Imprisoned
30. indvexp_sexassault- Sexually assaulted
31. indvexp_kidnap- Kidnapped or taken hostage
32. indvexp_familykilled- Family member killed
33. indvexp_wasrebel- A member of the rebel group
34. indvexp_wasarmy- A member of the army

35. indvconfexp_Q3
Individual Conflict Experience Question Three: The individual conflict experience of the respondent during the conflict.
Code 1: Horrible
Code 2: Hateful

Code 3: Disruptive
Code 4: Humiliating
Code 5: Confusing
Code 6: Uncertainty
Code 7: Powerless
Code 8: Challenging
Code 9: Exciting
Code 10: Remote
Code 11: Hopeful
Code 12: Don't know

indvconfexp_Q3 and indvconfexp_Q3A
The research created dummy variables for each option available for respondents to choose for this question. It is fine to use **indvconfexp_Q3** as our variable for this question but for detailed information dummy variables are useful here.

New (dummy) Variables Created:
35. indvexp_hateful
36. indvexp_horrible
37. indvexp_disruptive
38. indvexp_humiliating
39. indvexp_confusing
40. indvexp_uncertainty
41. indvexp_powerless
42. indvexp_challenging
43. indvexp_exciting
44. indvexp_remote
45. indvexp_hopeful

46. indvconfexp_Q4
Individual Conflict Experience Question Four: The individual conflict experience of the respondent during the conflict. Dummy variable
Code 1: Attack enemy combatants and civilians
Code 2: Attack enemy combatants and avoid civilians as much as possible
Code 3: Attack only enemy combatants and leave civilians alone
Code 4: Do not know / refused to answer

47. indvconfexp_Q4 and indvconfexp_Q4A:
Q: When combatants attack to weaken the enemy, should they…?
Attack enemy combatants and civilians
Attack enemy combatants and avoid civilians as much as possible
Attack only enemy combatants and leave civilians alone
Do not know / refused to answer
As you can see indvconfexp_Q4A has only 10 observations, so we can use **indvconfexp_Q4** as variable for the given question.

48. New Variable created: **lawofwar_indvexpQ4**

49. indvconfexp_Q5

Individual Conflict Experience Question Five: The individual conflict experience of the respondent during the conflict. -
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

50. conflictdur_Q1
Conflict Duration Question One: Who were the most frequent people/groups you interacted with during the conflict?
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

51. conflictdur_Q2
Conflict Duration Question Two: Who do you recall interacting with the most during the conflict?
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following

Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

52. combtntembd_Q1
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question One: When did the actors arrive in your district? Dummy variable

53. combtntembd_Q2
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Two: How long did the actor selected live amongst your community?
Code 1: Under a month
Code 2: Over a month
Code 3: 2-3 months
Code 4: 3-6 months
Code 5: 6-9 months
Code 6: 9-12 months
Code 7: 1-2 years
Code 8: 2-3 years
Code 9: 3-4 years
Code 10: 4-5 years
Code 11: 5-6 years
Code 12: 6-7 years
Code 13: 7-8 years
Code 14: 8-9 years
Code 15: 9-10 years
Code 16: 10 years and over

54. catcombtntembd_Q2
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Two: How long did the actor selected live amongst your community?
This is a categorical dummy variable created from the variable **combtntembd_Q2 above.**
Code 1: 0-6 months
Code 2: 6 months-3 years
Code 3: 3 years- 8 years
Code 4: 8 years to the end of the conflict

55. combtntembd_Q3
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Three: Did actors stay behind once a battle had occurred?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

56. combtntembd_Q4
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Four: How long did the actor identified stay amongst the civilian population where they were located during the conflict?

Code 1: Under a month
Code 2: Over a month
Code 3: 2-3 months
Code 4: 3-6 months
Code 5: 6-9 months
Code 6: 9-12 months
Code 7: 1-2 years
Code 8: 2-3 years
Code 9: 3-4 years
Code 10: 4-5 years
Code 11: 5-6 years
Code 12: 6-7 years
Code 13: 7-8 years
Code 14: 8-9 years
Code 15: 9-10 years
Code 16: 10 years and over

57. combtntembd_Q5
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Five: Did you notice forceful violence being used against you or your family where you were based?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

58. combtntembd_Q6
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Six: Did actors or observed actors embedded amongst the community use violence against other members of the community?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

59. combtntembd_Q7
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Seven: Whether violence was a one-off act or a continuous act toward community members.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

60. combtntembd_Q8
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Eight: Was the nature of combatant's behaviour-fatigue or tired?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown Q: If yes when did you notice this?

61. combtntembd_Q9
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Nine: Actors ability to embed themselves amongst civilians and whether the use of violence is linked to being amongst civilians or with the conflict.
Code 1: With civilians
Code 2: With the conflict
Code 3: With each other
Code 4: With the government
Code 5: With rebels only
Code 6: With the women only
Code 7: With men only

62. combtntembd_Q10
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Ten: Whether combatants remained embedded amongst civilians or whether they returned to violate the same people?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

63. combtntembd_Q11
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Eleven: Which one of the following choices of actors lived amongst the civilian population the longest?
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

64. combtntembd_Q11, combtntembd_Q11A-B
The examination observes that the second and third response is very low, so for the purposes of this examination the research will use combtntembd_Q11 as variable for this question.
Q: Which of the following were in your community the longest?
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals

Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

65. combtntembd_Q12
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Twelve:
Do you know where the actors identified in question 11 were located?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

66. combtntembd_Q13
Conflict embeddedness duration amongst civilians Question Thirteen: Where did the violence occur? (Respondent demonstrates on a map)

67. combtntfrstn_Q1
Combatant's frustration Question One: How would you describe the actors' behaviour that you observed during the conflict? Choose one of these options:
Code 1: Perfect
Code 2: Very good
Code 3: Good
Code 4: Bad
Code 5: Very bad
Code 6: Extremely bad

68. combtntfrstn_Q2
Combatant's frustration Question Two: Were combatants frustrated and angry when they entered your community?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

69. combtntfrstn_Q3
Combatant's frustration Question Three: Did the actors you observed appear to be tired and fatigued?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

70. combtntfrstn_Q4

Combatant's frustration Question Four: What forms of violence did you observe during the conflict?
Code 1: Rape
Code 2: Killing
Code 3: Verbal abuse
Code 4: Physical abuse
Code 5: Kidnapping
Code 6: Torture
Code 7: Psychological abuse
Code 8: Sexual abuse
Code 9: Other [SPECIFY]

combtntfrstn_Q4, combtntfrstn_Q4A-F
Dummy variables were created for each option available for respondents to choose for this question. It is fine to use **combtntfrstn_Q4** as our variable for this question but as previously explained, for detailed information dummy variables are useful here.

New (dummy) Variables Created:
71. rapebycombatant- Rape
72. killingbycombatant- Killing
73. vabusebycombatant- Verbal abuse
74. pabusebycombatant- Physical abuse
75. kidnapbycombatant- Kidnapping
76. torturebycombatant- Torture
77. psyabusebycombatant- Psychological abuse
78. sexabusebycombatant- Sexual abuse

79. combtntfrstn_Q5
Combatant's frustration Question Five: Did actors use violence against civilians because they could not differentiate between actors and civilians when they entered your community?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

80. combtntfrstn_Q6
Combatant's frustration Question Six: Describe what other types of behaviour you observed the conflict actor exhibiting.

81. combtntfrstn_Q7
Combatant's frustration Question Seven: The respondent is asked to choose two actors whom they observed to be fatigued and frustrated with civilians.
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals

Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

82. combtntfrstn_Q8
Combatant's frustration Question Eight: The respondent is asked to select which two people they felt were targeted because of the actor's frustration.
Code 1: Women
Code 2: Men
Code 3: Children
Code 4: Elderly
Code 5: Teenagers
Code 6: Ethnic groups
Code 7: Poor people
Code 8: Rich people
Code 9: Middle class

combtntfrstn_Q8 and combtntfrstn_Q8A
Dummy variables were created for each option available for respondents to choose for this question. The research still used the variable **targetofcombatant_combtntfrstnQ8 (**which is the same as **combtntfrstn_Q8)** as our variable for this question. However, for detailed analysis dummy variables are useful here.

New (dummy) Variables Created:
83. womentargetted- Women
84. mentargetted- Men
85. childrentargetted- Children
86. elderlytargetted- Elderly
87. teenagerstargetted- Teenagers
88. ethnicgrptargetted- Ethnic groups
89. poortargetted- Poor people
90. richtargetted- Rich people
91. midclasstargetted- Middle class

92. violagnstcvln_Q1
Violence against civilians in conflict Question One: The respondent is asked again to identify whether members of their community were targeted.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

93. violagnstcvln_Q2
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Two: Respondent is asked to identify why they feel this occurred.

94. violagnstcvln_Q3
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Three: Was the violence in your community observed during the initial periods of the conflict?
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

95: violagnstcvln_Q4
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Four: Which ethnic groups were targeted during the conflict?

96: violagnstcvln_Q5
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Five: The respondent is asked to identify how long this targeting of civilians did occur?
Code 1: Under a month
Code 2: Over a month
Code 3: 2-3 months
Code 4: 3-6 months
Code 5: 6-9 months
Code 6: 9-12 months
Code 7: 1-2 years
Code 8: 2-3 years
Code 9: 3-4 years
Code 10: 4-5 years
Code 11: 5-6 years
Code 12: 6-7 years
Code 13: 7-8 years
Code 14: 8-9 years
Code 15: 9-10 years
Code 16: 10 years and over

97: violagnstcvln_Q6
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Six: The respondent is asked to identify whether actors use violence individually or collectively?
Code 1: Individually
Code 2: Groups
Code 3: The whole group
Code 4: Unknown
Code 5: Collective of people

violagnstcvln_Q6 and violagnstcvln_Q6A: Respondents were given the option to select more than one option violagnstcvln_Q6 refers to their first option while and violagnstcvln_Q6A refers to their second option**.** Dummy variable
Q: Were these attacks done by individual members or by a collective of people?

Code 1: Individually
Code 2: Groups
Code 3: The whole group
Code 4: Unknown
Code 5: Collective of people
Due to small number of responses in violagnstcvln_Q6A, the researcher decided to keep only violagnstcvln_Q6,

98. New Variable indvcollectviol_violagnstcvlnQ6
Please see the above comments for the used variable.

99: violagnstcvln_Q7
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Seven: The respondent is asked to identify whether violence was a one-off occurrence or continuously used.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

100: violagnstcvln_Q7A
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Seven A: The respondent is asked to identify how long this form of violence continued to occur.
Code 1: Under a month
Code 2: Over a month
Code 3: 2-3 months
Code 4: 3-6 months
Code 5: 6-9 months
Code 6: 9-12 months
Code 7: 1-2 years
Code 8: 2-3 years
Code 9: 3-4 years
Code 10: 4-5 years
Code 11: 5-6 years
Code 12: 6-7 years
Code 13: 7-8 years
Code 14: 8-9 years
Code 15: 9-10 years
Code 16: 10 years and over

101. violagnstcvln_Q8
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Eight: The respondent is asked did actors start attacking civilians before or after the fighting ceased in their area.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

102. violagnstcvln_Q9

Violence against civilians in conflict Question Nine: The respondent is asked to identify *how long did this form of violence last for?*
Code 1: Under a month
Code 2: Over a month
Code 3: 2-3 months
Code 4: 3-6 months
Code 5: 6-9 months
Code 6: 9-12 months
Code 7: 1-2 years
Code 8: 2-3 years
Code 9: 3-4 years
Code 10: 4-5 years
Code 11: 5-6 years
Code 12: 6-7 years
Code 13: 7-8 years
Code 14: 8-9 years
Code 15: 9-10 years
Code 16: 10 years and over

103. catviolagnstcvln_Q9
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Nine: The respondent is asked to identify how long this form of violence lasted for. The variable is a categorical dummy variable created from the variable violagnstcvln_Q9
Code 1: Under a month to 6 months
Code 2: 3-6-years
Code 3: 6-8 years
Code 4: 8 years to end of the conflict

104. violagnstcvln_Q10
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Ten: The respondent is asked to identify how frequently the repeated attacks on civilians happened*?*

105. violagnstcvln_Q11
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Eleven: The respondent is asked to identify how long these repeated attacks on civilians continued for.
Code 1: Under a month
Code 2: Over a month
Code 3: 2-3 months
Code 4: 3-6 months
Code 5: 6-9 months
Code 6: 9-12 months
Code 7: 1-2 years
Code 8: 2-3 years
Code 9: 3-4 years
Code 10: 4-5 years
Code 11: 5-6 years
Code 12: 6-7 years
Code 13: 7-8 years
Code 14: 8-9 years

Code 15: 9-10 years
Code 16: 10 years and over

106. violagnstcvln_Q12
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twelve: The respondent is asked whether attacking civilians in populated areas is justified. *Who is doing the attacking?*
Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

107. violagnstcvln_Q13
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirteen: The respondent is asked to select an option that best describes their views on the effects of the conflict.
Code 1: Produces too much hate and division
Code 2: Causes too much psychological damage
Code 3: Produces too much destruction
Code 4: Causes too much physical suffering
Code 5: People have too much hate inside
Code 6: Other [SPECIFY]
Code 7: Do not know
Code 8: Refused to answer

108. violagnstcvln_Q14
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Fourteen: The respondent is given a scenario and asked to respond.
Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

109. violagnstcvln_Q15
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Fifteen: The respondent is given a scenario about attacking a civilian who provided food and shelter to the supposed enemy and asked to respond by selecting an option.
Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

110. violagnstcvln_Q16
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Sixteen: The respondent is asked their views on rape.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

111. violagnstcvln_Q17

Violence against civilians in conflict Question Seventeen: The respondent is asked to state which of the following describes the use of rape.
Code 1: Physical abuse
Code 2: Verbal abuse
Code 3: Psychological abuse
Code 4: Sexual abuse
Code 5: Refused to answer

112. violagnstcvln_Q18
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Eighteen: The respondent is asked to respond to how they view rape.
Code 1: Physical abuse
Code 2: Verbal abuse
Code 3: Psychological abuse
Code 4: Sexual abuse
Code 5: Refused to answer

113. violagnstcvln_Q19
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Nineteen: The respondent is asked to respond to how they view rape.
Code 1: Right
Code 2: Wrong
Code 3: Unknown
Code 4: Refused to answer

114. violagnstcvln_Q20
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty: The respondent is asked to respond to why they feel rape is wrong.
Code 1: Against human rights
Code 2: Against their religion
Code 3: Against the law
Code 4: Against personal code
Code 5: Against their culture
Code 6: Against people's beliefs
Code 7: Do not know
Code 8: Other

115. violagnstcvln_Q21
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-One: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario.
Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Wrong
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

116: violagnstcvln_Q22
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Two: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario.

Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Wrong
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

117. violagnstcvln_Q23
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Three: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario.
Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Wrong
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

118. violagnstcvln_Q24
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Four: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario.
Code 1: Against human rights
Code 2: Against their religion
Code 3: Against the law
Code 4: Against personal code
Code 5: Against their culture
Code 6: Against people's beliefs
Code 7: Do not know
Code 8: Other

119. violagnstcvln_Q25
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Five: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario.
Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

120. violagnstcvln_Q26
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Six: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario.
Code 1: Okay
Code 2: Not okay
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

121.violagnstcvln_Q27
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Seven: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario about actors attacking civilians.
Code 1: Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy combatants.
Code 2: Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine, or water.
Code 3: Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women

and children would be killed.
Code 4: Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them accidentally.

122. violagnstcvln_Q28
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Eight: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario about actors attacking civilians.
Code 1: Okay to attack civilians who voluntarily give food and shelter to enemy combatants.
Code 2: Part of war to deprive civilian populations of food, medicine, or water.
Code 3: Part of war to attack populated villages or towns knowing that many women and children would be killed.
Code 4: Okay to plant landmines even though civilians may step on them accidentally.

123. violagnstcvln_Q29
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Twenty-Nine: The respondent is asked to explain why they feel civilians are attacked.
Code 1: Win at any cost
Code 2: Don't care about laws
Code 3: Tired of the conflict
Code 4: Frustrated with the conflict
Code 5: Hate the other side
Code 6: Fatigued with the conflict
Code 7: Are told to do so
Code 8: Been amongst civilians for too long
Code 9: Lose all sense
Code 10: Alcohol / drugs
Code 11: Do not know the laws
Code 12: No discipline amongst fighters
Code 13: Combatants were amongst civilians for too long
Code 14: Other side doing same
Code 15: Are to young
Code 16: Are scared
Code 17: Committed to cause
Code 18: Abuse of power

violagnstcvln_Q29, violagnstcvln_Q29A-C:
Dummy variables were created for each option available for respondents to choose for this question.

124. reasonstoatk_violagnstcvlnQ29 (Which is the same as violagnstcvln_Q29) as our variable for this question for detailed information dummy variables are useful here.

New (dummy) variables created:
125. towin_violagnstcvln- Win at any cost
126. neglectlaw_violagnstcvln- Does not care about laws
127. tired_violagnstcvln- Tired of the conflict
128. hate_violagnstcvln- Hate the other side

129. frustration_violagnstcvln- Frustrated with the conflict
130. fatigue_violagnstcvln- Fatigued with the conflict
131. order_violagnstcvln- Are told to do so
132. longembed_violagnstcvln- Been amongst civilians for too long
133. losesense_violagnstcvln- Lose all sense
134. drugs_violagnstcvln- Alcohol / drugs
135. notknowinglaw_violagnstcvln- Does not know the laws
136. lackdiscipline_violagnstcvln- No discipline amongst fighters
137. tooyoung_violagnstcvln- Are too young
138. copyotherside_violagnstcvln- Other side doing same
140. amongstcvln_violagnstcvln- Living amongst civilians
141. scared_violagnstcvln- Are scared
142. cause_violagnstcvln- Committed to cause
143. abusepower_violagnstcvln- Abuse of power

144. violagnstcvln_Q30
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty: The respondent is asked were individuals known to use violence against civilians in your community.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unsure

145. violagnstcvln_Q30A
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty A: The respondent is asked to identify which actors did they notice using violence?
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

146: violagnstcvln_Q31
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-One: The respondent is asked whether they were forced to kill a friend or a family member.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unsure

147. violagnstcvln_Q32

Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Two: The respondent is asked whether they betrayed a friend or a family member.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unsure

148. violagnstcvln_Q33
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Three: The respondent is asked whether they lost any of their income since the conflict.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

149. violagnstcvln_Q34
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Four: The respondent is asked to state at what point they lost their income.

150. violagnstcvln_Q35
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Five: The respondent is asked to state the exact date.

151. violagnstcvln_Q36
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Six: The respondent is asked to state the overall value of the item.

152. violagnstcvln_Q37
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Seven: The respondent is asked to identify who the actors are.
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

153. violagnstcvln_Q38
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Eight: The respondent is asked to state whether their economic status has changed because of the conflict.

Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

154. violagnstcvln_Q39
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Thirty-Nine: The respondent is asked to state which of the following items were taken during the conflict.
Code 1: Dwelling/Mattress
Code 2: Bicycle Motorcycle/car
Code 3: Radio / TV
Code 4: Clothes
Code 5: Documents / certificates
Code 6: Jewellery
Code 7: Cell phone
Code 8: Blankets
Code 9: Rifle / machete
Code 10: Cultivation tools such as hoe, plough, etc.
Code 11: Tractor
Code 12: Torch / flashlight
Code 13: Equipment for education
Code 14: Shelter material
Code 15: Clothes
Code 16: Computer
Code 17: Others

155. violagnstcvln_Q40
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty: The respondent is asked to identify who was responsible for the damage.
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: Do not know
Code 14: Refused to answer

156: violagnstcvln_Q40A
The response from violagnstcvln_Q40A was extremely low, as a result the examination only focused on the responses from the first variable.

157.violagnstcvln_Q41

Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty: The respondent was given a list of options and was asked if anyone in their household experienced these scenarios first hand.
Code 1: No
Code 2: Was verbally threatened
Code 3: Was verbally insulted, but not threatened
Code 4: Was threatened with knife, gun or other type of weapon
Code 5: Other type of weapon
Code 6: Was attacked with knife, gun or other type of weapon
Code 7: Was beaten / assaulted/kicked
Code 8: Was strangled or burned
Code 9: Was injured or killed in gun shootings
Code10: Was injured by a landmine / UXO
Code 11: Was physically forced to have sexual intercourse
Code 12: Was forced to perform other sexual acts that the person did not want to do
Code 13: Lost body parts
Code 14: Was forced to labour
Code 15: Was robbed
Code 16: Was kidnapped / abducted
Code 17: Was extorted for money or other goods
Code 18: Don't know/ others

To have a detailed understanding of the results, dummy variables were created for each option available for respondents to choose for this question. It is fine to use

158.famexp_violagnstcvlnQ41 (same as violagnstcvln_Q41) Dummy variable as our variable for this question but as previously noted, for detailed information dummy variables are useful here.

New (dummy) variables created:
160.no_violagnstcvln_Q41- No
161.vthreat_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was verbally threatened
162.vinsulted_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was verbally insulted, but not threatened
163.knifegun_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was threatened with knife, gun or other type of weapon
164.oweapon_violagnstcvln_Q41- Other type of weapon
165.attack_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was attacked with knife, gun or other type of weapon
166.beat_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was beaten / assaulted/kicked
167.strangled_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was strangled or burned
168.guninjury_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was injured or killed in gun shootings
169.mineinjury_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was injured by a landmine / UXO
170.rape_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was physically forced to have sexual intercourse
171.sexabuse_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was forced to perform other sexual acts that the person did not want to do
172.lostlimb_violagnstcvln_Q41- Lost body parts
173.forcedlabour_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was forced to labour
174.robbed_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was robbed
175.kidnap_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was kidnapped / abducted
176.extortion_violagnstcvln_Q41- Was extorted for money or other goods

178. violagnstcvln_Q42
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty-Two: The respondent is asked to state the identified person receiving the harm they witnessed.
Code 1: You
Code 2: Mother
Code 3: Father
Code 4: Sister
Code 5: Brother
Code 6: Cousin
Code 7: Grandmother
Code 8: Grandfather
Code 9: Aunty
Code 10: Uncle
Code 11: Step-brother
Code 12: Step-sister
Code 13: Step-mother
Code 14: Step-father

violagnstcvln_Q42, violagnstcvln_Q42A-G The research has also created dummy variables out of the following variables:
179.self_violagnstcvln_Q42- You
180.mother_violagnstcvln_Q42- Mother
181.father_violagnstcvln_Q42- Father
182.sister_violagnstcvln_Q42- Sister
183.brother_violagnstcvln_Q42- Brother
184.cousin_violagnstcvln_Q42- Cousin
185.gmother_violagnstcvln_Q42- Grandmother
186.gfather_violagnstcvln_Q42- Grandfather
187.aunt_violagnstcvln_Q42- Aunty
188.uncle_violagnstcvln_Q42- Uncle
189.stepbr_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-brother
190.stepsis_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-sister
191.stepm_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-mother
192.stepf_violagnstcvln_Q42- Step-father

193.violagnstcvln_Q43
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty-Three: The respondent is asked to identify where the incident occurred.
Code 1: On the battlefield/in a combat operation
Code 2: At home
Code 3: In a refugee camp
Code 4: In the neighbourhood
Code 5: In your community
Code 6: At work (if other than home and not military service)
Code 7: While combatants were amongst the community
Code 8: During transit (e.g. migration)
Code 9: Other location
Code 10: Don’t know
Code 11: Refused to answer

194.violagnstcvln_Q44
Violence against civilians in conflict Question Forty-Four: The respondent is asked if the person identified has suffered from any physical or psychological illness of prolonged nature or death, or any afflictions due to the experiences described.
Code 1: Yes, illness of prolonged nature
Code 2: Yes, injury
Code 3: Yes, handicap
Code 4: Yes, psychological distress
Code 5: Yes, immediate death
Code 6: Yes, death at scene of incident
Code 7: Yes, disappeared
Code 8: Yes, tortured
Code 9: Yes, death in hospital
Code 10: Yes, death after discharge from hospital
Code 11: Yes, other
Code 12: No, don't know
Code 13: Refused to answer

195.cgrpatck_Q1
Actors and group attacks Question One: The respondent is asked to identify who they felt was the worst violator.
Code 1: Government army
Code 2: Soldiers
Code 3: Rebel group
Code 4: Militia members
Code 5: Bandits / criminals
Code 6: Neighbour(s)
Code 7: Households / member(s)
Code 8: Do not know / stranger
Code 9: Foreigners
Code 10: Other(s)
Code 11: None of the following
Code 12: Nobody
Code 13: **Do not** know
Code 14: Refused to answer

cgrpatck_Q1 and cgrpatck_Q1A:
196. New variable created **worstviol_cgrpatckQ1 (same as cgrpatck_Q1)** for our analysis in this research we have created dummy variables for detailed information

New (dummy) variables created:
197.govarmy_cgrpatck_Q1- Government army
198.sol_cgrpatck_Q1- Soldiers
199.reb_cgrpatck_Q1- Rebel group
200.militia_cgrpatck_Q1- Militia members
201.criminal_cgrpatck_Q1- Bandits / criminals
202.neighbor_cgrpatck_Q1- Neighbour(s)
203.family_cgrpatck_Q1- Households / member(s)
204.stranger_cgrpatck_Q1- Do not know / stranger

205.oreigner_cgrpatck_Q1- Foreigners

206.cgrpatck_Q2
Actors and group attacks Question Two: The respondent is asked to identify whether groups were targeted as weapons of warfare.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

207.cgrpatck_Q3
Actors and group attacks Question Three: The respondent is asked to state why they feel civilians experienced this form of violence.
Code 1: Bored
Code 2: For resources
Code 3: Poorest people
Code 4: Because the combatants were sent to the area
Code 5: Combatants were frustrated
Code 6: Because they were protecting the enemy
Code 7: Because they were helping the enemy
Code 8: Associated to the enemy
Code 9: Because of their ethnic origins
Code 10: Because of their cultural background
Code 11: Because of their religious beliefs

cgrpatck_Q3 and cgrpatck_Q3A-C:
208. Here the research uses **worstviol_cgrpatckQ1 (same as cgrpatck_Q1)** for our analysis and for detailed information dummy variables are useful here.

New (dummy) variables created:
209.bored_cgrpatck_Q3- Bored
210.resource_cgrpatck_Q3- For resources
211.beingpoor_cgrpatck_Q3- Poorest people
212.combatantinarea_cgrpatck_Q3- Because the combatants were sent to the area
213.frustration_cgrpatck_Q3- Combatants were frustrated
214.forprotectenmy_cgrpatck_Q3- Because they were protecting the enemy
215.forhelpenmy_cgrpatck_Q3- Because they were helping the enemy
216.forascnenmy_cgrpatck_Q3- Associated to the enemy
217.ethnct_cgrpatck_Q3- Because of their ethnic origins
218.culture_cgrpatck_Q3- Because of their cultural background
219.relblf_cgrpatck_Q3- Because of their religious beliefs

220.cgrpatck_Q4
Actors and group attacks Question Four: The respondent is asked to state whether security forces used civilians as human shields.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe

Code 4: Unknown

221. cgrpatck_Q4A
Actors and group attacks Question Four: The respondent is asked to identify were these areas in opposition strong hold.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown

222. cgrpatck_Q5
Actors and group attacks Question Five: The respondent is asked to identify the most used form of violence used by an actor.
Code 1: Rape
Code 2: Harassment
Code 3: Sexual Violence
Code 4: Abuse
Code 5: Discrimination
Code 6: Torture
Code 7: Killing

233. cgrpatck_Q7
Actors and group attacks Question Seven: The respondent is asked to give a reason why they felt this was the case.
Code 1: Because of their association
Code 2: Because of where they lived
Code 3: Because of the length of the conflict
Code 4: Unknown
Code 5: Refused to answer

234. The research also created a dummy variable called **reason_cgrpatck_Q7** (same as **cgrpatck_Q7**) as our variable here is capturing the first response only. I create a dummy variables:

New dummy variables
235. association_cgrpatck_Q7- Because of their association
236. livingarea_cgrpatck_Q7- Because of where they lived
237. conflictlength_cgrpatck_Q7- Because of the length of the conflict

238. cgrpatck_Q8
Actors and group attacks Question Eight: The respondent is asked to identify how often this occurred.
Code 1: 0-5 times
Code 2: 5-10 times
Code 3: 10-15 times
Code 4: 15-20 times
Code 5: 20-30 times
Code 6: 30-40 times
Code 7: 40-50 times

239. cgrpatck_Q9
Actors and group attacks Question Nine: The respondent is asked to identify how long the violence they witnessed by the actor lasted for.
Code 1: 1-2 weeks
Code 2: 2-3 weeks
Code 3: 3-4 weeks
Code 4: Over a month
Code 5: 1-3 months
Code 6: 3-6 months
Code 7: 6-9 months
Code 8: 9-12 months
Code 9: 1 year and over

240. cgrpatck_Q10
Actors and group attacks Question Ten: The respondent is asked to differentiate between the different types of violence that civilians experienced.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

241. cgrpatck_Q11
Actors and group attacks Question Eleven: The respondent was asked to identify why they thought the group experienced violence.
Code 1: Some were harmed more than others
Code 2: Violence was the same
Code 3: Violence depended on your gender
Code 4: Violence depended on your income
Code 5: Violence depended on how long combatants were in the community

cgrpatck_Q11 and cgrpatck_Q11A
Owing to the low second response rate, we will include only first response in our variable for this question.

242. New variable **difinviol_cgrpatck_Q11** created that includes only first response, as second response is quite low.

243. cmbtntbhvr_Q1
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question One: The respondent is asked whether they would assist an enemy.
Code 1: Would assist
Code 2: Would not assist
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

244. cmbtntbhvr_Q2
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Two: The respondent is asked if they would help a wounded person who killed somebody close to them.

Code 1: Would save
Code 2: Would not save
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

245.cmbtntbhvr_Q3
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Three: The respondent is asked if actors imprisoned them where they are based.

Code 1: Imprisoned
Code 2: Imprisoned but free to move
Code 3: Lived under enemy control but restricted
Code 4: Lived under enemy control but free to move
Code 5: Did not come under enemy control

246.cmbtntbhvr_Q4
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Four: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Wrong
Code 2: Part of war
Code 3: Both [Volunteered response]
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

247.cmbtntbhvr_Q5
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Five: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: You were personally mistreated
Code 2: You were physically injured
Code 3: You had contact with a representative from an independent organization to check on your wellbeing.

248. New variable **treatmentincapture_cmbtntbhvr_Q5** is created.
cmbtntbhvr_Q5 and cmbtntbhvr_Q5A: As observed in the previous question only the first responses are used because of low observations in second response.

249. cmbtntbhvr_Q6
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Six: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Unknown
Code 5: Refused to answer
Code 6: Would help a wounded combatant
Code 7: Would save a surrendering combatant

250. cmbtntbhvr_Q7
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Seven: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.

Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Do not know
Code 4: Refused to answer

251. cmbtntbhvr_Q7A
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Seven A: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Country's laws
Code 2: International law
Code 3: Religious principles
Code 4: The values people hold
Code 5: Other
Code 6: Don't know

252. cmbtntbhvr_Q8
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Eight: The respondent is asked what should be done to people who break the rules during the conflict?
Code 1: Be put on trial
Code 2: Be exposed to the public but not put on trial
Code 3: Be victimised themselves
Code 4: Granted amnesty
Code 5: Be forgiven after the war
Code 6: Be forgotten when the war is over
Code 7: Don't know

253. cmbtntbhvr_Q9
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Nine: The respondent is asked who should punish wrongdoers?
Code 1: International criminal court
Code 2: Own government
Code 3: Own courts
Code 4: Victims of violence
Code 5: The military itself
Code 6: Own political leaders
Code 7: The civilian population
Code 8: Other
Code 9: Don't know

254. cmbtntbhvr_Q10
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Ten: The respondent is asked whom they feel should be responsible for the punishment given to actors.

Code 1: International criminal court
Code 2: Own government
Code 3: Own courts
Code 4: The military itself
Code 5: Own political leaders
Code 6: The civilian population

Code 7: Other
Code 8: Don't know

255. cmbtntbhvr_Q11
The behaviour of actors during battles and conflicts Question Eleven: The respondent is asked to describe the nature of international works.
Code 1: Better
Code 2: Worse
Code 3: No difference
Code 4: Don't know

256. cmbtntbhvr_Q12
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Twelve: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Want more intervention
Code 2: Want less intervention
Code 3: Unknown

257. cmbtntbhvr_Q13
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Thirteen: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Government
Code 2: UN organizations (e.g. UNHCR)
Code 3: Humanitarian organizations
Code 4: No one
Code 5: Religious leaders
Code 6: International organizations
Code 7: Local government leaders
Code 8: Other
Code 9: God / church
Code 10: Army / military
Code 11: The people
Code 12: Do not know / refused to answer

258. cmbtntbhvr_Q14
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Fourteen: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.

Code 1: Be put on trial
Code 2: Be forgiven / forgotten after the war
Code 3: Be exposed to the public but not put on trial
Code 4: Be granted amnesty
Code 5: Do not know

259. cmbtntbhvr_Q15
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Fifteen: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: What each side is fighting for
Code 2: How each side acts during war
Code 3: Both

Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

260. cmbtntbhvr_Q16
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Sixteen: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

261. cmbtntbhvr_Q17
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Seventeen: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

262. cmbtntbhvr_Q18
Combatant's behaviour during the conflict Question Eighteen: The respondent is asked to respond to a scenario question.
Code 1: Yes
Code 2: No
Code 3: Maybe
Code 4: Do not know
Code 5: Refused to answer

APPENDIX D

Translated Survey from English to Nepalese

द्वन्दको विन्यासिकरण : पीडक, पीडित र मानव अधिकार हनन् सर्वेक्षण

शोध प्रश्न

पत्र दुई : द्वन्दको क्रममा कुन नागरीकहरुले सामुहिक लक्षित हिंसाको अनुभव गरे ? र, के उनीहरु समानरुपमा द्वन्दबाट पीडित थिए ?

पत्र तीन : द्वन्दको/हिंसाको अनुभव गरेपछिको अबस्थामा के निशाना बनाइएका नागरीकहरुले फरक फरक समुहलाई निशाना बनाउने सम्भाबना रहला ?

सामान्य सूचना

१. प्र: तपाइको उमेर कति हो ? _____ वर्ष
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२. प्र: शिक्षामा कति वर्ष बिताउनु भयो ? _____ वर्ष
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार
- कत्ति पनि नाई
- निश्चित छैन

३. प्र: तपाईको वर्तमान पारिवारीक अवस्था ?
- विवाहित (पति वा पत्नी भएको)
- एकल
- स्थायी सम्बन्धमा (सँगै बस्ने गरेको)
- सम्बन्ध-विच्छेद भएको
- वेपत्ता व्यक्तिको पति/पत्नी
- विधुवा/विदुर
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

४. प्र: तपाईको छोराछोरी छन् ? भए कति ?
- छैन
- छ, _____ जना छोरा-छोरी
- निश्चित छैन

५. तपाईको वर्तमान काम (जागिर) के हो ? के तपाई काम/जागिर गर्नुहुन्छ ?
- किसान
- ज्यालादारी काम गर्ने अथवा मजदुर
- सीपयुक्त कामदार
- स्वरोजगार भएको

- गृहिणी अथवा घरायसी काम गर्ने
- सैनिक (लडाकु)
- सरकारी जागिरे
- नीजी क्षेत्रको जागिरे
- शिक्षक / प्राध्यापक / वुद्धिजीवी
- पेन्सन भएको / अवकाश प्राप्त
- बेरोजगार (कामको खोजीमा)
- बेरोजगार (काम नखोजेको)
- विद्यार्थी
- अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस)
- थाहा छैन (उत्तर दिन अस्विकार)

द्वन्दको व्यक्तिगत वर्णन

१. प्र: द्वन्दको बेला तपाइँ कुन काम गर्नुहुन्थ्यो ?
- किसान
- ज्यालादारी काम गर्ने अथवा मजदुर
- सीपयुक्त कामदार
- स्वरोजगार भएको
- गृहिणी अथवा घरायसी काम गर्ने
- सैनिक (लडाकु)
- सरकारी जागिरे
- निजि क्षेत्रको जागिरे
- शिक्षक / प्राध्यापक / वुद्धिजीवी
- पेन्सन भएको / अवकास प्राप्त
- वेरोजगार (कामको खोजीमा)
- बेरोजगार (काम नखोजेको)
- विद्यार्थी
- अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस)
- थाहा छैन (उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार)

२. प्र: तपाइको द्वन्दको अनुभब के हो ?
- आफू बसोबास गरेको क्षेत्रमा युद्ध भयो / भिडन्त भएको
- नजिकको आफन्तसँग सम्पर्क-विच्छेद भएको
- घर छोडेर बस्न बाध्य भएको
- नीजि सम्पत्तिको अन्यत्र गम्भीर क्षति भयो
- घर लुटियो
- लडाकु थिए
- लडाकुहरुले खानेकुरा लगेको
- यातना पाएको

- लडाकुले राम्ररी चिनेको मान्छेलाई बलात्कार गरेको
- लडाइको क्रममा घाइते भएको
- चिनेको मान्छे घाइते भएको
- यौन हिंसाको सिकार भएको
- अपहरणमा परेको / बन्धक बनाएको
- परिवारको सदस्यको मृत्यु भएको
- विद्रोही समुहको सदस्य भएको
- सैनिक भएको

३. प्र: तलका मध्य कुन दुई शब्दहरुले तपाइको व्यक्तिगत द्वन्दको भोगाईलाई उचित वर्णन गर्छन?

- घिन लाग्दो/ डर लाग्दो
- घृणाजनक
- विचल्लित
- अपमानजनक
- अष्पस्ट
- अनिश्चितता
- निरीह
- चुनौतीपूर्ण
- उत्साहजनक
- दुर्गम
- आशावादी
- थाहा छैन

४. प्र: जब लडाकुले दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउन आक्रमण गर्छन, के तिनीहरुले .....

- दुस्मन लडाकु र नागरीक दुबैलाई आक्रमण गर्नुपर्छ्।
- दुस्मन लडाकुलाई आक्रमण गर्ने र नागरीकलाइ जोगाउन भरपुर कोसिस गर्नुपर्छ |
- नागरीकलाई छोडेर दुस्मन लडाकुलाईमात्र आक्रमण गर्नुपर्छ।
- थाहा छैन / उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

५. प्र: तलका मध्ये कुन समूहलाई तपाई व्यक्तिगत रुपमा सबैभन्दा कम रुचाउनुहुन्छ ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिक
- विद्रोही समुह
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसिया
- लुटेरा/ अपराधी
- छिमेकी (हरु)
- घरका सदस्यहरु
- थाहा छैन/ अपरिचित व्यक्ति
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएको मध्य कोही पनि नाई
- कोही पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

समय/ द्वन्दको अवधि

१. तलका मध्य द्वन्दको समयबाट कसलाई सबभदा बढी सम्झनु हुन्छ ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिक
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसिया
- लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु
- छिमेकी (हरु)
- घरका सदस्यहरु
- थाहा छैन/ अपरिचित
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएका मध्ये कोहि होइन
- कोही पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२. प्र: तल दिइएका व्यक्ति मध्ये द्वन्दको समयबाट कसलाइ कति पटक देखेको सम्झनुहुन्छ ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसिया
- लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु
- छिमेकी (हरु)
- घरका सदस्यहरु
- थाहा छैन/ अपरिचित
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएका मध्य कोहि होइन
- कोहि पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्विकार

सम्मिलित लडाकुहरु

१. प्र: लडाकुहरु सर्वप्रथम कहिले आए ? आएपछि तिनीहरुले के के गरे ?

२. प्र: तपाइको समुदायमा लडाकुहरु कति समय बसे ?

- एक महिना भन्दा कम
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी
- २-३ महिना

- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १-२ वर्ष
- २-३ वर्ष
- ३-४ वर्ष
- ४-५ वर्ष
- ५-६ वर्ष
- ६-७ वर्ष
- ७-८ वर्ष
- ८-९ वर्ष
- ९-१० वर्ष
- १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी

३. के कुनै लडाकुहरु मूख्य समूह गइसकेपछि पनि यथावत बसे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा छैन

४. यदि हो भने कति समय बसे त ?

- एक महिना भन्दा कम
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी
- २-३ महिना
- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १-२ वर्ष
- २-३ वर्ष
- ३-४ वर्ष
- ४-५ वर्ष
- ५-६ वर्ष
- ६-७ वर्ष
- ७-८ वर्ष
- ८-९ वर्ष
- ९-१० वर्ष
- १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी

५. प्र: के लडाकुहरुले तपाइँ वा तपाईको परिवारको कुनै सदस्य माथि बल प्रयोग गरे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन

६. प्र: के लडाकुहरुले तपाइको समुदायमा कसैमाथि हिंसाको प्रयोग गरे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन

७. प्र: के पहिलो हिंसाको घटनापछि पनि लडाकुले तपाई, परिवार वा समुदायका सदस्यहरु उपर हिंसा जारी राखे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन

८. प्र: के तपाईसामु भएका लडाकाहरू द्वन्दबाट थकित देखिन्थे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन
- प्र: यदि हो भने कहिले पत्ता लगाउनु भयो ?

९. प्र: लडाकुहरू को सँग दिक्क भएका देखिन्थे , जनता वा द्वन्द ?

- नागरीक/ जनता सँग
- द्वन्दसँग
- एक-अर्का सँग
- सरकारसँग
- विद्रोहीसँग मात्र
- आइमाईसँग/ महिलासँग मात्र
- पुरुषसँग मात्र

१०. प्र: के लडाकाहरू कहिलै तपाइको समुदायमा समुदायका उही व्यक्ति उपर हिंसा गर्न फर्किए त ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- निश्चित छैन

११. प्र: तलका मध्ये को तपाइको समुदायमा सबैभन्दा लामो समयसम्म रहे ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिकहरु
- विद्रोही समुह
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसिया
- छिमेकी(हरु)
- लुटेरा/अपराधीहरु
- घरका सदस्यहरु
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएका मध्ये कोहि होइनन्
- कोहि पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन

- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१२. प्र: के तपाइले लडाकाहरुको अवस्थिति बताउन सक्नुहुन्छ ?

- सक्छु/ हो
- सक्दैन/ होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- अनिश्चित

यदि सक्नुहुन्छ भने, तपाईले नक्सामा तिनीहरु रहेको स्थान बताउन सक्नुहुन्छ ?

- सक्छु/ हो
- सक्दैन/ होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- अनिश्चित

१३. प्र: कृपया नक्सामा जिल्ला अथवा नम्बर किटान गर्नुहोस् |

<u>लडाकाहरुको निराशा</u>

१. प्र: लडाकाहरूको व्यवहार कस्तो किसिमको थियो ?

- सर्वोत्कृष्ट
- धेरै राम्रो
- राम्रो
- खराब
- धेरै खराब
- चरम/ अती खराब

२. प्र: के लडाकाहरू समुदायमा आउदा निराशापूर्ण/ दिक्क लाग्दा तथा रिसाएका जस्ता देखिन्थे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- अनिश्चित

३. प्र: के लडाकाहरू थकित जस्ता देखिन्थे ? यदि हो भने के तिनीहरुले नागरीक विरुद्ध हिंसा प्रयोग गरे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- अनिश्चित

४. प्र: यदि हो भने लड़ाकाले कस्ता प्रकारको हिंसा प्रयोग गरे ?

- बलात्कार
- हत्या
- मौखिक दुर्व्यबहार

- शारीरिक दुर्व्यबहार
- अपहरण
- यातना
- मनोवैज्ञानिक यातना
- यौन दुर्व्यबहार
- अन्य [खुलाउनुहोस]

५. प्र: समुदाय सदस्य विरूद्धको हिंसा कति समय सम्म रह्यो ?

- एक महिना भन्दा कम
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी
- २-३ महिना
- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १-२ वर्ष
- २-३ वर्ष
- ३-४ वर्ष
- ४-५ वर्ष
- ५-६ वर्ष
- ६-७ वर्ष
- ७-८ वर्ष
- ८-९ वर्ष
- ९-१० वर्ष
- १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी

६. प्र: लडाकुहरुको व्यवहारको सम्बन्धमा अन्य के कुराहरु तपाइले भेटाउने भयो ? [खुलाउनुहोस]

७. प्र: द्वन्दको समयमा तलका मध्य कुन दुइ व्याक्तिहरु सबै भन्दा निराश र थकित थिए ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिकहरु
- विद्रोही समुह
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसिया
- छिमेकी(हरु)
- लुटेरा/अपराधीहरु
- घरका सदस्यहरु
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएका मध्य कोहि होइनन
- कोहि पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

८. प्र: यदि लडाकाहरू रिसाएका र उदास भएका भए कुन समुहका व्यक्तिहरु निशाना बनाइएका थिए ? कृपया दुईवटा बताउनुहोस |

- महिला
- पुरुष

- बालबालिका
- वृद्धवृद्धा
- किशोर-किशोरीहरु
- जातिय समुह
- धनी वर्गको व्यक्ति
- मध्यम वर्गीय व्यक्ति

नागरीक विरुद्धको सामुहिक निशाना नबनाइएको हिंसा

१. प्र: के तपाइको समुदायका सदस्यहरु निशाना बनाइएका थिए ?
- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२. प्र: यदि हो भने यसो किन भयो होला ?

३. प्र: यदि तपाईको समुदायका सदस्य आक्रमण गरिएका थिए भने के यो द्वन्दको शुरुवाती क्षणमा भएको थियो ?
- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

४. प्र: कुन समुदाय अथवा जनजातीय समुह निशाना बनाइएका थिए ?

५. प्र: कति समयसम्म निशाना बनाउने र जथाभाबी आक्रमणको क्रम चलिरह्यो ?
- एक महिना भन्दा कम
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी
- २-३ महिना
- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १-२ वर्ष
- २-३ वर्ष
- ३-४ वर्ष
- ४-५ वर्ष
- ५-६ वर्ष
- ६-७ वर्ष
- ७-८ वर्ष
- ८-९ वर्ष
- ९-१० वर्ष
- १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी

६. प्र: के यी आक्रमण व्यक्तिगत सदस्यले गरेका थिए अथवा समुहगत रुपमा ?

- व्यक्तिगत
- समुहहरुले
- सम्पूर्ण समूहले
- थाहा भएन
- सामुहिक रुपमा व्यक्तिले

७. प्र: के लडाकुहरुले आक्रमणको पहिलो घटना-पश्चात पनि बासिन्दाको विरुद्धमा हिंसा जारी राखे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

यदि हो भने कति समय सम्म जारे रह्यो ?

- एक महिना भन्दा कम
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी
- २-३ महिना
- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १-२ वर्ष
- २-३ वर्ष
- ३-४ वर्ष
- ४-५ वर्ष
- ५-६ वर्ष
- ६-७ वर्ष
- ७-८ वर्ष
- ८-९ वर्ष
- ९-१० वर्ष
- १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी

८. प्र: के लडाकुहरुले तपाईको क्षेत्रको सदस्यहरुलाई सशस्त्र भिडन्त अघि अथवा पछि पनि आक्रमण गर्न शुरु गरे ?

- हो
- होइन हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

९. प्र: यदि हो भने यो कति लामो अवधिसम्म रह्यो ?

- एक महिना भन्दा कम
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी

- २-३ महिना
- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १-२ वर्ष
- २-३ वर्ष
- ३-४ वर्ष
- ४-५ वर्ष
- ५-६ वर्ष
- ६-७ वर्ष
- ७-८ वर्ष
- ८-९ वर्ष
- ९-१० वर्ष
- १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी

१०. प्र: कति पल्ट यी आक्रमण भए ?

११. प्र: कति समय सम्म यो चलिरह्यो ?

- एक महिना भन्दा कम
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी
- २-३ महिना
- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १-२ वर्ष
- २-३ वर्ष
- ३-४ वर्ष
- ४-५ वर्ष
- ५-६ वर्ष
- ६-७ वर्ष
- ७-८ वर्ष
- ८-९ वर्ष
- ९-१० वर्ष
- १० वर्ष र त्यो भन्दा बढी

१२. प्र: गाउँ तथा नगरमा दुश्मनलाई आक्रमण गर्नु धेरै नागरीक/ महिला र बालबालिका मर्नेछन् भन्ने जानीकन गाउँ तथा नगरमा दुश्मनलाई आक्रमण गर्नु .....

- ठीक हो
- ठीक होइन
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१३. प्र: तलका मध्य कसले द्वन्दको परिणामलाइ सबै भन्दा बढी वर्णन गर्छ ?

- घृणा र विभाजन पैदा गर्छ
- धेरै मनोवैज्ञानिक हानि गर्छ

- धेरै विध्वंश गर्छ
- धेरै शारीरिक पीडा सिर्जना गर्छ
- जनमानसमा धेरै घृणा सिर्जना हुन्छ
- अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस)
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

कृपया तल दिइएको परिस्थितिको जवाफ दिनुहोस् |

१४. प्र: संस्करण १: स्वेच्छिक रुपमा दुश्मनलाई खानेकुरा र शरण दिने नागरीक माथिको आक्रमण: के उनीहरु माथि दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउन गरिने आक्रमण ठीक वा बेठिक होला ?

- ठीक हो
- ठीक होईन
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१५. प्र: संस्करण २: जवर्जस्ती बाध्य भएर दुश्मन लडाकुलाई खानेकुरा र शरण दिने नागरीक माथिको आक्रमण: के उनीहरु माथिको आक्रमण शत्रुलाई कमजोर बनाउनको लागि गर्नु ठिक वा बेठिक हो?

- ठीक हो
- ठीक होईन
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१६. प्र: के तपाई बलात्कारलाई हिंसात्मक दुर्व्यवहार ठान्नुहुन्छ ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहाछैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१७. प्र: तलका मध्ये कुनले बलात्कारलाई सबभन्दा राम्ररी वर्णन गर्छ ?

- शारीरिक दुर्व्यवहार
- मौखिक दुर्व्यवहार
- मनोवैज्ञानिक दुर्व्यवहार
- यौनजन्य दुर्व्यवहार
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१८. प्र: तपाइले बलात्कारलाई के ठान्नुहुन्छ ?

- शारीरिक दुर्व्यवहार
- मौखिक दुर्व्यवहार
- मनोवैज्ञानिक दुर्व्यवहार
- यौनजन्य दुर्व्यवहार

- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१९. प्र: तपाइले बलात्कारलाई के भन्नुहुन्छ ?

- सही
- गलत
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२०. प्र: जब तपाइले यसलाई 'गलत' भन्नुहुन्छ, यो गलत हो किनकी यो .....

- मानव अधिकारको विरुद्धमा छ
- तपाइको धर्म विपरीत छ
- कानुन विपरीत छ
- व्यक्तिगत मर्यादा/ आचारसंहिता विपरीत छ
- तपाइको संस्कृति विपरीत छ
- जनविश्वास/ भावना विपरीत छ
- थाहा छैन
- अन्य

कृपया दिइएको स्थितिहरुको उत्तर दिनुहोस् ....

२१. प्र: सस्करण १: नागरीकहरु माथिको आक्रमण जसले स्वेच्छिक रुपमा आफ्नो नगरको रक्षाको लागि दुश्मन लडाकुको गोला बारुद र सैन्य सामग्री ओसारपसार गरे: दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउनको लागि उनीहरु माथि (नागरीक) को आक्रमण ठीक वा बेठिक हो ?

- ठीक हो
- ठीक होइन
- गलत
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२२. प्र: संस्करण २: नागरीकहरु माथिको आक्रमण जसले बलपूर्बक वा दबाबमा परेर आफ्नो नगरको रक्षाको लागि दुश्मन लडाकुको गोला बारुद र सैन्य सामाग्री ओसार-पसार गरे: दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउनको लागि उनीहरु माथि (नागरीक माथि) को आक्रमण ठीक वा बेठिक के हो ?

- ठीक हो
- ठीक होइन
- गलत
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२३. प्र: यदी एउटा पुरुषले एउटा महिला माथि जबर्जस्ति गर्छ भने के त्यो गलत हो ?

- ठीक हो
- ठीक होइन
- गलत
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२४. प्र: यदी तपाइले 'गलत' भन्नु भयो भने, यो प्रथमत: गलत हो किनभने .....

- मानव अधिकारको विरुद्धमा छ
- तपाइको धर्म विपरीत छ
- कानुन विपरीत छ
- व्यक्तिगत मर्यादा/ आचार संहिता विरुद्ध छ
- तपाइको संस्कृति विपरीत छ
- जनविश्वास/ भावना विपरीत छ
- अन्य (खुलाउनुहोस)
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

कृपया तलका परिस्थितिहरुको उत्तर दिनुहोस |

२५. प्र: नागरीक माथिको आक्रमण जसले दुश्मन लडाकुलाई खाने कुरा र शरण दिए/ उनीहरू माथिको आक्रमण दुश्मनलाई कमजोर बनाउनको लाही ठीक वा बेठिक के हो ?

- ठीक
- बेठीक
- हुन सक्छ तर अन्य कुरामा भर पर्छ
- उत्तर दिन अस्विकार

२६. प्र: दुश्मनलाई कमजोर पार्न आम जनतालाई खाद्यान्न, औषधी, अथवा खानेपानी बाट बन्चित गर्नु/ के त्यो गलत हो ?

- ठिक
- ठीक होईन
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

अथवा त्यसो गर्नु युद्धको एउटा अंश हो ?

- गलत
- सही
- युद्धको अंश हो
- आशा गरे अनुसार

कृपया तलका परिस्थितिको जवाफ दिनुहोस् |

२७. प्र: दुश्मन लड़कुहरुमथी आक्रमण गर्दा र नागरीकहरुलाई जति सक्दो जोगाउने कोशिस गर्दा के यो.....

- स्वेच्छिकरुपमा खानेकुरा र शरण दुश्मनलाई दिने नागरीक माथि आक्रमण गर्नु ठीक हो ?
- आमजनतालाई खाद्यान्न, औषधि अथवा खानेपानीबाट बन्चित गर्नु युद्धको अंश हो |
- महिला र बालबालिका मारिन्छन भन्ने थाहा भईकन गाउँ सहरको बस्तीउपर आक्रमण गर्नु युद्धको अंश हो |

- नागरीकहरु दुर्घटनावश पर्नसक्छन भन्ने थाहा भईकन पनि ल्याण्डमाइन (बम) बिच्छाउनु ठीक हो |

२८. प्र: जनतालाई छाडेर दुश्मन लडाकुलाई मात्र आक्रमण गर्दा...

- दुश्मनलाई स्वेछिकरूपमा रुपमा खानेकुरा र शरण दिने नागरीक माथि आक्रमण गर्नु ठीक हो |
- आमजनतालाई खाद्यान्न, औषधि तथा खानेपानीबाट बन्चित गर्नु युद्धको अंश हो |
- महिला र बालबालिका मारिन्छन भन्ने थाहा भईकन पनि गाउँ-सहरको बस्तीउपर आक्रमण गर्नु युद्धको अंश हो |
- नागरीकहरु दुर्घटनाबश ल्याण्डमाइन (बम) कुल्चन सक्छन भन्ने थाहा भईकन पनि ल्याण्डमाइन बिच्छाउनु ठीक हो |

२९. प्र: धेरै नागरीकले कानुनको विरुद्ध हो र ठीक होइन भन्दाभन्दै पनि लडाकुहरुले नागरिकलाई आक्रमण गर्नु र घाइते बनाउनुमा तलका मध्ये कुन तीन कारणले उचित रुपमा प्रष्ट्याउछन् ?

- कुनैपनि मूल्यमा विजय प्राप्त गर्नु
- कानुनको बेवास्ता गर्नु
- युद्धबाट थकित हुनु
- युद्धबाट दिक्क मानु
- अर्को पक्षलाई घृणा गर्नु
- युद्धबाट आजित हुनु
- आदेश प्राप्त भएर
- नागरीकसामु लामो समय सम्म भएकाले
- सम्पूर्ण संवेदना गुमाएर
- मादक/ लागुपदार्थ
- कानुन थाहा नभएर
- युद्धको क्रममा अनुशासन नहुनु
- लडाकुहरु नगरीक बीच लामो समयसम्म रहनु
- अर्को पक्षले पनि त्यस्तै गरेको हुनाले
- धेरै जवान/ सानो भएकोले
- डराएकोले
- कुनै उद्देश्यउपर प्रतिबद्ध भएकोले
- शक्ति दुरुपयोग

३०. प्र: के कुनै व्यक्तिगत सदस्यले तपाइको समुदायमा नागरीक विरुद्ध हिंसा गरेका थिए ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुन सक्छ
- निश्चित छैन

यदि हो भने कुन लडाकु-पक्षका तिमीहरु सदस्य थिए ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिक
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसिया
- विद्रोही समूह
- लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु

- छिमेकी(हरु)
- घरका सदस्य (हरु)
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएका मध्ये कोहि पनि होइनन्
- कोहि पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

३१. प्र: के तपाई कहिले परिवारका सदस्य वा साथीलाई मार्न बाध्य पारिनुभएको थियो ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- अनिश्चित

३२. प्र: के तपाइँ परिवारको सदस्य वा साथीलाई धोका दिन बाध्य पारिनु भएको थियो ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- अनिश्चित

३३. प्र: के तपाईको घर परिवारले युद्ध शुरु भए देखि आयमा गम्भीर क्षति व्यहोर्नुपर्यो ?

- हो
- होइन
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

३४. प्र: तपाइले निश्चितरुपमा सर्वप्रथम यसको अनुभव कहिले गर्नुभयो ?

३५. प्र: यो निश्चितरुपमा कहिले भयो ?

३६. प्र: यो गुमेको समय यसको कूल मूल्य कति थियो ? [मुद्रा खुलाउनुहोस्]

३७. प्र: यसको चोरी तथा नोक्सानीमा को जिम्मेवार थियो ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिक
- विद्रोही समुह
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसियहरु
- लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु
- छिमेकी (हरु)
- घर परिवारका सदस्यहरु
- थाहा छैन/ अपरिचित
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएका मध्ये कोहि पनि होइनन्
- कोहि पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

३८. प्र: के तपाइँ वा तपाइको परिवारको सदस्यले आफ्नो आर्थिक गतिविधिहरु हिंसाको कारणले परिवर्तन गर्नुभयो ?

- हो
- होइन
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

३९. प्र: के हिंसा तथा विस्थापनको कारणले तल दिइएका मध्ये कुनै सम्पत्ति उल्लेख्यरुपमा गुमे/लुटिए वा नष्ट भए ?

- डसना
- रेडियो/ टिभी
- कपडाहरु
- कागजात प्रमाणपत्रहरु
- गहना
- सेलफोन
- कम्बलहरु
- राइफल/ खाँड
- कृषिजन्य साधन जस्तो हलो, कोदालो, इत्यादी
- ट्र्याक्टर
- टर्चलाइट/ फ्ल्यासलाइट
- शिक्षा सामाग्री
- आश्रयका सामाग्री
- कम्प्युटर
- अन्य

४०. प्र: चोरी र विध्वंशको लागि को जिम्मेवार थियो ?

- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिक
- विद्रोही समुह
- सैन्य तालिम प्राप्त सदस्यहरु/ मिलिसियहरु
- लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु
- छिमेकी (हरु)
- घर परिवारका सदस्यहरु
- थाहा छैन/ अपरिचित
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएका मध्ये कोहि पनि होइनन्
- कोहि पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

४१. प्र: तपाइँ अथवा तपाइको परिवारको सदस्यले दिइएको मध्ये कुनै अनुभब गर्नु भएको छ ?

- नाई/ छैन
- मौखिक रुपमा धम्की पाएको
- मौखिक रुपमा वेइज्जत गरिएको तर धम्की नपाएको
- चक्कु, बन्दुक अथवा अन्य हतियारले धम्क्याइएको

- पिटिएको/ आक्रमण गरिएको/ लात्तीले हानिएको
- घाटी अठ्याइएको अथवा जलाइएको
- घाइते भएको अथवा गोलि प्रहारको क्रममा मारिएको
- जमिन मुनि बिछाइएको बम (माइनमा) परि घाइते भएको
- व्यक्तिले नचाहदा पनि यौनक्रिया गर्न शारिरीक रुपमा बाध्य पारिएको
- व्यक्तिले नचाहदा पनि अन्य यौनजन्य क्रियाकलाप गर्न बाध्य पारिएको
- अंगभंग भएको
- श्रम गर्न बाध्य पारिएको
- लुटिएको
- पैसा तथा अन्य बस्तु जबर्जस्ती असुल गरिएको
- अपहरणमा परिएको
- थाहा छैन/ अन्य

४२. प्र: यो हानि/ क्षति व्यहोर्ने व्यक्ति को थियो ?

- तपाई
- आमा
- बुबा
- दिदि-बहिनी
- दाजु-भाई
- काका वा मामाका छोराछोरी
- हजुरआमा
- हजुरबुवा
- काकी
- काका
- सौतेलो दाजुभाई
- सौतेलो दिदीबहिनी
- सौतेनी आमा
- सौतेलो बुवा

४३. प्र: घटना कहा घट्यो ?

- युद्ध मैदानमा/ लडाइको क्रममा
- घरमा
- शरणार्थी शिविरमा
- छिमेकमा
- तपाइको समुदायमा
- कार्यस्थलमा (घर र मिलिटरी सेवा बाहेक)
- जब लडाकुहरु समुदाय बीच भएको अवस्थामा
- ओसारपसारको क्रममा (उदाहरणको लागि बसाइसराइ)
- अन्य क्षेत्र
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

४४. प्र: उक्त व्यक्ति सो अनुभवको कारणले कुनै किसिमको दुरगामी र शारिरीक अथवा मनोरोग, मृत्यु वा अन्य कष्ट भोग्नु परेको छ ?

- हो, दीर्घकालिन प्रकृतिको रोग

- हो, घाउ
- हो, अपाङ्गता
- हो, मनोवैज्ञानिक तनाव/ हैरानी
- हो, तत्कालिन मृत्यु
- हो, घटनास्थलमै मृत्यु
- हो, बेपत्ता गरिएको
- हो, यातना दिइएको
- हो, अस्पतालमा मृत्यु
- हो, अस्पतालबाट डिस्चार्ज भए पछि मृत्यु
- हो, अन्य
- होइन, थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

<u>लडाकु दस्ता र आक्रमण</u>

१. प्र: तपाइको विचारमा कुन समुहले समुदायका सदस्यको विरुद्धमा सबभन्दा नराम्रो हिंसा गरेको थियो ?
- सरकारी सेना
- सैनिकहरु
- विद्रोही समूह
- लुटेरा/ अपराधीहरु
- थाहा छैन/ अपरिचित
- विदेशीहरु
- अन्य
- दिइएको मध्ये कोहि पनि होइनन्
- कोहि पनि नाई
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२. प्र: के समुहहरु निशाना बनाइएका थिए र युद्धको हतियारको रुपमा प्रयोग गरिएका थिए ?
- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

३. प्र: यी समुहहरु किन निशाना गरिएका थिए ?
- दिक्क भएर
- स्रोतको लागि
- सबभन्दा गरिब भएर
- लडाकुहरु त्यस क्षेत्रमा पठाईएको हुनाले
- लडाकुहरु निराश भएर

- तिनीहरुले दुश्मनलाई संरक्षण दिएकोले
- तिनीहरुले दुश्मनलाई सहयोग गरेकोले
- दुश्मनसँग सम्बन्धित भएकाले
- तिनीहरुको जातीय मूलको कारणले
- तिनीहरुको सांस्कृतिक पृष्ठभूमीको कारणले
- धार्मिक आस्थाको कारणले

४. प्र: के सुरक्षा फौजले समुहहरुलाई मानव ढालको रुपमा द्वन्दको अवधिमा प्रायोग गरे ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन

यदि हो भने के यो क्षेत्र विपक्षीको बलियो पकड भएको क्षेत्र थियो ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन

५. प्र: तलका मध्य कुन लडाकुहरुले बढी गरे ?

- बलात्कार
- सन्ताप दिनु
- यौन हिंसा
- दुर्व्यवहार
- भेदभाव
- यातना
- हत्या

६. प्र: कुन समुहले हिंसाको सबभन्दा बढी अनुभव गर्यो ? [खुलाउनुहोस]

७. प्र: यसो किन भयो होला ?

- उनीहरुको संगठनको कारणले
- उनीहरुको बसोबास स्थलको कारणले
- युद्धको लम्बाइको कारणले
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

८. प्र: उनीहरुले यो हिंसा कत्तिको अनुभब गरे ?

- ०-५ पटक
- ५-१० पटक
- १०-१५ पटक
- १५-२० पटक
- २०-३० पटक

- ३०-४० पटक
- ४०-५० पटक

९. प्र: यो हिंसा कति समयसम्म चली रह्यो ?

- १-२ हप्ता
- २-३ हप्ता
- ३-४ हप्ता
- एक महिना भन्दा बढी
- १-३ महिना
- ३-६ महिना
- ६-९ महिना
- ९-१२ महिना
- १ वर्ष र बढी

१०. प्र: के भिन्न भिन्नै समूहमाथि भएको हिंसामा भिन्नता थियो ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

११. प्र: भिन्नता के के थिए ?

- कुनैले अरु भन्दा बढी क्षती व्यहोरे
- हिंसा एउटै थियो
- हिंसा लिंगमा आधारित थियो
- हिंसा आयमा आधारित थियो
- हिंसा लडाकुहरु समुदायमा रहेको अबधिमा आधारित थियो

<u>लडाकुहरु र व्यवहार</u>

म अब द्वन्द वा सशस्त्र द्वन्दको क्रममा हुनसक्ने केहि परिस्थितिहरुको वर्णन गर्नेछु | प्रत्येक परिस्थितिको लागि म हजुरलाई त्यस परिस्थितिको भागीदार भएको कल्पना गर्न आग्रह गर्दछु | यदी निर्णयहरु तपाईउपर निर्भर रहेको खण्डमा तपाइले कसरी व्यवहार गर्नुहुन्थ्यो होला | यहा पहिलो काल्पनिक परिस्थिति दिइएको छ :

१. प्रA: के तपाइले आत्मसमर्पण गरेको दुश्मन लडाकु, जसले तपाइको नजिकको व्यक्तिलाई मार्यो, लाइ जोगाउनु हुन्थ्यो ?

- जोगाउथे
- जोगाउने थिएन
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

२. प्रB: के तपाइले घाइते भएको दुश्मन लडाकु, जसले तपाइको नजिकको व्यक्ति मार्यो, लाइ सहायता गर्नुहुन्थ्यो ?

- सहायता गर्थे
- सहायता गर्ने थिएन
- थाहा छैन

- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

३. प्र: के दुश्मन लडाकुले तपाईलाई कैद गरे अथवा तपाइ रहेको क्षेत्र दुश्मनको नियन्त्रणमा आयो ?

- कैद गरिएको थियो
- कैद गरिएको थीयो तर जान स्वतन्त्र थियो
- दुश्मनको नियन्त्रणमा बसियो तर सिमितता थियो
- दुश्मनको नियन्त्रणमा बसियो तर जान स्वतन्त्र थियो
- दुश्मनको नियन्त्रणमा आइएन

४. प्र: नागरिक बन्धकमा राखेर बदलामा केहि लिने विषय नि ? के यो गलत हो या युद्ध को अंश हो ?

- गलत
- युद्धको अंश
- दुवै (स्वेच्छाको प्रतिक्रिया)
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

५. प्र: कृपया तपाइँ दुश्मनको नियन्त्रणमा तलका मध्य केहि कुरा घेको भए बताउनुहोस:

- तपाईलाई व्यक्तिगत रुपमा गलत व्यवहार गरियो
- तपाइ शारिरीक रुपमा घाइते हुनुभयो
- तपाइलाई तपाइको तन्दुरुस्ती/सु-स्वास्थ्यको परीक्षणको लागि तटस्थ संस्थाका प्रतिनिधि सँग सम्पर्क भयो |

६. प्र: के तपाई आत्मसमर्पण गरेको घाइते लडाकुलाई सहायता गर्नुहुन्थ्यो/ जीवन बचाउनुहुन्थ्यो जबकि आत्मसमर्पण गरेको दुश्मन लडाकु जसले तपाइको नजिकको व्यक्तिलाई मार्यो ?

- गर्थे
- गर्ने थिएन
- गर्न सक्थे होला
- थाहा भएन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार
- घाइते भएको लडाकुलाई सहायता गर्थे
- आत्मसमर्पण गरेको लडाकुलाई जोगाउथे

७. प्र: के नियम कानुनहरु त्यति महत्वपूर्ण छन् कि यदी युद्धको क्रममा तोडिएमा, तोड्ने व्यक्तिलाई कारवाही गरियोस् ?

- हो
- होइन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा भएन

यदी हो भने, यी नियमहरु/कानुनहरु के मा आधरित छन् ?

- देशको कानुन
- अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय कानुन
- धार्मिक सिद्धान्तहरु
- जनमूल्य मान्यताहरु
- अन्य

- थाह छैन

८. प्र: युद्ध समाप्ति पश्चात, व्यक्ति जसले यी कानुन तोड्यो .... ?

- मुद्दा चलाउनु पर्छ
- जनसमक्ष सार्वजनिक गर्नु पर्छ, तर मुद्दा चलाउनुहुन्न
- तिनीहरुद्वारा आफै पीडित हुनुपर्छ
- क्षमादान गरिनु पर्छ/ आम माफी दिनुपर्छ
- युद्ध पश्चात माफी दिइनुपर्छ
- युद्ध समाप्ति पश्चात बिर्सिनुपर्छ
- थाहा छैन

९. प्र: गलत काम गर्नेलाइ कसले दण्डित गर्नुपर्छ ?

- अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय न्यायालयले
- आफ्नै सरकारले
- आफ्नै न्यायालयले
- हिंसाको पीडितले
- सैनिक आफैले
- आफ्नै राजनैतिक नेताले
- नागरिक जनसंख्याले
- अन्य
- थाहा छैन

१०. प्र: दण्डको लागि जिम्मेवार को हुनुपर्छ ?

- अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय न्यायालय
- आफ्नै सरकार
- आफ्नै न्यायालय
- सैनिक आफै
- आफ्नै राजनैतिक नेता
- नागरिक जनसंख्या
- अन्य
- थाहा छैन

११. प्र: के अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय संघसंस्थाहरुले यसलाई सजिलो अथवा अफ्ठ्यारो बनाएका छन्, अथवा कुनै भिन्नता आएको छैन ?

- राम्रो भएको छ
- नराम्रो भएको छ
- कुनै अन्तर छैन
- थाहा छैन

१२. प्र: भविष्यमा यस्ता प्रकारका विषयहरु सम्बोधन गर्दा, के तपाइले अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय समुदायबाट कम या बढी हस्तक्षेप चाहनुहुन्छ (नागरिक क्षेत्र आक्रमण गरिएको वा खानेकुरा, खानेपानी, औषधि आपूर्ति र बिजुलीबाट बन्चित गरिएको छ) ?

- अझ बढी हस्तक्षेप चाहन्छु
- कम हस्तक्षेप चाहन्छु
- थाहा भएन

१३. प्र: मलाई प्रश्न गर्न दिनुहोस् कि यदी द्वन्दको बेला नागरीक क्षेत्र आक्रमण गरियो अथवा गाउँ नगर खानेकुरा, खानेपानी, औषधि आपूर्ति र बिजुलीबाट बन्चित परियो भने के गर्न साकिएला ? सहायता र सुरक्षाको लागि को तर्फ जानुहोला ?

- सरकार

- युएन् संस्थाहरु (उदाहरणको लागि UNHCR)
- मानवीय संस्थाहरु
- कुनै पनि नाई
- धार्मिक नेताहरु
- अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय संस्थाहरु
- स्थानीय सरकारी नेताहरु
- अन्य
- भगवान (मन्दिर/चर्च)
- आर्मी/ मिलिटरी
- जनता
- थाहा छैन/ अस्वीकार

१४. प्र: युद्ध समाप्तिपश्चात् नियम तोडेको व्यक्तिलाई ..... ?

- मुद्दा चलाउनुपर्छ
- माफी दिनुपर्छ/ युद्धपश्चात् बिर्सिनुपर्छ
- जनतासामु सार्वजनिक गरिनु पर्छ तर मुद्दा चलाउनु हुन्न
- आममाफी दिइनुपर्छ
- थाहा छैन

१५. प्र: द्वन्दको क्रममा कुनै एक पक्षको साथ दिने सोच्नु पर्दा, कुन कुरा तपाइलाई महत्वपूर्ण लाग्छ, एक-अर्काको युद्ध लड्नुको कारण अथवा युद्धको क्रममा कुनै पक्षले गर्ने व्यवहार ?

- कुन पक्ष केका लागि लडेको छ
- कुन पक्ष युद्धको दौरान कसरी व्यवहार गर्छ
- दुवै
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१६. प्र: के तपाइलाई युद्धका पीडितहरुलाई प्रतिशोध लिने अधिकार छ जस्तो लाग्छ ?

- छ
- छैन
- हुनसक्छ
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१७. प्र: यदी उनीहरु परिवारको सदस्य वा साथीलाई मार्न बाध्य बनाइएको भए ?

- छ
- छैन
- हुन सक्छ
- थाहा छैन
- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

१८. प्र: यदि उनीहरु परिवारका सदस्य वा साथीहरुलाई धोका दिन बाध्य बनाईएको भए ?

- छ
- छैन
- हुन सक्छ
- थाहा छैन

- उत्तर दिन अस्वीकार

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